
Classified by the SEC under retail-computer and computer software stores.
GameStop at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 10 of 29 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against GME's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - earnings multiple above its own long-run norm.
→At 13.8x earnings, the market is paying +636% more than GME's own 3-year median of 1.9x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 13.8x earnings, the market is paying +636% more than GME's own 3-year median of 1.9x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
8.6%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 8.6%, the business is throwing off more cash per dollar of market value than its own 6-year median of 7.6% - the cheaper end of its history.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| ✕ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 13.79 vs 1.87 |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 7.3% vs 4.0% |
| ✓ | Better cash yield than its own history | 8.6% vs 7.6% |
| ✓ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 8.6% vs 3.0% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value | EBITDA at or below zero, or unavailable |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Not enough data to score this fairly - the checks below show exactly what's missing.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $3.6B in 2025, compounding -15% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $3.7B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $418M in 2025, against $-313M the year before. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $763M.
-39%revenue growth, FY 2025
→Revenue grew -39% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| – | Outgrew its sector last year | under 8 quarters of history |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | -15.1% vs 13.0% (market 70th pct) |
| – | Profits grew last year | loss-making in both years |
| – | Profit growth beats its peers | earnings at or below zero at either end |
| – | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | under 3 years of history |
| ✕ | Grew per share, not just in total | -66.1% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
A solidly profitable business, though not exceptional against its sector.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-02), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin widened 12 points to 6% since 2022. After everything, 12 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-02), not a full fiscal year
→Operating cash flow tracks reported profit almost exactly (100%). The earnings are real cash, not accounting.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-02), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 8% but ROCE of only 2% - a chunk of those shareholder returns is manufactured with leverage, not operations.
→Of $3.6B in sales, $1.2B survives production costs, $232M survives running the company, and $418M - 12¢ of every dollar - reaches the bottom line.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→16 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, up 16 points since 2022 - the best conversion in its filed history.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-02), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is stock compensation, at 1% of revenue (capital spending 0%).
→Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 2 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.
→GME earns 2.4% on the capital it employs, below the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Better gross margins than peers | 34.4% vs 52.5% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | 10.3% vs 13.0% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $763M |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 13.1% vs 12.3% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | 3.8% vs 10.0% |
| ✓ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 1.00 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could GME survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-05-02), not a fiscal year-end
→Debt isn't clearly tagged in GME's filings, so treat the balance sheet with extra care rather than assuming zero.
→The company's own capital grew from $1.3B in 2023 to $5.8B (+336%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 12.40 vs 1.50 |
| – | Debt isn't dominating | debt unreported - cannot verify |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 46.8% of assets vs 54.2% five years ago |
| ✓ | Earnings cover the interest | 133.17 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 20.4% vs 20.5% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $741M |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
GME returns nothing to owners yet, and the share count keeps rising - every dollar stays in the business.
→Stock compensation ($27M) flows out with nothing returned - the dilution is winning.
→80.5% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
→Down from $1.31 to $0.00 per share - the cheque has shrunk.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-02), not a full fiscal year
→Comfortable: 44% of profits and 39% of free cash flow go out as dividends - well inside what the business generates.
Both lines start at 100 in 2008, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→GME issued +227% more shares from 2008 to 2025 and revenue per share still fell -87%. On this measure the new shares have not paid for themselves.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 80.5% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $30M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| ✕ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 4/10 years, worst year-on-year change -99.8% |
| ✕ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | -100.0% vs 9.0% |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→GME is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | In an uptrend | 19.16 vs 22.18 |
| ✕ | Trend structure is healthy | 20.27 vs 22.18 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -12.1% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -12.1% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -14.3% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -30.8% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→Insiders bought $33M against $3M of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | Mark Haymond Robinson | General Counsel and Secretary | SELL | 3,957 | $89,511 |
| 2026-07-01 | Daniel William Moore | PFO and PAO | SELL | 7,085 | $158,562 |
| 2026-07-01 | Mark Haymond Robinson | General Counsel and Secretary | SELL | 7,083 | $158,518 |
| 2026-04-13 | Mark Haymond Robinson | General Counsel and Secretary | SELL | 3,912 | $90,715 |
| 2026-04-01 | Daniel William Moore | PFO and PAO | SELL | 7,210 | $165,430 |
| 2026-04-01 | Daniel William Moore | PFO and PAO | award | 21,196 | $500,014 |
| 2026-04-01 | Mark Haymond Robinson | General Counsel and Secretary | SELL | 7,209 | $165,407 |
| 2026-04-01 | Mark Haymond Robinson | General Counsel and Secretary | award | 21,196 | $500,014 |
| 2026-01-23 | Lawrence Cheng | Director | BUY | 5,000 | $114,369 |
| 2026-01-21 | Ryan Cohen | President, CEO and Chairman | BUY | 500,000 | $11M |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.