
Owns and runs premium shopping malls and outlet centres.
Simon Property Group at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 24 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against SPG's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Priced modestly against both its own history and its peers.
→At 12.7x earnings, the market is paying about what it has typically paid SPG's own 8-year median of 14.0x. Neither a bargain nor a stretch by its own standard.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 12.7x earnings, the market is paying about what it has typically paid SPG's own 8-year median of 14.0x. Neither a bargain nor a stretch by its own standard.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| ✓ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 12.69 vs 14.01 |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 7.9% vs 4.0% |
| ✕ | Better cash yield than its own history | 4.7% vs 9.6% |
| ✓ | FFO yield above 5% | 10.4% vs 5.0% |
| ✓ | Cheap on FFO | 9.59 vs 16.00 (peer median) |
| ✓ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 0.42 |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
The business is genuinely growing - revenue +15.0% in the last year, and it's consistent.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $6.4B in 2025, compounding +6% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The trailing twelve months are already running at $6.9B, ahead of the last full year.
→Net income was $5.4B in 2025, compounding +30% a year over three years. Earnings per share moved +121% over the last twelve months.
+7%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +7% while earnings moved +97% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✓ | Outgrew its sector last year | 15.0% vs 7.7% (sector 70th pct, n=179) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 6.3% vs 16.1% (sector 70th pct, n=170) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 120.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Profit growth beats its peers | 30.0% vs 16.5% (sector 70th pct, n=118) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 15.0% vs 3y 6.3% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total (FFO per share) | 85.4% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Rare profitability: margins and returns on capital are well above its peers.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin has held near 50% since 2022. After everything, 84 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit. SPG doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
→Only 77% of reported profit becomes operating cash. Accounting profit is running ahead of cash collection, which is worth watching in the receivables and inventory lines.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 103% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
Net income plus property depreciation, less gains on property sales - the measure REITs are actually valued on, because a building does not lose value on the schedule the accounts assume.
→SPG generated $6.8B of funds from operations in 2025, growing +23% a year over three years. FFO adds back depreciation because a REIT's buildings do not really wear out the way the accounts assume. Per share that is $20.81, +164% since 2011 - the number REIT investors actually compare. Property-sale gains are not separately tagged in these filings, so this reads slightly high against the strict NAREIT definition.
→SPG earns 103.0% on the capital it employs, well above the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 78.1% in 2022, so the trend is up, and the pace is picking up. That is the highest in SPG's filed history.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✓ | Turns more rent into FFO than peers | 101.8% vs 47.1% (sector 70th pct, n=172) |
| ✓ | Keeps more of its rent as profit than peers | 77.6% vs 18.5% (sector 70th pct, n=187) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $5.4B |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 121.4% vs 6.2% (sector 70th pct, n=197) |
| ✓ | FFO is a real return on its property | 17.8% vs 4.5% |
| ✕ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 0.77 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could SPG survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
→Debt of $28.7B sits against $1.3B of cash, or 6.5x shareholders' equity. Earnings cover interest 3.1 times - adequate, with less room than it looks in a downturn.
→The company's own capital grew from $3.0B in 2023 to $4.4B (+47%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✕ | Leverage is under control | 85.3% vs 60.0% |
| ✕ | Less levered than its peers | 0.85 vs 0.48 (sector 30th pct, n=221) |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 6.47 now vs 7.53 five years ago |
| ✓ | FFO covers the interest | 6.59 vs 2.00 |
| ✓ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 59.4% vs 50.1% (sector 70th pct, n=186) |
| ✓ | FFO covers interest and the distribution | FFO covers 6.59x interest plus distributions |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
SPG returns nothing to owners yet - every dollar stays in the business.
→$227M returned last year, with no stock compensation reported against it.
→0.1% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→SPG issued +44% more shares from 2008 to 2025, but FFO per share still rose +164%. The dilution bought more growth than it cost existing holders.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 0.4% over 3 years |
| – | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | neither buybacks nor stock compensation reported |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
Mixed signals from the market - some trends up, some rolling over.
Chart by TradingView
→SPG is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | Trading above its cloud | 0.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✓ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 222.57 vs 199.38 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 0.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 0.7% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 20.9% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -11.5% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→Insiders bought $729,717 against $0.00 of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-31 | Matthew A Jackson | SVP, ASSISTANT TREASURER | tax | 250 | $53,640 |
| 2026-08-31 | Richard S Sokolov | Director | tax | 2,306 | $494,775 |
| 2026-08-31 | Eli Simon | CEO/PRESIDENT/COO | tax | 5,821 | $1M |
| 2026-08-31 | Kevin M Kelly | ASST. GENERAL COUNSEL/SEC. | tax | 1,434 | $307,679 |
| 2026-06-30 | Stefan M Selig | Director | BUY | 187 | $41,727 |
| 2026-06-30 | Stefan M Selig | Director | BUY | 33 | $7,392 |
| 2026-06-30 | Peggy Roe | Director | BUY | 80 | $17,851 |
| 2026-06-30 | Peggy Roe | Director | BUY | 6 | $1,340 |
| 2026-06-30 | Peggy Roe | Director | BUY | 3 | $669.93 |
| 2026-06-30 | Reuben S Leibowitz | Director | BUY | 430 | $95,950 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.