→JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) are close in size, worth $881.4B and $249.1B, and JPMorgan Chase passes more of the TenQ Score checks, 24 of 36 against 17.
Each company is scored on the same checks, computed from its own filings: value, growth, quality, financial health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the more checks it passes.
→No part of the score separates them by more than 2 checks, and the widest gap is on Growth.
→JPMorgan Chase brings in $199.4B of revenue a year to Wells Fargo's $86.8B, 2.3 times as much. JPMorgan Chase keeps 32.6% of revenue as profit against 26.0% at Wells Fargo.
Wells Fargo costs less for each dollar of profit, a P/E of 11.8x against 14.2x. Against its own past, JPMorgan Chase trades above its usual 9.3x and Wells Fargo above its usual 9.7x.
| Year | JPM P/E | WFC P/E | JPM P/S | WFC P/S | JPM P/B | WFC P/B |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 7.4679 | 8.6016 | 1.9127 | - | 0.7266 | 0.9455 |
| 2017 | 10.5265 | 9.6658 | 2.5548 | - | 1.0062 | 1.0361 |
| 2018 | 9.2972 | 9.5387 | 2.7754 | 2.472 | 1.177 | 1.0889 |
| 2019 | 8.3001 | 9.0753 | 2.613 | 2.0605 | 1.1571 | 0.956 |
| 2020 | 9.5857 | 31.672 | 2.328 | 1.4402 | 0.9996 | 0.5791 |
| 2021 | 8.534 | 7.1977 | 3.3907 | 2.0101 | 1.4024 | 0.8482 |
| 2022 | 9.0794 | 11.629 | 2.658 | 2.1387 | 1.1702 | 0.8825 |
| 2023 | 7.9433 | 7.6415 | 2.4895 | 1.7709 | 1.2005 | 0.7875 |
| 2024 | 9.627 | 9.8963 | 3.1703 | 2.3716 | 1.6327 | 1.0896 |
| 2025 | 13.2925 | 11.6765 | 4.1563 | 2.9768 | 2.0923 | 1.3756 |
| 2026 | 14.1745 | 11.8148 | 4.4201 | 2.8705 | 2.3529 | 1.3827 |
◌ The last point is at each company's latest close. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's price to earnings is 14.2x, against 11.8x at WFC.
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash a business produces. A high multiple is not automatically bad, since fast growers can earn theirs, but a price far above a company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. Each company is measured against its own past and its sector.
JPMorgan Chase grew revenue faster over the last twelve months, +13.5% against +6.2% at Wells Fargo, 7 percentage points apart. Over three years the order is the same, JPMorgan Chase at +12.3% a year and Wells Fargo at +4.0%.
| Period | JPM revenue | WFC revenue |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 97.37B | - |
| 2014 | 95.11B | - |
| 2015 | 93.54B | - |
| 2016 | 96.57B | - |
| 2017 | 100.70B | - |
| 2018 | 108.78B | 86.41B |
| 2019 | 115.72B | 86.83B |
| 2020 | 119.95B | 74.26B |
| 2021 | 121.65B | 79.17B |
| 2022 | 128.69B | 74.37B |
| 2023 | 158.10B | 82.60B |
| 2024 | 177.56B | 82.30B |
| 2025 | 182.45B | 83.70B |
| 2026 | 199.41B | 86.80B |
◌ The last yearly bar is the trailing twelve months. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's revenue is $199.4B, against $86.8B at WFC.
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
| Period | JPM net profit | WFC net profit |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 18.98B | 15.87B |
| 2012 | 21.28B | 18.90B |
| 2013 | 17.89B | 21.88B |
| 2014 | 21.75B | 23.06B |
| 2015 | 24.44B | 22.89B |
| 2016 | 24.73B | 21.94B |
| 2017 | 24.44B | 22.18B |
| 2018 | 32.47B | 22.39B |
| 2019 | 36.43B | 19.71B |
| 2020 | 29.13B | 3.38B |
| 2021 | 48.33B | 22.11B |
| 2022 | 37.68B | 13.68B |
| 2023 | 49.55B | 19.14B |
| 2024 | 58.47B | 19.72B |
| 2025 | 57.05B | 21.34B |
| 2026 | 65.07B | 22.61B |
◌ The last yearly bar is the trailing twelve months. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's net profit is $65.1B, against $22.6B at WFC.
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
| Period | JPM revenue growth | WFC revenue growth |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | -0.0232 | - |
| 2015 | -0.0165 | - |
| 2016 | 0.0323 | - |
| 2017 | 0.0428 | - |
| 2018 | 0.0802 | - |
| 2019 | 0.0638 | 0.0049 |
| 2020 | 0.0366 | -0.1447 |
| 2021 | 0.0142 | 0.066 |
| 2022 | 0.0579 | -0.0606 |
| 2023 | 0.2285 | 0.1107 |
| 2024 | 0.123 | -0.0036 |
| 2025 | 0.0275 | 0.017 |
◌ On the quarterly view, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before.
→On the latest figures, JPM's revenue growth is 13.5%, against 6.2% at WFC.
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Growth here is what each company has reported to the SEC, not a forecast: the last year, the three-year pace, and whether growth is speeding up or slowing down. Both companies are measured the same way, so their lines can be read against each other.
| Year | JPM Net | WFC Net |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 | 0.1837 | - |
| 2014 | 0.2286 | - |
| 2015 | 0.2613 | - |
| 2016 | 0.2561 | - |
| 2017 | 0.2427 | - |
| 2018 | 0.2985 | 0.2592 |
| 2019 | 0.3148 | 0.227 |
| 2020 | 0.2429 | 0.0455 |
| 2021 | 0.3973 | 0.2793 |
| 2022 | 0.2928 | 0.1839 |
| 2023 | 0.3134 | 0.2318 |
| 2024 | 0.3293 | 0.2396 |
| 2025 | 0.3127 | 0.2549 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's net margin is 32.6%, against 26.0% at WFC.
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
| Period | JPM operating cash per dollar of profit | WFC operating cash per dollar of profit |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 5.0554 | 0.8611 |
| 2012 | 1.1783 | 3.0978 |
| 2013 | 6.0356 | 2.6347 |
| 2014 | 1.6828 | 0.7602 |
| 2015 | 3.0057 | 0.6947 |
| 2016 | 0.8848 | 0.0459 |
| 2017 | -0.443 | 0.8393 |
| 2018 | 0.4808 | 1.6109 |
| 2019 | 0.1123 | 0.3414 |
| 2020 | -2.7431 | 0.6073 |
| 2021 | 1.6155 | -0.5213 |
| 2022 | 2.8432 | 1.9776 |
| 2023 | 0.2618 | 2.1083 |
| 2024 | -0.7185 | 0.1539 |
| 2025 | -2.5905 | -0.8905 |
◌ Operating cash flow divided by net income, in years with a profit. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's operating cash per dollar of profit is -2.6x, against -0.9x at WFC.
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
| Year | JPM Return on equity | WFC Return on equity |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 0.1055 | 0.119 |
| 2012 | 0.1098 | 0.1269 |
| 2013 | 0.0861 | 0.1335 |
| 2014 | 0.0982 | 0.1301 |
| 2015 | 0.102 | 0.1213 |
| 2016 | 0.0986 | 0.1118 |
| 2017 | 0.0959 | 0.1091 |
| 2018 | 0.1268 | 0.1111 |
| 2019 | 0.1407 | 0.1029 |
| 2020 | 0.1078 | 0.0182 |
| 2021 | 0.1686 | 0.1188 |
| 2022 | 0.1285 | 0.0744 |
| 2023 | 0.1598 | 0.1046 |
| 2024 | 0.1739 | 0.1081 |
| 2025 | 0.1613 | 0.1185 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's return on equity is 17.9%, against 12.5% at WFC.
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
| Period | JPM net interest margin | WFC net interest margin |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 0.021 | 0.0325 |
| 2012 | 0.019 | 0.0304 |
| 2013 | 0.0179 | 0.0281 |
| 2014 | 0.017 | 0.0258 |
| 2015 | 0.0185 | 0.0253 |
| 2016 | 0.0185 | 0.0247 |
| 2017 | 0.0198 | 0.0254 |
| 2018 | 0.021 | 0.0264 |
| 2019 | 0.0213 | 0.0245 |
| 2020 | 0.0161 | 0.0205 |
| 2021 | 0.014 | 0.0184 |
| 2022 | 0.0182 | 0.0239 |
| 2023 | 0.023 | 0.0271 |
| 2024 | 0.0231 | 0.0247 |
| 2025 | 0.0216 | 0.0221 |
→On the latest figures, JPM's net interest margin is 2.16%, against 2.21% at WFC.
What a bank earns on its assets after paying for deposits and other funding: the spread between the two, over total assets.
What good looks like. A stable or widening spread, and one at least in line with comparable banks.
If it rises or falls. This spread is where a bank's profit begins, so everything below it moves with it. It widens when rates rise faster than the bank has to pay depositors, and narrows when depositors demand more or lending gets more competitive.
| Period | JPM efficiency ratio | WFC efficiency ratio |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 0.647 | 0.6102 |
| 2012 | 0.6671 | 0.5854 |
| 2013 | 0.7237 | 0.583 |
| 2014 | 0.6442 | 0.5814 |
| 2015 | 0.6309 | 0.5807 |
| 2016 | 0.5869 | 0.5934 |
| 2017 | 0.591 | 0.6617 |
| 2018 | 0.5805 | 0.6495 |
| 2019 | 0.564 | 0.67 |
| 2020 | 0.5557 | 0.776 |
| 2021 | 0.5865 | 0.6791 |
| 2022 | 0.5916 | 0.7692 |
| 2023 | 0.5514 | 0.6727 |
| 2024 | 0.517 | 0.6634 |
| 2025 | 0.5242 | 0.6552 |
→On the latest figures, JPM's efficiency ratio is 52.4%, against 65.5% at WFC.
Operating costs as a share of revenue. Unusually for a ratio on this site, lower is better.
What good looks like. Below roughly 60%, and falling. The best-run large banks sit in the 50s.
If it rises or falls. Costs are the part of a bank's result management actually controls, so this ratio is the clearest read on how well it is run. A rising ratio during a revenue squeeze is normal; a rising ratio while revenue grows is not.
Quality asks whether growth turns into real money: how much of each sale is kept as profit, whether that profit arrives as cash, and what return the business earns on the money invested in it.
Both carry a similar amount of debt for their size, 1.23x of debt for each dollar of equity at JPMorgan Chase and 1.15x at Wells Fargo.
| Year | JPM Debt | WFC Debt | JPM Cash | WFC Cash |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 275.66B | 184.55B | - | - |
| 2013 | 267.89B | 206.88B | - | - |
| 2014 | 276.38B | 247.46B | - | 238.79B |
| 2015 | 288.65B | 297.06B | 361.68B | 239.52B |
| 2016 | 295.25B | 351.86B | 391.15B | 221.40B |
| 2017 | 284.08B | 328.28B | 431.30B | 215.95B |
| 2018 | 282.03B | 334.83B | 278.79B | 173.29B |
| 2019 | 291.50B | 332.70B | 263.63B | 141.25B |
| 2020 | 281.69B | 271.95B | 527.61B | 264.61B |
| 2021 | 301.00B | 195.10B | 740.83B | 234.23B |
| 2022 | 295.87B | 226.01B | 567.23B | 159.16B |
| 2023 | 391.82B | 297.15B | 624.15B | 236.05B |
| 2024 | 401.42B | 175.78B | 469.32B | 201.90B |
| 2025 | 435.21B | 193.03B | 343.34B | 172.59B |
| 2026 | 460.52B | 207.31B | 309.81B | 201.46B |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's total debt is $460.5B, against $207.3B at WFC.
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
| Period | JPM provision for credit losses | WFC provision for credit losses |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 7.57B | 7.90B |
| 2012 | 3.38B | 7.22B |
| 2013 | 225.0M | 2.31B |
| 2014 | 3.14B | 1.40B |
| 2015 | 3.83B | 2.44B |
| 2016 | 5.36B | 3.77B |
| 2017 | 5.29B | 2.53B |
| 2018 | 4.87B | 1.74B |
| 2019 | 5.58B | 2.69B |
| 2020 | 17.48B | 14.13B |
| 2021 | -9.26B | -4.16B |
| 2022 | 6.39B | 1.53B |
| 2023 | 9.32B | 5.40B |
| 2024 | 10.68B | 4.33B |
| 2025 | 14.21B | 3.66B |
→On the latest figures, JPM's provision for credit losses is $14.2B, against $3.7B at WFC.
The charge a bank takes against loans it expects to go bad, each year. It is a forecast, made by the bank, that runs through profit.
What good looks like. A charge in line with the bank's own history and with the credit cycle, without sudden jumps.
If it rises or falls. Provisions rise before losses do, so this is the bank's own early read on borrower stress. A sharp rise says management sees trouble coming; a sharp fall releases past provisions back into profit and flatters the year.
| Period | JPM loan-loss reserve as a share of loans | WFC loan-loss reserve as a share of loans |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.0256 |
| 2012 | 0.0299 | 0.0219 |
| 2013 | 0.0281 | 0.0182 |
| 2014 | - | 0.0153 |
| 2015 | - | 0.0137 |
| 2016 | - | 0.013 |
| 2017 | 0.0147 | 0.0125 |
| 2018 | 0.0139 | 0.0112 |
| 2019 | 0.0139 | 0.0109 |
| 2020 | 0.0295 | 0.0227 |
| 2021 | 0.0162 | 0.0156 |
| 2022 | 0.0181 | 0.0138 |
| 2023 | 0.0175 | - |
| 2024 | 0.0187 | - |
| 2025 | 0.0183 | - |
→JPM's latest loan-loss reserve as a share of loans is 1.83% (2025), against 1.38% at WFC (2022).
The allowance for credit losses as a share of total loans - the buffer already charged against profit for loans expected to go bad.
What good looks like. A buffer in line with the bank's peers and its own history. Higher is more cautious; much lower invites the question of what the bank is seeing that others are not.
If it rises or falls. It rises when a bank expects more borrowers to fail, so a sharp increase is a forward-looking warning rather than a loss already taken.
| Period | JPM shareholders' equity | WFC shareholders' equity |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 204.07B | 157.55B |
| 2013 | 211.18B | 170.14B |
| 2014 | 231.73B | 184.39B |
| 2015 | 247.57B | 193.00B |
| 2016 | 254.19B | 199.58B |
| 2017 | 255.69B | 206.94B |
| 2018 | 256.51B | 196.17B |
| 2019 | 261.33B | 187.15B |
| 2020 | 279.35B | 184.68B |
| 2021 | 294.13B | 187.61B |
| 2022 | 292.33B | 180.23B |
| 2023 | 327.88B | 185.74B |
| 2024 | 344.76B | 179.12B |
| 2025 | 362.44B | 181.12B |
| 2026 | 374.60B | 180.19B |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's shareholders' equity is $374.6B, against $180.2B at WFC.
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
Financial health asks one question: could the business get through a bad year? It looks at how much each company has borrowed, how easily its profits cover the interest, and how much cash it holds against the bills due soon.
Both pay dividends, and Wells Fargo has the higher yield, 2.2% against 1.8%. A yield also rises when a share price falls, so it reads best beside how much of its profit each pays out.
| Period | JPM cash returned in dividends and buybacks | WFC cash returned in dividends and buybacks |
|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 8.18B | - |
| 2008 | 0 | - |
| 2009 | 0 | - |
| 2010 | 3.00B | - |
| 2011 | - | 4.95B |
| 2012 | - | 8.48B |
| 2013 | - | 11.31B |
| 2014 | - | 16.32B |
| 2015 | 13.49B | 16.10B |
| 2016 | 17.56B | 15.59B |
| 2017 | 24.40B | 17.39B |
| 2018 | 30.09B | 28.32B |
| 2019 | 36.34B | 32.73B |
| 2020 | 19.21B | 8.27B |
| 2021 | 31.27B | 16.89B |
| 2022 | 16.72B | 10.21B |
| 2023 | 23.29B | 16.64B |
| 2024 | 33.61B | 24.58B |
| 2025 | 48.22B | 22.95B |
◌ Dividends plus share buybacks in each fiscal year. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's cash returned in dividends and buybacks is $48.2B, against $22.9B at WFC.
Cash returned through buybacks and dividends, alongside the value of new shares issued to employees as compensation.
What good looks like. Returns comfortably larger than stock compensation, so the share count actually falls.
If it rises or falls. A company can announce billions in buybacks while issuing nearly as much stock to staff, and the two largely cancel. What reaches you is the net effect, which is why both bars are here rather than only the buyback.
| Period | JPM change in share count | WFC change in share count |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | -0.025 | 0.0053 |
| 2013 | -0.0019 | 0.0037 |
| 2014 | -0.0046 | -0.0087 |
| 2015 | -0.0063 | -0.0215 |
| 2016 | -0.0222 | -0.0195 |
| 2017 | -0.0307 | -0.0178 |
| 2018 | -0.0455 | -0.0357 |
| 2019 | -0.0538 | -0.0854 |
| 2020 | -0.0443 | -0.0658 |
| 2021 | -0.0197 | -0.0092 |
| 2022 | -0.0187 | -0.0633 |
| 2023 | -0.0091 | -0.0304 |
| 2024 | -0.0218 | -0.0679 |
| 2025 | -0.0339 | -0.065 |
◌ Split-adjusted. Below zero, the company has fewer shares than a year earlier. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's change in share count is -3.6%, against -5.9% at WFC.
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
| Period | JPM dividend per share | WFC dividend per share |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 0.9935 | 0.4766 |
| 2012 | 1.3589 | 0.853 |
| 2013 | 1.5875 | 1.1083 |
| 2014 | 1.8407 | 1.2974 |
| 2015 | 2.0863 | 1.4204 |
| 2016 | 2.297 | 1.4627 |
| 2017 | 2.5143 | 1.4908 |
| 2018 | 2.961 | 1.5898 |
| 2019 | 3.8209 | 1.8525 |
| 2020 | 4.1103 | 1.1736 |
| 2021 | 4.2483 | 0.5913 |
| 2022 | 4.5663 | 1.0889 |
| 2023 | 4.5744 | 1.2872 |
| 2024 | 5.1348 | 1.4803 |
| 2025 | 5.977 | 1.676 |
◌ Split-adjusted. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's dividend per share is $5.98, against $1.68 at WFC.
The dividend paid on one share each year, adjusted for splits so a share today compares with a share ten years ago.
What good looks like. A payment that rises steadily. A long unbroken run of rises is a management commitment as much as a number.
If it rises or falls. A cut is one of the strongest signals a board can send, because they know how it will be read. Check it against the payout chart: a rising dividend the business cannot cover is a promise borrowed against.
| Period | JPM dividend yield | WFC dividend yield |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 0.0459 | 0.0396 |
| 2017 | 0.035 | 0.0349 |
| 2018 | 0.0335 | 0.036 |
| 2019 | 0.0408 | 0.0458 |
| 2020 | 0.0454 | 0.0454 |
| 2021 | 0.0312 | 0.0152 |
| 2022 | 0.0396 | 0.0263 |
| 2023 | 0.0342 | 0.0327 |
| 2024 | 0.0263 | 0.0263 |
| 2025 | 0.0219 | 0.0218 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's dividend yield is 2.1%, against 2.3% at WFC.
The dividend paid over the trailing twelve months as a percentage of the share price, at each quarter's (or year's) average price and at today's.
What good looks like. A yield in line with the company's own history. A yield far above it is usually the price falling, not the dividend rising.
If it rises or falls. Yield moves for two opposite reasons, and they are easy to confuse: a bigger dividend, or a cheaper share. The dividend-per-share chart above tells you which one happened.
| Period | JPM share of profit paid as dividends | WFC share of profit paid as dividends |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 0.2053 | 0.1599 |
| 2012 | 0.244 | 0.2416 |
| 2013 | 0.3386 | 0.2721 |
| 2014 | 0.3215 | 0.2996 |
| 2015 | 0.3221 | 0.3232 |
| 2016 | 0.3427 | 0.3406 |
| 2017 | 0.3679 | 0.3372 |
| 2018 | 0.3113 | 0.3435 |
| 2019 | 0.3388 | 0.4158 |
| 2020 | 0.4356 | 1.4368 |
| 2021 | 0.266 | 0.1095 |
| 2022 | 0.36 | 0.3055 |
| 2023 | 0.2717 | 0.2502 |
| 2024 | 0.2528 | 0.2603 |
| 2025 | 0.2914 | 0.2547 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, JPM's share of profit paid as dividends is 26.6%, against 24.7% at WFC.
The dividend as a share of profit, and as a share of free cash flow. Two views of the same question, because profit and cash are not the same thing.
What good looks like. Comfortably under 75% of profit and under 90% of free cash flow, which leaves room to keep paying through a weak year.
If it rises or falls. A payout ratio climbing towards 100% means the dividend is consuming everything the business earns, so the next bad year has to be funded by borrowing or by a cut. Above 100% it is already being funded from somewhere else.
Shareholder returns is the cash a company hands back to the people who own its shares, through dividends and by buying its own shares back, and whether the stock it issues to staff quietly undoes those buybacks.
Charts by TradingView
→JPM is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. WFC is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling.
Trend reads the share price only: where it sits against its own long-term averages and how it has moved against the S&P 500. It says nothing about the business, which the other chapters cover.