NikeNKE
$32.8B market capClassified by the SEC under rubber and plastics footwear.
Nike in 31 checks
Nike at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 16 of 31 checks passed.
Value
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against NKE's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - earnings multiple below its own long-run norm.
Is the price high or low right now, compared to what the market usually pays?
→At 18.3x earnings, the market is paying 43% less than NKE's own 11-year median of 31.8x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.
What has the market paid for NKE over the years?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 18.3x earnings, the market is paying 43% less than NKE's own 11-year median of 31.8x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.
What cash return does the business throw off per dollar of market value?
6.6%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 6.6%, the business is throwing off more cash per dollar of market value than its own 11-year median of 3.1% - the cheaper end of its history.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
How we scored it · 4 of 4 checks passed
| ✓ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 18.30 vs 31.85 |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 5.5% vs 4.0% |
| ✓ | Better cash yield than its own history | 6.6% vs 3.1% |
| ✓ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 6.6% vs 3.0% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value | EBITDA at or below zero, or unavailable |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
Growth
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.
Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?
→Revenue reached $46.4B in 2025, compounding -3% a year since 2022 though the path has been bumpy.
Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?
→Net income was $3.1B in 2025, compounding -15% a year over three years.
How fast is it growing, year by year?
+0%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +0% while earnings moved -3% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
How we scored it · 1 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 0.2% vs 11.3% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | -3.2% vs 13.0% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Profits grew last year | -3.4% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | -13.4% vs 13.0% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 0.2% vs 3y -3.2% |
| ✕ | Grew per share, not just in total | -4.0% vs 0.0% |
Quality
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
A solidly profitable business, though not exceptional against its sector.
Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?
→Net margin stands at 7% in 2025. NKE doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?
→92% of reported profit shows up as operating cash - a normal gap, usually working capital absorbing some of the growth.
What does it earn on the money it uses?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-05-31), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 22% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
How much of every sales dollar ends up as free cash?
→5 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, down 5 points since 2022.
What does staying competitive cost, per dollar of sales?
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is stock compensation, at 2% of revenue (capital spending 1%).
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
How we scored it · 3 of 4 checks passed
| ✕ | Better gross margins than peers | 42.9% vs 52.5% (market 70th pct) |
| – | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | operating margin not reported |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $3.1B |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 20.9% vs 12.3% (market 70th pct) |
| – | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | operating income or capital employed unavailable |
| ✓ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 0.92 vs 0.80 |
Health
The balance sheet stress test: could NKE survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?
→The company holds $10.1B in cash against $7.9B of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?
→The company's own capital grew from $14.1B in 2023 to $14.9B (+5%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
How we scored it · 4 of 5 checks passed
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 1.96 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.53 vs 1.00 |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.53 now vs 0.63 five years ago |
| – | Earnings cover the interest | operating income or interest expense unavailable |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 6.2% vs 20.5% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $2.2B |
Shareholder returns
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.
How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?
→$2.6B returned last year against $715M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 3.6-to-1.
How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?
→The count shrank 0.4% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
Is the dividend cheque itself growing?
→Up from $1.02 to $1.63 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
What does the payout earn you at each year's prices?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 7.3%.
Can it actually afford the dividend?
→Stretched: 77% of profits and 110% of free cash flow go out as dividends - most of what the business generates, so a cut gets likelier in a bad year.
NKE has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→NKE has shrunk its share count -21% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +152% over the same years.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 5.7% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $146M bought back vs $715M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | 116.9% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $2.6B returned, 7.8% of market value |
| ✓ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change 4.7% |
| ✓ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 19.6% vs 9.0% |
Trend analysis
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
How is NKE's trend actually behaving right now?
Chart by TradingView
→NKE is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
How we scored it · 0 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | In an uptrend | 38.40 vs 50.40 |
| ✕ | Trend structure is healthy | 41.10 vs 50.40 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -9.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -9.7% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -47.4% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -46.8% from its 52-week high |
Insider activity
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?
→Insiders bought $8M against $2M of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
Who did what, exactly?
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | Johanna Nielsen | VP: CORP CONTROLLER | tax | 263 | $10,273 |
| 2026-09-01 | Elliott Hill | PRESIDENT & CEO | tax | 9,462 | $369,586 |
| 2026-09-01 | Venkatesh Alagirisamy | EVP: CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER | tax | 3,453 | $134,874 |
| 2026-09-01 | Treasure Heinle | EVP: CHIEF PEOPLE OFFICER | tax | 3,430 | $133,976 |
| 2026-09-01 | Amy Montagne | PRESIDENT, NIKE | tax | 2,647 | $103,392 |
| 2026-09-01 | Philip Mccartney | EVP: CHIEF INN,PROD&DSG OFCR | tax | 2,407 | $94,017 |
| 2026-09-01 | Robert Leinwand | EVP: Chief Legal Officer | tax | 3,430 | $133,976 |
| 2026-08-07 | Amy Montagne | PRESIDENT, NIKE | SELL | 4,867 | $204,657 |
| 2026-08-05 | Robert Leinwand | EVP: Chief Legal Officer | SELL | 821 | $34,154 |
| 2026-08-05 | Venkatesh Alagirisamy | EVP: CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER | SELL | 890 | $37,024 |
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.