
Classified by the SEC under security brokers, dealers and flotation companies.
Goldman Sachs at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 18 of 28 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against GS's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector - you're paying up for what you get.
→At 15.7x earnings, the market is paying +64% more than GS's own 11-year median of 9.6x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 15.7x earnings, the market is paying +64% more than GS's own 11-year median of 9.6x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
-13.7%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At -13.7%, you get less cash per dollar of market value than the 11-year median of 1.4% - the market is charging more for the same cash.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| ✕ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 15.73 vs 9.57 |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 6.4% vs 4.0% |
| ✕ | Better cash yield than its own history | -13.7% vs 1.4% |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | FCF yield -13.7% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value | EBITDA at or below zero, or unavailable |
| ✓ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 0.79 |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +17.8% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $58.3B in 2025, compounding +7% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $66.2B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $17.2B in 2025, compounding +15% a year over three years. Earnings per share moved +35% over the last twelve months. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $21.0B.
+9%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +9% while earnings moved +20% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 17.8% vs 22.7% (sector 70th pct, n=73) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 7.2% vs 10.2% (sector 70th pct, n=68) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 34.8% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Profit growth beats its peers | 19.8% vs 8.2% (sector 70th pct, n=67) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 17.8% vs 3y 7.2% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 38.7% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Not enough data to score this fairly - the checks below show exactly what's missing.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Net margin stands at 29% in 2025. GS doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Only -188% of reported profit becomes operating cash. Accounting profit is running ahead of cash collection, which is worth watching in the receivables and inventory lines.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 14% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is stock compensation, at 6% of revenue (capital spending 4%). That share has fallen since 2022, so the cost of competing is easing.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| – | Better gross margins than peers | gross profit not tagged in its filings |
| – | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | operating margin not reported |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $21.0B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 17.1% vs 23.2% (sector 70th pct, n=77) |
| – | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | operating income or capital employed unavailable |
| ✕ | Profits are cash, not accounting | -1.88 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could GS survive a bad year?
Not enough data to score this fairly - the checks below show exactly what's missing.
→Debt isn't clearly tagged in GS's filings, so treat the balance sheet with extra care rather than assuming zero.
→The company's own capital grew from $116.9B in 2023 to $122.7B (+5%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| – | Comfortable near-term liquidity | current assets or liabilities not split out |
| – | Debt isn't dominating | debt unreported - cannot verify |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 94.2% of assets vs 92.5% five years ago |
| – | Earnings cover the interest | operating income or interest expense unavailable |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | -59.5% vs 35.3% (sector 70th pct, n=76) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | 4.51 years of cash at current burn |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Owners are paid reliably and affordably, and the share count is not eroding their stake.
→$17.6B returned last year against $3.4B of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 5.1-to-1.
→The count shrank 4.8% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
→Up from $6.48 to $16.62 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 1.7%.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Comfortable: 31% of profits go out as dividends - well inside what the business generates.
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→GS has shrunk its share count -43% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +255% over the same years.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 11.3% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $14.0B bought back vs $3.5B of stock compensation |
| – | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | free cash flow unavailable or negative |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $20.1B returned, 6.7% of market value |
| ✓ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change 2.3% |
| ✓ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 43.3% vs 9.0% |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market agrees: the stock is in a healthy uptrend on every horizon.
Chart by TradingView
→GS has no trend to speak of right now: the price is inside the band where recent trading settled, and that band is tilting down, so the drift is gently against it. It crossed only 2 sessions ago, so treat it as unsettled. The last two weeks have rolled over even though the price is above where it stood a month ago, which is what losing steam looks like before it shows up in the trend. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✓ | In an uptrend | 1,039 vs 939.20 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 1,039 vs 939.20 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 0.5% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 0.5% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 41.4% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -9.4% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→Insiders bought $21M against $5M of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-28 | Ericka T Leslie | Chief Administrative Officer | SELL | 600 | $620,280 |
| 2026-08-06 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | BUY | 500,000 | $9M |
| 2026-08-06 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | BUY | 500,000 | $9M |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | BUY | 85,000 | $2M |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 988 | $21,766 |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 447 | $9,776 |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 1,332 | $29,344 |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 200 | $4,410 |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 1,556 | $34,325 |
| 2026-08-05 | Sachs Group Inc Goldman | Insider | SELL | 3,402 | $74,912 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.