IntelINTC
$483.2B market capClassified by the SEC under semiconductors and related devices.
Intel in 32 checks
Intel at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 8 of 32 checks passed.
Value
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against INTC's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales - not yet profitable) - you're paying up for what you get.
Intel isn't profitable yet - so is the price high compared to its sales?
→At 8.5x sales, the market is paying +240% more than INTC's own 11-year median of 2.5x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price. Today's multiple is the highest in the charted history.
What has the market paid for INTC over the years?
→At 8.5x sales, the market is paying +240% more than INTC's own 11-year median of 2.5x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price. Today's multiple is the lowest in the charted history.
What cash return does the business throw off per dollar of market value?
0.6%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 0.6%, you get less cash per dollar of market value than the 11-year median of 6.8% - the market is charging more for the same cash.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
How we scored it · 0 of 5 checks passed
| ✕ | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | 8.47 vs 2.49 |
| ✕ | Cheaper than its peers (sales) | 8.47 vs 2.50 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales | 9.13 vs 3.00 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 0.6% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value | 45.86 vs 14.00 (peer median) |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
Growth
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.
Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $52.9B in 2025, compounding -6% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $57.0B, ahead of the last full year.
Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→The company lost $267M in 2025, less than the $18.8B it lost the year before. The losses are narrowing, but it is still burning shareholder money.
How fast is it growing, year by year?
-0%revenue growth, FY 2025
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2024 earnings -1210% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
→Revenue grew -0% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
How we scored it · 1 of 4 checks passed
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 7.5% vs 10.5% (sector 70th pct, n=163) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | -5.7% vs 10.3% (sector 70th pct, n=156) |
| – | Profits grew last year | loss-making in both years |
| – | Profit growth beats its peers | earnings at or below zero at either end |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 7.5% vs 3y -5.7% |
| ✕ | Grew per share, not just in total | -23.7% vs 0.0% |
Quality
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-27), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin compressed 8 points to -4% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-27), not a full fiscal year
→The company generated $9.7B of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
What does it earn on the money it uses?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-27), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -0% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
Where does each dollar of revenue actually go?
→Of $52.9B in sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $267M underwater.
How much of every sales dollar ends up as free cash?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
What does staying competitive cost, per dollar of sales?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-27), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 28% of revenue (research and development 26%, stock compensation 5%). That share has fallen since 2022, so the cost of competing is easing.
When sales grow, do profits grow faster?
→Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 0 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.
Does INTC earn more on its capital than that capital costs?
→INTC's return on capital is negative at -1.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
How we scored it · 0 of 5 checks passed
| ✕ | Better gross margins than peers | 38.6% vs 44.7% (sector 70th pct, n=155) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | -0.1% vs 8.5% (sector 70th pct, n=161) |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $-11.3B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -12.9% vs 11.6% (sector 70th pct, n=149) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -0.0% vs 10.0% |
| – | Profits are cash, not accounting | loss-making or operating cash flow unavailable |
Health
The balance sheet stress test: could INTC survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?
→Debt of $50.5B sits against $12.9B of cash, or 0.6x shareholders' equity. Earnings don't currently cover the interest bill at all.
Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?
→The company's own capital shrank from $105.6B in 2023 to $87.5B (-17%). Buybacks or losses are drawing the buffer down - the distinction matters.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 1.60 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.58 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.58 now vs 0.40 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -0.07 vs 5.00 |
| ✓ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 26.2% vs 16.8% (sector 70th pct, n=166) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $2.8B |
Shareholder returns
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
INTC returns nothing to owners yet, and the share count keeps rising - every dollar stays in the business.
How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?
→Stock compensation ($2.4B) flows out with nothing returned - the dilution is winning.
How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?
→5.8% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Is the dividend cheque itself growing?
→Down from $1.25 to $0.37 per share - the cheque has shrunk.
What does the payout earn you at each year's prices?
Can it actually afford the dividend?
→Stretched: 183% of profits go out as dividends - most of what the business generates, so a cut gets likelier in a bad year.
INTC has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→INTC has shrunk its share count -16% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +17% over the same years.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
How we scored it · 0 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 9.9% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $2.4B of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| ✕ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 9/10 years, worst year-on-year change -48.5% |
| ✕ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | -100.0% vs 9.0% |
Trend analysis
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
Mixed signals from the market - some trends up, some rolling over.
How is INTC's trend actually behaving right now?
Chart by TradingView
→INTC is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. The last two weeks have rolled over, though the price is still above where it stood a month ago, so the fall is recent rather than long-running.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | In an uptrend | 95.80 vs 74.15 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 100.61 vs 74.15 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -3.4% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -3.4% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 289.3% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -32.0% from its 52-week high |
Insider activity
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?
→Insiders bought $10M against $7M of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
Who did what, exactly?
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-11 | Lip Bu Tan | CEO | BUY | 105,263 | $10M |
| 2026-07-30 | Nagasubramaniyan Chandrasekaran | EVP, CT & Ops Off, GM Foundry | tax | 14,738 | $1M |
| 2026-06-01 | David Zinsner | EVP, CFO | tax | 18,353 | $2M |
| 2026-05-29 | Nagasubramaniyan Chandrasekaran | EVP, CT & Ops Off, GM Foundry | SELL | 21,024 | $2M |
| 2026-05-01 | Boise April Miller | EVP and Chief Legal Officer | SELL | 40,256 | $4M |
| 2026-04-30 | Nagasubramaniyan Chandrasekaran | EVP, CT & Ops Off, GM Foundry | tax | 13,649 | $1M |
| 2026-03-02 | David Zinsner | EVP, CFO | tax | 34,883 | $2M |
| 2026-03-02 | David Zinsner | EVP, CFO | tax | 14,377 | $645,240 |
| 2026-03-02 | Scott Gawel | CVP, Chief Accounting Officer | tax | 3,897 | $174,897 |
| 2026-03-02 | Scott Gawel | CVP, Chief Accounting Officer | tax | 1,004 | $45,060 |
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.