Developing small nuclear reactors to sell power to data centres and industry, pre-revenue.
Oklo at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 6 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against OKLO's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales - not yet profitable) - you're paying up for what you get.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | under 3 years of history |
| – | Cheaper than its peers (sales) | ps not reported |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales | enterprise value unavailable |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | FCF yield -3.6% |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value | no EBITDA to value: $-217M over the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive three-year earnings growth behind the price |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.
→No revenue history has been filed for OKLO yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→The company lost $106M in 2025, more than the $74M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| – | Outgrew its sector last year | under 8 quarters of history |
| – | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | under 3 years of history |
| ✕ | Profits grew last year | loss-making: TTM net income $-153M |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | loss-making: TTM net income $-153M |
| – | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | under 3 years of history |
| – | Grew per share, not just in total | under 3 years of per-share history |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The company generated $-82M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -7% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
→OKLO's return on capital is negative at -9.3% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| – | Better gross margins than peers | gross profit not tagged in its filings |
| – | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | operating margin not reported |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $-153M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -4.7% vs 10.2% (sector 70th pct, n=99) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -6.6% vs 10.0% |
| ✕ | Generates cash despite the loss | TTM operating cash flow $-117M on a net loss of $153M |
The balance sheet stress test: could OKLO survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
→The company holds $1.8B in cash against $700,000 of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
→The company's own capital grew from $-34M in 2023 to $3.3B. The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 48.46 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.00 vs 1.00 |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 2.5% of assets vs 3.5% five years ago |
| – | Earnings cover the interest | operating income or interest expense unavailable |
| – | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | cash-flow statement unavailable |
| ✓ | Self-funding | 6.43 years of cash at current burn |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
What comes back to owners is thin or stretched - read the checks before counting on it.
→$216M returned last year against $42M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 5.2-to-1.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| – | Share count isn't climbing | under 3 years of share counts |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $216M bought back vs $58M of stock compensation |
| – | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | free cash flow unavailable or negative |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $216M returned, 2.8% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | $216M bought back in the last twelve months, 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | $216M vs 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→OKLO is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. It has held that side of the band for 64 sessions, so this is well established. The last two weeks have rolled over, though the price is still above where it stood a month ago, so the fall is recent rather than long-running.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | Trading above its cloud | 0.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✕ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 44.07 vs 64.85 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -29.0% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -29.0% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -40.7% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -76.3% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→No open-market buying, and $55M of selling across 6 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-02 | Richard Craig Bealmear | Chief Financial Officer | exercise | 5,666 | $18,018 |
| 2026-09-01 | Richard Craig Bealmear | Chief Financial Officer | exercise | 16,430 | $52,247 |
| 2026-09-01 | Richard Craig Bealmear | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 16,430 | $636,827 |
| 2026-09-01 | Alexandra Renner | Chief Product Officer | SELL | 1,930 | $74,112 |
| 2026-09-01 | Caroline Cochran | Co-Founder, COO | SELL | 40,000 | $2M |
| 2026-09-01 | Caroline Cochran | Co-Founder, COO | SELL | 19,800 | $769,824 |
| 2026-09-01 | Caroline Cochran | Co-Founder, COO | SELL | 200 | $7,830 |
| 2026-09-01 | Caroline Cochran | Co-Founder, COO | SELL | 40,000 | $2M |
| 2026-09-01 | Caroline Cochran | Co-Founder, COO | SELL | 20,000 | $771,200 |
| 2026-09-01 | Jacob Dewitte | Co-Founder, CEO | SELL | 40,000 | $2M |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.