Wells FargoWFC
$272.1B market capA large US bank centred on consumer and commercial lending.
Wells Fargo in 36 checks
Wells Fargo at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 23 of 36 checks passed.
Value
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against WFC's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - earnings multiple above its own long-run norm.
Is the price high or low right now, compared to what the market usually pays?
→At 12.9x earnings, the market is paying +33% more than WFC's own 10-year median of 9.7x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What has the market paid for WFC over the years?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 12.9x earnings, the market is paying +33% more than WFC's own 10-year median of 9.7x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 7.8% vs 4.0% |
| – | Better cash yield than its own history | under 3 years of cash-flow history |
| ✓ | Hands back over 3% in dividends and buybacks | 8.7% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on book value | 1.51 vs 1.30 (peer median) |
| ✓ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 0.57 |
Growth
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +6.2% over the last year.
Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $83.7B in 2025, compounding +4% a year since 2022 though the path has been bumpy. The trailing twelve months are already running at $86.8B, ahead of the last full year.
Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $21.3B in 2025, compounding +16% a year over three years. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $22.6B.
How fast is it growing, year by year?
+2%revenue growth, FY 2025
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2021 earnings +555% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
→In 2025 revenue grew +2% while earnings moved +8% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 6.2% vs 8.9% (sector 70th pct, n=107) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 4.0% vs 9.7% (sector 70th pct, n=86) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 9.9% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Profit growth beats its peers | 22.7% vs 3.5% (sector 70th pct, n=271) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 6.2% vs 3y 4.0% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 33.2% vs 0.0% |
Quality
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
A solidly profitable business, though not exceptional against its sector.
Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Net margin stands at 25% in 2025. WFC doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→85% of reported profit shows up as operating cash - a normal gap, usually working capital absorbing some of the growth.
What does it earn on the money it uses?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 12% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
What does WFC earn on the money it lends out?
Net interest income over total assets. Interest-earning assets are not tagged separately in XBRL, so this reads a little below the margin WFC reports itself, but it is measured the same way for every bank.
→WFC earns 2.21% on its assets after paying for deposits and other funding. That is below the 2.86% median of the largest US banks. The spread has narrowed from 2.39% in 2022. This spread is where a bank's profit begins, so it drives everything below.
How much does it cost to run the bank?
Costs as a share of revenue, so lower is better.
→It costs WFC 65.5% of every revenue dollar to run the bank, and lower is better here. Peers run at 65.4%, so WFC is carrying more cost per dollar of revenue. It has improved from 76.9% in 2022.
Is it a lender, or a fee business?
→Roughly a third of WFC's revenue (43%) comes from fees rather than interest, on $83.7B of total revenue in 2025. The mix has tilted back towards lending since 2011, and fee income matters because it does not depend on interest rates.
Does WFC earn more on its capital than that capital costs?
→WFC earns 11.8% on the capital it employs, comfortably above the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 7.6% in 2022, so the trend is up, and the pace is picking up.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Wider interest margin than peers | 2.1% vs 3.1% (sector 70th pct, n=310) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (efficiency ratio) | 64.0% vs 60.2% (sector 30th pct, n=301) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $22.6B |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 12.5% vs 10.6% (sector 70th pct, n=309) |
| ✓ | Earns a real return on shareholders' capital | 12.5% vs 10.0% |
| ✕ | Credit costs stay contained | 7.7% vs 1.8% (sector 30th pct, n=186) |
Health
The balance sheet stress test: could WFC survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?
→Debt of $207.3B sits against $201.5B of cash, or 1.2x shareholders' equity.
What is the bank setting aside for loans that go bad?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
Charged against profit before the losses actually arrive, so this is WFC's own forward read on borrower stress.
→WFC set aside $3.7B against expected credit losses in 2025, mid-range in its filed history. The sharpest move was 2020, when the charge went from $2.7B to $14.1B. Provisions rise before losses do, so this is the bank's own early read on borrower stress.
Is the lending funded by its own depositors?
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet, not a fiscal year-end
→WFC holds $1.43T of deposits in 2025, +55% since 2011. Deposits are a bank's cheapest funding, and depositors leaving is the first sign of real trouble.
Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?
→The company's own capital shrank from $185.7B in 2023 to $180.2B (-3%). Buybacks or losses are drawing the buffer down - the distinction matters.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Capitalised well | 7.9% vs 6.0% |
| ✓ | Lends less than it takes in deposits | 0.65 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 1.15 now vs 1.04 five years ago |
| ✓ | The interest spread covers its credit losses | 0.08 vs 0.20 |
| ✓ | Deposits are growing, not fleeing | 5.3% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Reserves cover the loan book | 1.4% vs 1.6% (peer median) |
Shareholder returns
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.
How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?
→$22.9B returned last year against $1.5B of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 15.5-to-1.
How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?
→The count shrank 6.5% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
Is the dividend cheque itself growing?
→Up from $1.17 to $1.68 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
What does the payout earn you at each year's prices?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 2.0%.
Can it actually afford the dividend?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Comfortable: 25% of profits go out as dividends - well inside what the business generates.
WFC has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?
Both lines start at 100 in 2016, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→WFC has shrunk its share count -39% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +49% over the same years.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 15.5% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $18.0B bought back vs $1.5B of stock compensation |
| ✕ | What it hands back fits inside its profits | 104.4% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $23.6B returned, 8.7% of market value |
| ✕ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change -50.1% |
| ✓ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 30.1% vs 9.0% |
Trend analysis
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market agrees: the stock is in a healthy uptrend on every horizon.
How is WFC's trend actually behaving right now?
Chart by TradingView
→WFC is in a clear uptrend. The price is above the band where recent trading settled, and that band is still rising underneath it, so the floor keeps moving up. The last two weeks are running ahead of the last month and the price is above where it stood a month ago, so the shorter-term readings back the trend up.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
How we scored it · 5 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Trading above its cloud | 1.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✓ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 86.36 vs 84.16 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 10.4% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 10.4% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 12.3% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -5.1% from its 52-week high |
Insider activity
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?
→No open-market buys or sells in the recent filings - everything below is compensation plumbing (grants, option exercises, tax withholding).
Who did what, exactly?
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | Jason M. Rosenberg | SEVP & Head of Public Affairs | tax | 8,079 | $676,496 |
| 2026-03-16 | Fernando Rivas | Sr. Executive Vice President | J | 39 | $39,000 |
| 2026-03-05 | Beurden Saul Van | Sr. Executive Vice President | tax | 45,014 | $4M |
| 2026-03-05 | Barry Sommers | Sr. Executive Vice President | tax | 50,699 | $4M |
| 2026-03-05 | Charles W Scharf | Chairman and CEO | tax | 210,011 | $18M |
| 2026-03-05 | Michael P. Santomassimo | Sr. EVP & CFO | tax | 64,036 | $5M |
| 2026-03-05 | Kleber Santos | Sr. Executive Vice President | tax | 29,930 | $3M |
| 2026-03-05 | Scott Powell | SEVP & Chief Operating Officer | tax | 50,375 | $4M |
| 2026-03-05 | Ellen R Patterson | Sr. EVP and General Counsel | tax | 49,639 | $4M |
| 2026-03-05 | Bei Ling | Sr. Executive Vice President | tax | 24,228 | $2M |
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.