
Classified by the SEC under prepackaged software.
CrowdStrike at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 17 of 29 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against CRWD's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Not enough data to score this fairly - the checks below show exactly what's missing.
0.7%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 0.7%, you get less cash per dollar of market value than the 7-year median of 4.8% - the market is charging more for the same cash.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✕ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 0.1% vs 4.0% |
| ✕ | Better cash yield than its own history | 0.7% vs 4.8% |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 0.7% vs 3.0% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value | EBITDA at or below zero, or unavailable |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +24.3% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $4.8B in 2025, compounding +29% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $5.4B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→The company lost $161M in 2025, more than the $13M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
+22%revenue growth, FY 2025
→Revenue grew +22% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✓ | Outgrew its sector last year | 24.3% vs 15.8% (sector 70th pct, n=404) |
| ✓ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 29.0% vs 17.6% (sector 70th pct, n=373) |
| – | Profits grew last year | loss-making in both years |
| – | Profit growth beats its peers | earnings at or below zero at either end |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 24.3% vs 3y 29.0% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 99.8% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
A solidly profitable business, though not exceptional against its sector.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-07-31), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin widened 2 points to -6% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-07-31), not a full fiscal year
→Operating cash flow runs at 4353% of reported profit, so the earnings are more than backed by cash - depreciation and other non-cash charges are understating what the business actually collects.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-07-31), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -4% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
→Of $4.8B in sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $161M underwater.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→27 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, down 4 points since 2022.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-07-31), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is research and development, at 29% of revenue (stock compensation 23%, capital spending 6%).
→CRWD's return on capital is negative at -4.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✓ | Better gross margins than peers | 75.2% vs 74.4% (sector 70th pct, n=245) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | -2.5% vs 11.0% (sector 70th pct, n=398) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $46M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 0.9% vs 13.3% (sector 70th pct, n=346) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -1.8% vs 10.0% |
| ✓ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 43.53 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could CRWD survive a bad year?
A fortress balance sheet - CRWD can survive a very bad year.
→The company holds $5.0B in cash against $746M of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
→The company's own capital grew from $2.3B in 2023 to $5.1B (+121%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 1.57 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.15 vs 1.00 |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.15 now vs 0.72 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -4.99 vs 5.00 |
| ✓ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 37.4% vs 23.1% (sector 70th pct, n=410) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $1.6B |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
CRWD returns nothing to owners yet, and the share count keeps rising - every dollar stays in the business.
→Stock compensation ($1.1B) flows out with nothing returned - the dilution is winning.
→2.4% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Both lines start at 100 in 2019, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→CRWD issued +69% more shares from 2019 to 2025, but revenue per share still rose +491%. The dilution bought more growth than it cost existing holders.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 7.5% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $1.2B of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| – | Reliable payer, never cut | no dividend in the last three years |
| – | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | no dividend in the last three years |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market agrees: the stock is in a healthy uptrend on every horizon.
Chart by TradingView
→CRWD is in a clear uptrend. The price is above the band where recent trading settled, and that band is still rising underneath it, so the floor keeps moving up. The last two weeks have rolled over even though the price is above where it stood a month ago, which is what losing steam looks like before it reaches the trend itself.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✓ | In an uptrend | 213.10 vs 142.49 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 200.81 vs 142.49 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 27.0% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 27.0% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 106.7% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -7.7% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→No open-market buying, and $12M of selling across 4 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 360 | $73,580 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 229 | $47,121 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 279 | $57,658 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 1,180 | $245,275 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 471 | $98,326 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 282 | $59,195 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 531 | $111,993 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 562 | $119,015 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 2,469 | $525,749 |
| 2026-09-03 | George Kurtz | PRESIDENT AND CEO | SELL | 3,037 | $649,098 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.