TenQ · Equity ReportCharts view ⇢  Fact sheet  Updated 2026-09-04

PENN EntertainmentPENN

$2.3B market cap

Runs regional casinos and the ESPN Bet sportsbook.

$17.07-22.6% from 52-week high · delayed close as of 2026-09-04 · not investment advice
-16.6% vs S&P 500 (SPY) +20.3% over twelve months
$10.71$14.51$18.32$22.12$25.92Sep '25Nov '25Jan '26Apr '26Jun '26Sep '26
The verdict

PENN Entertainment in 36 checks

PENN Entertainment at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.

VALUEGROWTHQUALITYHEALTHRETURNSTREND

The business itself is the question here - 12 of 36 checks passed.

Advertisement
I

Value

●●●●●●3/6

What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against PENN's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.

Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - sales multiple below its own long-run norm (judged on sales - not yet profitable).

-own 7-year median 31x
0.3xown 11-year median 1x
4.2%cash earned per $ of price
-whole-business multiple
Today's multiple

PENN Entertainment isn't profitable yet - so is the price high compared to its sales?

11-year median 1xP/S today 0.3x

At 0.3x sales, the market is paying 45% less than PENN's own 11-year median of 0.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.

Valuation history

What has the market paid for PENN over the years?

0.001000200020152016201720182019202120227-year median 31.4xP/E 28.63

At 0.3x sales, the market is paying 45% less than PENN's own 11-year median of 0.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.

Free cash flow yield

What cash return does the business throw off per dollar of market value?

4.2%FCF yield today

0.0%20%20152016201720182019202020212022202320242025202611-year median 8.9%FCF yield 4.2%

2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages

At 4.2%, you get less cash per dollar of market value than the 11-year median of 8.9% - the market is charging more for the same cash.

What does “Value” actually mean?

Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.

How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable)under 3 years of history
Cheaper than its peers (sales)0.32 vs 2.50 (peer median)
Cheap on enterprise value vs sales0.58 vs 3.00 (peer median)
Free cash flow yield above 3%4.2% vs 3.0%
Cheap on enterprise valueno EBITDA to value: $-102M over the last twelve months
Price isn't outrunning growthno positive three-year earnings growth behind the price
II

Growth

●●●●●●2/6

What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?

Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.

+6.1%vs the year before
+2.8%compound annual
-net income growth
-compound annual
Revenue history

Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?

0.00$5.0B2011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026$7.2B

◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year

Revenue reached $7.0B in 2025, compounding +3% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $7.2B, ahead of the last full year.

Profit history

Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?

0.002011201220132014201520162017$473M201820192020202120222023202420252026$-907M

◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year

The company lost $843M in 2025, more than the $312M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.

Growth rate

How fast is it growing, year by year?

+6%revenue growth, FY 2025

0.0%201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420255.8%-47%

Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2013 earnings -376% · 2016 earnings +15834% · 2017 earnings +333% · 2020 earnings -1625% · 2023 earnings -321% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.

Revenue grew +6% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.

Per-share growth

Revenue per share: is your slice growing as fast as the company?

$48.14revenue per share, FY 2025

0.0020.0040.00201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025202649.520.66

2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year

Revenue per share reached $48.14 in 2025, compounding +10% a year against +3% for PENN as a whole. Buybacks added roughly 7.1 points to your per-share result. Free cash flow per share stands at $-0.96.

What does “Growth” actually mean?

Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).

How we scored it · 2 of 6 checks passed
Outgrew its sector last year6.1% vs 6.7% (sector 70th pct, n=26)
Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years)2.8% vs 21.9% (sector 70th pct, n=25)
Profits grew last yearloss-making: TTM net income $-907M
Profit growth beats its peersloss-making: TTM net income $-907M
Growth is speeding up, not slowing1y 6.1% vs 3y 2.8%
Grew per share, not just in total32.8% vs 0.0%
III

Quality

●●●●●1/6

Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.

Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.

-kept after direct costs
-7.9%kept after running costs
-48.7%profit on shareholders' money
-4.5%against a 10% cost of capital
-operating cash ÷ net income
Margins

Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?

-20%0.0%20%2011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026-7.9%-13%

2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year

Operating margin compressed 25 points to -10% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left. PENN doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.

Earnings quality

Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?

$-1.0B0.00$1.0B2011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026$651M$-907M

2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year

The company generated $508M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.

Returns on capital

What does it earn on the money it uses?

-500%0.0%2011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026-49%-6.4%-5.3%

2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year

ROE of -46% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).

Cash conversion

How much of every sales dollar ends up as free cash?

0.0%10%201113%2012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520261.3%

◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year

Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.

Spending intensity

What does staying competitive cost, per dollar of sales?

0.0%10%20112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520267.8%0.8%

2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year

The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 9% of revenue (stock compensation 1%). That share has risen since 2022, so the cost of competing is climbing.

Operating leverage

When sales grow, do profits grow faster?

-1000%-500%0.0%201220132015201620172018201920202022202320255.8%-1029%

Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 0 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.

Return on capital employed

Does PENN earn more on its capital than that capital costs?

-10%0.0%10%20112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202510% cost-of-capital lineReturn on capital -5.3%

PENN's return on capital is negative at -5.3% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.

What does “Quality” actually mean?

Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.

How we scored it · 1 of 6 checks passed
Better net margins than peers-12.7% vs 13.7% (sector 70th pct, n=27)
Runs leaner than peers (operating margin)-7.9% vs 21.8% (sector 70th pct, n=23)
Actually profitableTTM net income $-907M
Earns well on shareholders' money-48.7% vs 36.5% (sector 70th pct, n=20)
Earns a real return on the capital it employs-4.5% vs 10.0%
Generates cash despite the lossTTM operating cash flow $651M on a net loss of $907M
IV

Health

●●●●●1/6

The balance sheet stress test: could PENN survive a bad year?

The balance sheet carries real risk - read the checks before anything else.

1.49xborrowed vs owned
0.9xnear-term bills coverage
-1xearnings ÷ interest bill
$887Mcash plus short-term investments
Debt & cash

Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?

0.00$2.0B201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026$2.8B$887M

Debt of $2.8B sits against $887M of cash, or 1.5x shareholders' equity. Earnings don't currently cover the interest bill at all.

Shareholders' equity

Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?

0.00$2.0B$4.0B2012201320142015201620172018201920202021$4.1B20222023202420252026$1.9B

The company's own capital shrank from $3.2B in 2023 to $1.9B (-42%). Buybacks or losses are drawing the buffer down - the distinction matters.

What does “Health” actually mean?

Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.

How we scored it · 1 of 6 checks passed
Comfortable near-term liquidity0.89 vs 1.50
Debt isn't dominating1.49 vs 1.00
Debt trending the right waydebt/equity 1.49 now vs 0.67 five years ago
Earnings cover the interest-1.30 vs 5.00
Converts sales to cash better than its sector9.1% vs 20.6% (sector 70th pct, n=27)
Self-fundingTTM free cash flow $96M
V

Shareholder returns

●●●●●●3/6

How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.

Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.

$239Mdividends plus buybacks
-last fiscal year
$354Mlast fiscal year
$61Mdilutes the buybacks
+35.1%since 2011 (as reported)
Capital returned vs stock comp

How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?

0.00$250M$500M2008201020112016201720182019202020212022202320242025

$354M returned last year against $61M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 5.8-to-1.

Dilution rate (split-adjusted)

How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?

-25%0.0%25%201220132014201520162017201820192020202131%2022202320242025-4.9%

The count shrank 4.9% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.

Dilution against what it bought

PENN has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?

0100201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025135188

Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.

PENN issued +35% more shares from 2011 to 2025, but revenue per share still rose +88%. The dilution bought more growth than it cost existing holders.

Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?

A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.

How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
Share count isn't climbingshares down 18.1% over 3 years
Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff$239M bought back vs $61M of stock compensation
What it hands back fits inside its cash flow248.8% vs 100.0%
Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks)$239M returned, 10.4% of market value
Buybacks are sustained, not one-off$239M bought back in the last twelve months, 0.00 the year before; no dividend
Buybacks growing$239M vs 0.00 the year before; no dividend
VI

Trend analysis

●●●●●●2/6

What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).

The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.

+3.2%the long-term trend line
-11.2%S&P 500 (SPY): +4.7%
-13.1%S&P 500 (SPY): +20.0%
-22.6%drawdown from peak
Trend

How is PENN's trend actually behaving right now?

Price chart loads as you scroll…

Chart by TradingView

PENN is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.

How the trend above is worked out

The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.

How we scored it · 2 of 6 checks passed
Trading above its cloud0.00 vs 0.50
Long-term trend structure is healthy19.69 vs 16.54
Rising over 3 months-11.2% vs 0.0%
Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months-11.2% vs 4.7%
Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months-13.1% vs 20.0%
Not in a deep hole-22.6% from its 52-week high
VII

Insider activity

informational

What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.

$2Mtheir own money
$115,891often pre-scheduled
9of the last filings
47grants · exercises · tax
Open-market flow

Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?

0.00500000May '25Aug '25Nov '25Mar '26

Insiders bought $2M against $115,891 of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.

The record

Who did what, exactly?

DateInsiderRoleTypeSharesValue
2026-08-08Johnny HartnettDirectordisposition14,775$298,160
2026-03-10Jay A SnowdenCEO and Presidenttax108,063$2M
2026-03-02Jane ScaccettiDirectorBUY8,000$120,720
2026-02-26Felicia HendrixEVP and CFOtax17,133$214,848
2026-02-26Christopher Byron RogersSee Remarkstax7,070$88,658
2026-01-03Todd GeorgeEVP, Operationstax6,865$101,945
2026-01-03Felicia HendrixEVP and CFOtax7,010$104,099
2026-01-03Christopher Byron RogersSee Remarkstax4,605$68,384
2026-01-03Anuj DhandaDirectordisposition12,994$192,961
2026-01-03Gupta Vimla BlackDirectordisposition12,994$192,961
Why do the transaction types matter so much?

Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.

§

Recent filings

  • 10-Q Quarterly report
  • 10-Q Quarterly report
  • DEF 14A Proxy statement
  • 10-K Annual report
  • 10-Q Quarterly report
  • 10-Q Quarterly report
  • 10-Q Quarterly report
  • DEF 14A Proxy statement
A short weekly note on what changed in the numbers, coming soon.One email a week: the charts that mattered, nothing else.