
A global bank: cards, corporate banking, markets and treasury services, in the middle of a restructuring.
Citigroup at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 20 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against C's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - earnings multiple above its own long-run norm.
→At 18.0x earnings, the market is paying +147% more than C's own 10-year median of 7.3x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price. Today's multiple is the highest in the charted history.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 18.0x earnings, the market is paying +147% more than C's own 10-year median of 7.3x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price. Today's multiple is the highest in the charted history.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 5.5% vs 4.0% |
| – | Better cash yield than its own history | under 3 years of cash-flow history |
| ✓ | Hands back over 3% in dividends and buybacks | 7.7% vs 3.0% |
| ✓ | Cheap on book value | 1.13 vs 1.30 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 51.15 |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +5.6% over the last year.
→Revenue reached $85.2B in 2025, compounding +4% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up.
→Net income was $14.3B in 2025, compounding -1% a year over three years.
+6%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +6% while earnings moved +13% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 5.6% vs 8.9% (sector 70th pct, n=107) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 4.2% vs 9.7% (sector 70th pct, n=86) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 12.8% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | 0.4% vs 3.5% (sector 70th pct, n=271) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 5.6% vs 3y 4.2% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 18.6% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
→Net margin stands at 17% in 2025. C doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
→Only -473% of reported profit becomes operating cash. Accounting profit is running ahead of cash collection, which is worth watching in the receivables and inventory lines.
→ROE of 7% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
Net interest income over total assets. Interest-earning assets are not tagged separately in XBRL, so this reads a little below the margin C reports itself, but it is measured the same way for every bank.
→C earns 2.25% on its assets after paying for deposits and other funding. That is below the 2.86% median of the largest US banks. The spread has widened from 2.01% in 2022. This spread is where a bank's profit begins, so it drives everything below.
Costs as a share of revenue, so lower is better.
→It costs C 64.7% of every revenue dollar to run the bank, and lower is better here. Peers run at 65.4%, so C is the leaner operator. It has improved from 68.1% in 2022.
→A minority of C's revenue (30%) comes from fees rather than interest, on $85.2B of total revenue in 2025. The mix has tilted back towards lending since 2011, and fee income matters because it does not depend on interest rates.
→C earns 6.7% on the capital it employs, below the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 7.4% in 2022, so the trend is down, and the pace is picking up.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Wider interest margin than peers | 2.3% vs 3.1% (sector 70th pct, n=310) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (efficiency ratio) | 64.7% vs 60.2% (sector 30th pct, n=301) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $14.3B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 6.7% vs 10.6% (sector 70th pct, n=309) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on shareholders' capital | 6.7% vs 10.0% |
| ✕ | Credit costs stay contained | 13.5% vs 1.8% (sector 30th pct, n=186) |
The balance sheet stress test: could C survive a bad year?
A fortress balance sheet - C can survive a very bad year.
→Debt of $367.7B sits against $349.6B of cash, or 1.7x shareholders' equity.
◌ 2025 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
Charged against profit before the losses actually arrive, so this is C's own forward read on borrower stress.
→C set aside $7.6B against expected credit losses in 2018, mid-range in its filed history. The sharpest move was 2008, when the charge went from $17.0B to $33.3B. Provisions rise before losses do, so this is the bank's own early read on borrower stress.
→C holds $1.40T of deposits in 2025, +62% since 2011. Deposits are a bank's cheapest funding, and depositors leaving is the first sign of real trouble. It lends out 54% of that, so the book is funded comfortably from deposits rather than borrowed money.
→The company's own capital grew from $201.2B in 2022 to $212.3B (+6%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Capitalised well | 8.0% vs 6.0% |
| ✓ | Lends less than it takes in deposits | 0.54 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 1.73 now vs 1.51 five years ago |
| ✓ | The interest spread covers its credit losses | 0.14 vs 0.20 |
| ✓ | Deposits are growing, not fleeing | 9.3% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Reserves cover the loan book | 2.6% vs 1.6% (peer median) |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.
→$18.6B returned last year against $1.7B of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 11.2-to-1.
→The count shrank 3.5% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
→Up from $2.55 to $2.87 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 2.2%.
→Comfortable: 38% of profits go out as dividends - well inside what the business generates.
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→C has shrunk its share count -38% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +76% over the same years.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 4.6% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $13.2B bought back vs $1.5B of stock compensation |
| ✕ | What it hands back fits inside its profits | 130.2% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $18.6B returned, 7.7% of market value |
| ✕ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change -3.8% |
| ✕ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 7.4% vs 9.0% |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market agrees: the stock is in a healthy uptrend on every horizon.
Chart by TradingView
→C is still in an uptrend, trading above the band where recent months settled - but that band has started to slope down, so the support under the price is weakening rather than building. It crossed only 3 sessions ago, so treat it as unsettled. The last two weeks have rolled over even though the price is above where it stood a month ago, which is what losing steam looks like before it reaches the trend itself. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there. The band is unusually narrow at the moment, which makes it easy to cross in either direction.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✓ | Trading above its cloud | 1.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✓ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 134.94 vs 122.19 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 4.5% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 4.5% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 44.9% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -5.0% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→No open-market buying, and $6M of selling across 3 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-01 | Koskull Casper Wilhelm Von | Director | award | 5 | $761.66 |
| 2026-07-01 | Koskull Casper Wilhelm Von | Director | award | 22 | $3,181 |
| 2026-07-01 | James S Turley | Director | award | 5 | $761.66 |
| 2026-07-01 | James S Turley | Director | award | 165 | $23,570 |
| 2026-07-01 | Diana L Taylor | Director | award | 5 | $761.66 |
| 2026-07-01 | Diana L Taylor | Director | award | 254 | $36,142 |
| 2026-07-01 | Gary M Reiner | Director | award | 385 | $54,884 |
| 2026-07-01 | Jonathan Paul Moulds | Director | award | 10 | $1,355 |
| 2026-07-01 | Jonathan Paul Moulds | Director | award | 222 | $31,674 |
| 2026-07-01 | Jonathan Paul Moulds | Director | award | 3 | $491.08 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.