ProgressivePGR
$128.2B market capSells car and home insurance direct and through agents, and prices it on driving data.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 25 of 36 checks passed.
Value
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against PGR's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Fairly priced on some measures, rich on others - earnings multiple below its own long-run norm.
Is the price high or low right now, compared to what the market usually pays?
→At 11.1x earnings, the market is paying 12% less than PGR's own ten-year median of 12.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
What has the market paid for PGR over the years?
→At 11.1x earnings, the market is paying 12% less than PGR's own ten-year median of 12.6x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 11.09 vs 12.64 |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 9.0% vs 4.0% |
| ✕ | Better cash yield than its own history | 12.4% vs 15.7% |
| ✓ | Hands back over 3% in dividends and buybacks | 6.5% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on book value | 3.73 vs 1.50 (peer median) |
| ✓ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 0.07 |
Growth
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +10.5% over the last year.
Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?
◌ TTM = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a filed fiscal year
→Revenue reached $87.7B in 2025, compounding +21% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The last twelve months (+10%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing. The trailing twelve months are already running at $91.1B, ahead of the last full year.
Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?
◌ TTM = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a filed fiscal year
→Net income was $11.3B in 2025, compounding +150% a year over three years. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $11.7B.
How fast is it growing, year by year?
+16%revenue growth, FY 2025
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2023 earnings +441% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
→In 2025 revenue grew +16% while earnings moved +33% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Premiums outgrew the sector last year | 9.5% vs 16.7% (sector 70th pct, n=103) |
| ✓ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 20.9% vs 11.7% (sector 70th pct, n=101) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 12.1% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Profit growth beats its peers | 150.1% vs 13.8% (sector 70th pct, n=80) |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 10.5% vs 3y 20.9% |
| ✓ | Growth is consistent, not lumpy | revenue up in 5 of the last 5 years |
What matters for Progressive
What does Progressive owe, and when must it pay it back?
→38% of Progressive's $8.4B of borrowing is not due until after 2040, and only $2.3B falls due this decade. An insurer can borrow that long because the premiums keep arriving whatever the bond market does.
Source: SEC filings - segment disclosures (XBRL notes) · as at 2026-06-30
Progressive holds its float in bonds - how much are they down?
→The bonds Progressive is under water on are down 4.3% on commercial mortgages against 2.1% on government paper. These are paper losses it need not realise while the premiums keep the float topped up - but they are the reason a rate shock hurts an insurer at all.
Source: SEC filings - segment disclosures (XBRL notes) · as at 2026-06-30
Quality
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
A solidly profitable business, though not exceptional against its sector.
Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?
→Net margin stands at 13% in 2025. PGR doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?
◌ TTM = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a filed fiscal year
→Operating cash flow runs at 140% of reported profit, so the earnings are more than backed by cash - depreciation and other non-cash charges are understating what the business actually collects.
What does it earn on the money it uses?
◌ TTM = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a filed fiscal year
→ROE of 37% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
Does the underwriting make money on its own?
→PGR's combined ratio was 89.9% in 2025, meaning it keeps 10.1% of every premium dollar before investment income. Peers sit at 89.5%. The ratio has improved from 98.9% in 2022. Anything under 100% is an underwriting profit.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
How we scored it · 3 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Underwrites at a profit, better than peers | 9.7% vs 10.5% (peer median) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (expenses vs revenue) | 83.8% vs 82.5% (sector 30th pct, n=79) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $11.7B |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 34.1% vs 17.8% (sector 70th pct, n=101) |
| ✓ | Earns well on all assets | 9.4% vs 4.0% (sector 70th pct, n=105) |
| ✕ | Claims stay contained (loss ratio) | 66.2% vs 58.1% (sector 30th pct, n=78) |
Health
The balance sheet stress test: could PGR survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?
◌ Now = the most recent quarter-end, not a filed fiscal year
→Debt isn't clearly tagged in PGR's filings, so treat the balance sheet with extra care rather than assuming zero.
Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?
→The company's own capital grew from $20.3B in 2023 to $34.3B (+69%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Capitalised well | 27.5% vs 15.0% |
| ✕ | Less levered than its peers | 0.73 vs 0.71 (sector 30th pct, n=106) |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 72.5% of assets vs 74.4% five years ago |
| ✓ | Investment income covers the interest | 12.65 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 17.9% vs 27.0% (sector 70th pct, n=105) |
| ✓ | Underwrites at a profit (combined ratio) | 90.3% vs 100.0% |
Capital allocation
What management does with the money: what PGR earns on the capital it employs, whether the share count is growing, and what comes back to you.
PGR earns a real return on its capital and hands back what it can afford.
Does PGR earn more on its capital than that capital costs?
→PGR earns 37.3% on the capital it employs, well above the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 4.5% in 2022, so the trend is up, and the pace is picking up. That is the highest in PGR's filed history.
PGR has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→PGR has shrunk its share count -8% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +502% over the same years.
Why Capital allocation, and not Future?
This axis used to be Future, scored on analyst forecasts and price targets. We do not license that data, so every check came back n/a for every company - and its questions duplicated Growth anyway. Capital allocation asks something Growth cannot: the business makes money, so what does management do with it? Every check here is computed from the filings, which means it works for a bank, a REIT and a company with two years of history alike.
How we scored it · 6 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Earns a real return on shareholders' capital | 34.1% vs 10.0% |
| ✓ | Returns are improving, not eroding | return on equity 34.1% vs 19.2% three years ago |
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 0.2% over 3 years |
| ✓ | The share count bought real growth (revenue per share) | 76.4% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | What it hands back fits inside its profits | 71.3% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $192M bought back vs $132M of stock compensation |
Momentum
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business, so it sits outside the 36-check fundamental score and colours the snowflake instead: ember for weak, ash for flat, violet for strong.
The market agrees: this stock is in a healthy uptrend on every horizon.
How is PGR's trend actually behaving right now?
Chart by TradingView
→PGR is still in an uptrend, trading above the band where recent months settled - but that band has started to slope down, so the support under the price is weakening rather than building. The last two weeks are running ahead of the last month and the price is above where it stood a month ago, so the shorter-term readings back the trend up. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice.
How we scored it · 5 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | In an uptrend | 220.54 vs 208.45 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 217.53 vs 208.45 |
| ✓ | Rising recently | 8.1% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Beating the market (short) | 8.1% vs 5.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the market (long) | -5.7% vs 20.3% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -5.9% from its 52-week high |
Shareholder returns
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, and whether the share count truly falls.
Pays a dividend, with caveats worth reading below.
How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?
→$3.1B returned last year against $132M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 23.2-to-1.
How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?
→0.1% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Is the dividend cheque itself growing?
→Up from $2.64 to $4.88 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
What does the payout earn you at each year's prices?
→At today's price the yield is 2.2%.
Can it actually afford the dividend?
◌ TTM = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a filed fiscal year
→Comfortable: 25% of profits and 17% of free cash flow go out as dividends - inside the 75%/90% comfort lines.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Never cut the dividend | $2.9B paid last year, worst year-on-year change -93.8% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield | yield 2.2% |
| ✓ | Payout growing ahead of inflation | 1126.9% vs 9.0% |
| ✕ | Reliable payer | paid 10/10 years, worst change -93.8% |
| ✓ | Affordable from profits | payout 24.5% of profits |
| ✓ | Dividends and buybacks together fit inside profits | 71.3% vs 100.0% |
Insider activity
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?
→No open-market buying, and $23M of selling across 3 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
Who did what, exactly?
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | Susan Patricia Griffith | President and CEO | SELL | 37,338 | $8M |
| 2026-08-20 | Steven Broz | Chief Information Officer | SELL | 1,225 | $268,765 |
| 2026-08-13 | Lori A Niederst | Chief Personal Lines Officer | SELL | 7,339 | $2M |
| 2026-07-28 | Andrew J Quigg | VP and Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 3,499 | $769,780 |
| 2026-07-27 | John Jo Murphy | Claims President | SELL | 8,124 | $2M |
| 2026-07-27 | Susan Patricia Griffith | President and CEO | SELL | 37,338 | $8M |
| 2026-07-27 | Jonathan S. Bauer | Chief Investment Officer | SELL | 2,242 | $476,896 |
| 2026-07-27 | Karen Bailo | Commercial Lines President | SELL | 8,452 | $2M |
| 2026-07-24 | Daniel J Witalec | Chief Strategy Officer | tax | 706 | $149,601 |
| 2026-07-24 | David M Stringer | Vice Pres, Secretary and CLO | tax | 235 | $49,797 |
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.