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PENN Entertainment at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 12 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against PENN's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - sales multiple below its own long-run norm (judged on sales - not yet profitable).
→At 0.3x sales, the market is paying 45% less than PENN's own 11-year median of 0.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.
→At 0.3x sales, the market is paying 45% less than PENN's own 11-year median of 0.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.
4.2%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 4.2%, you get less cash per dollar of market value than the 11-year median of 8.9% - the market is charging more for the same cash.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | under 3 years of history |
| ✓ | Cheaper than its peers (sales) | 0.32 vs 2.50 (peer median) |
| ✓ | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales | 0.58 vs 3.00 (peer median) |
| ✓ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 4.2% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value | no EBITDA to value: $-102M over the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive three-year earnings growth behind the price |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $7.0B in 2025, compounding +3% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $7.2B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→The company lost $843M in 2025, more than the $312M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
+6%revenue growth, FY 2025
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2013 earnings -376% · 2016 earnings +15834% · 2017 earnings +333% · 2020 earnings -1625% · 2023 earnings -321% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
→Revenue grew +6% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 6.1% vs 6.7% (sector 70th pct, n=26) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 2.8% vs 21.9% (sector 70th pct, n=25) |
| ✕ | Profits grew last year | loss-making: TTM net income $-907M |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | loss-making: TTM net income $-907M |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 6.1% vs 3y 2.8% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 32.8% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin compressed 25 points to -10% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left. PENN doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The company generated $508M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -46% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 9% of revenue (stock compensation 1%). That share has risen since 2022, so the cost of competing is climbing.
→Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 0 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.
→PENN's return on capital is negative at -5.3% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Better net margins than peers | -12.7% vs 13.7% (sector 70th pct, n=27) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | -7.9% vs 21.8% (sector 70th pct, n=23) |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $-907M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -48.7% vs 36.5% (sector 70th pct, n=20) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -4.5% vs 10.0% |
| ✓ | Generates cash despite the loss | TTM operating cash flow $651M on a net loss of $907M |
The balance sheet stress test: could PENN survive a bad year?
The balance sheet carries real risk - read the checks before anything else.
→Debt of $2.8B sits against $887M of cash, or 1.5x shareholders' equity. Earnings don't currently cover the interest bill at all.
→The company's own capital shrank from $3.2B in 2023 to $1.9B (-42%). Buybacks or losses are drawing the buffer down - the distinction matters.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✕ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 0.89 vs 1.50 |
| ✕ | Debt isn't dominating | 1.49 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 1.49 now vs 0.67 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -1.30 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 9.1% vs 20.6% (sector 70th pct, n=27) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $96M |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.
→$354M returned last year against $61M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 5.8-to-1.
→The count shrank 4.9% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→PENN issued +35% more shares from 2011 to 2025, but revenue per share still rose +88%. The dilution bought more growth than it cost existing holders.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 18.1% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $239M bought back vs $61M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | 248.8% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $239M returned, 10.4% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | $239M bought back in the last twelve months, 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | $239M vs 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→PENN is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | Trading above its cloud | 0.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✓ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 19.69 vs 16.54 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -11.2% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -11.2% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -13.1% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -22.6% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→Insiders bought $2M against $115,891 of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-08 | Johnny Hartnett | Director | disposition | 14,775 | $298,160 |
| 2026-03-10 | Jay A Snowden | CEO and President | tax | 108,063 | $2M |
| 2026-03-02 | Jane Scaccetti | Director | BUY | 8,000 | $120,720 |
| 2026-02-26 | Felicia Hendrix | EVP and CFO | tax | 17,133 | $214,848 |
| 2026-02-26 | Christopher Byron Rogers | See Remarks | tax | 7,070 | $88,658 |
| 2026-01-03 | Todd George | EVP, Operations | tax | 6,865 | $101,945 |
| 2026-01-03 | Felicia Hendrix | EVP and CFO | tax | 7,010 | $104,099 |
| 2026-01-03 | Christopher Byron Rogers | See Remarks | tax | 4,605 | $68,384 |
| 2026-01-03 | Anuj Dhanda | Director | disposition | 12,994 | $192,961 |
| 2026-01-03 | Gupta Vimla Black | Director | disposition | 12,994 | $192,961 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.