
Classified by the SEC under finance services.
SoFi at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 11 of 29 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against SOFI's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector - you're paying up for what you get.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✕ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 2.8% vs 4.0% |
| ✕ | Better cash yield than its own history | -37.4% vs -16.0% |
| ✕ | Hands back over 3% in dividends and buybacks | 0.0% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on book value | 2.12 vs 1.30 (peer median) |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +9.2% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $619M in 2025, compounding +18% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The last twelve months (+9%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $481M in 2025, against $499M the year before. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $636M.
+23%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +23% while earnings moved -3% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 9.2% vs 34.1% (sector 70th pct, n=73) |
| ✓ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 18.0% vs 17.6% (sector 70th pct, n=55) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 13.3% vs 0.0% |
| – | Profit growth beats its peers | earnings at or below zero at either end |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 9.2% vs 3y 18.0% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 18.2% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Net margin stands at 78% in 2025. SOFI doesn't break out gross or operating margin in its filings, so net is the only layer the data supports.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Only -1336% of reported profit becomes operating cash. Accounting profit is running ahead of cash collection, which is worth watching in the receivables and inventory lines.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 5% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
Net interest income over total assets. Interest-earning assets are not tagged separately in XBRL, so this reads a little below the margin SOFI reports itself, but it is measured the same way for every bank.
→SOFI earns 4.38% on its assets after paying for deposits and other funding. That is above the 0.74% median of the largest US banks. The spread has widened from 3.07% in 2022. This spread is where a bank's profit begins, so it drives everything below.
Costs as a share of revenue, so lower is better.
→It costs SOFI 84.6% of every revenue dollar to run the bank, and lower is better here. Peers run at 32.5%, so SOFI is carrying more cost per dollar of revenue. It has improved from 116.8% in 2022.
→Roughly a third of SOFI's revenue (39%) comes from fees rather than interest, on $3.6B of total revenue in 2025. Fees have been taking a growing share since 2019, and fee income matters because it does not depend on interest rates.
→SOFI earns 4.6% on the capital it employs, below the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✓ | Wider interest margin than peers | 4.4% vs 1.9% (sector 70th pct, n=39) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (efficiency ratio) | 82.0% vs 25.4% (sector 30th pct, n=20) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $636M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 5.7% vs 16.1% (sector 70th pct, n=79) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on shareholders' capital | 5.7% vs 10.0% |
| – | Credit costs stay contained | loan-loss provisions not reported |
The balance sheet stress test: could SOFI survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
→Debt isn't clearly tagged in SOFI's filings, so treat the balance sheet with extra care rather than assuming zero.
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet, not a fiscal year-end
→SOFI holds $37.5B of deposits in 2025, +411% since 2022. Deposits are a bank's cheapest funding, and depositors leaving is the first sign of real trouble.
→The company's own capital grew from $5.2B in 2023 to $11.1B (+112%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Capitalised well | 18.2% vs 6.0% |
| ✓ | Lends less than it takes in deposits | 0.04 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 81.8% of assets vs 48.8% five years ago |
| – | The interest spread covers its credit losses | provisions or net interest income not reported |
| ✓ | Deposits are growing, not fleeing | 21.4% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Reserves cover the loan book | 6.5% vs 1.6% (peer median) |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
SOFI returns nothing to owners yet, and the share count keeps rising - every dollar stays in the business.
→Stock compensation ($262M) flows out with nothing returned - the dilution is winning.
→13.7% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Both lines start at 100 in 2019, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→SOFI's share count rose +1808% from 2019 to 2025 while revenue per share grew +618%. Holders are further ahead than before, though the gain per share is smaller than the growth in the business.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 38.9% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $284M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| – | Reliable payer, never cut | no dividend in the last three years |
| – | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | no dividend in the last three years |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→SOFI is in a clear uptrend. The price is above the band where recent trading settled, and that band is still rising underneath it, so the floor keeps moving up. It crossed only 3 sessions ago, so treat it as unsettled. The last two weeks are running ahead of the last month and the price is above where it stood a month ago, so the shorter-term readings back the trend up. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns upward partway through, so the support beneath the price should firm up from there.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | In an uptrend | 18.22 vs 19.97 |
| ✕ | Trend structure is healthy | 17.88 vs 19.97 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 13.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 13.7% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -28.2% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -43.4% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→$3M sold against $749,336 bought. Watch whether the buyers are executives (conviction) or the sales cluster outside scheduled plans.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-20 | Kelli Keough | EVP, GBUL, SIPS | SELL | 11,286 | $203,184 |
| 2026-08-18 | Eric Schuppenhauer | EVP GBUL Borrow | tax | 23,720 | $427,007 |
| 2026-08-18 | Arun Pinto | Chief Risk Officer | tax | 25,118 | $452,174 |
| 2026-07-20 | Kelli Keough | EVP, GBUL, SIPS | SELL | 10,954 | $188,290 |
| 2026-06-22 | Kelli Keough | EVP, GBUL, SIPS | SELL | 10,954 | $190,058 |
| 2026-06-18 | Robert S Lavet | General Counsel | SELL | 1,188 | $20,845 |
| 2026-06-17 | Jeremy Rishel | Chief Technology Officer | SELL | 102,123 | $2M |
| 2026-06-16 | Kelli Keough | EVP, GBUL, SIPS | tax | 61,479 | $1M |
| 2026-06-16 | Robert S Lavet | General Counsel | tax | 14,914 | $262,576 |
| 2026-06-16 | Arun Pinto | Chief Risk Officer | tax | 11,029 | $194,177 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.