UnitedHealthUNH
$356.5B market capClassified by the SEC under hospital and medical service plans.
UnitedHealth in 30 checks
UnitedHealth at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 16 of 30 checks passed.
Value
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against UNH's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector - you're paying up for what you get.
Is the price high or low right now, compared to what the market usually pays?
→At 25.6x earnings, the market is paying +44% more than UNH's own 11-year median of 17.8x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What has the market paid for UNH over the years?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 25.6x earnings, the market is paying +44% more than UNH's own 11-year median of 17.8x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
How we scored it · 1 of 5 checks passed
| ✕ | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | 25.62 vs 17.79 |
| ✕ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 3.9% vs 4.0% |
| ✓ | Better cash yield than its own history | 6.6% vs 6.4% |
| ✕ | Hands back over 3% in dividends and buybacks | 2.7% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on book value | 3.41 vs 1.50 (peer median) |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
Growth
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growth is weak or inconsistent - the trend, not the story, is the problem.
Revenue: is the business selling more than it used to?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $447.6B in 2025, compounding +11% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The last twelve months (+6%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing.
Net income: how much of that revenue becomes profit?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $12.1B in 2025, compounding -16% a year over three years. Earnings per share moved -34% over the last twelve months. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $14.1B.
How fast is it growing, year by year?
+12%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +12% while earnings moved -16% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
How we scored it · 1 of 6 checks passed
| ✕ | Premiums outgrew the sector last year | 7.3% vs 16.7% (sector 70th pct, n=103) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 11.4% vs 11.7% (sector 70th pct, n=101) |
| ✕ | Profits grew last year | -33.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | -14.5% vs 13.8% (sector 70th pct, n=80) |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 6.5% vs 3y 11.4% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 44.0% vs 0.0% |
Quality
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Not enough data to score this fairly - the checks below show exactly what's missing.
Margins: of every $1 of sales, how much survives each cost layer?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin compressed 5 points to 4% since 2022. After everything, 3 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit. UNH doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
Earnings quality: do the reported profits turn into real cash?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating cash flow runs at 191% of reported profit, so the earnings are more than backed by cash - depreciation and other non-cash charges are understating what the business actually collects.
What does it earn on the money it uses?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE 12% and ROCE 10% sit close together - the returns come from the business itself, not from borrowing.
Does UNH earn more on its capital than that capital costs?
→UNH earns 12.0% on the capital it employs, comfortably above the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 24.7% in 2022, so the trend is down, though the pace has cooled. That is the lowest in UNH's filed history.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
How we scored it · 2 of 3 checks passed
| – | Underwrites at a profit, better than peers | underwriting margin not reported |
| – | Runs leaner than peers (expenses vs revenue) | expense to revenue not reported |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $14.1B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 13.5% vs 17.8% (sector 70th pct, n=101) |
| ✓ | Earns a real return on shareholders' capital | 13.5% vs 10.0% |
| – | Claims stay contained (loss ratio) | claims not reported |
Health
The balance sheet stress test: could UNH survive a bad year?
The balance sheet carries real risk - read the checks before anything else.
Could it handle its debt if things went wrong?
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end
→Debt of $73.3B sits against $31.5B of cash, or 0.7x shareholders' equity. Earnings cover interest 5.6 times - adequate, with less room than it looks in a downturn.
Is the company's own capital growing or shrinking?
→The company's own capital grew from $94.4B in 2023 to $104.5B (+11%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
How we scored it · 2 of 4 checks passed
| ✓ | Capitalised well | 33.7% vs 15.0% |
| ✓ | Less levered than its peers | 0.66 vs 0.71 (sector 30th pct, n=106) |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.70 now vs 0.61 five years ago |
| – | Investment income covers the interest | investment income or interest expense unavailable |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 6.0% vs 27.0% (sector 70th pct, n=105) |
| – | Underwrites at a profit (combined ratio) | combined ratio unavailable |
Shareholder returns
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Owners are paid reliably and affordably, and the share count is not eroding their stake.
How much goes back to shareholders - and how much leaks out as stock compensation?
→$13.5B returned last year against $971M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 13.9-to-1.
How fast is your ownership being diluted - or concentrated?
→The count shrank 1.9% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
Is the dividend cheque itself growing?
→Up from $4.77 to $8.69 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
What does the payout earn you at each year's prices?
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 2.2%.
Can it actually afford the dividend?
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Stretched: 66% of profits and 49% of free cash flow go out as dividends - most of what the business generates, so a cut gets likelier in a bad year.
UNH has issued or retired shares - did shareholders end up better off?
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→UNH has shrunk its share count -16% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +424% over the same years.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
How we scored it · 6 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 4.1% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $1.6B bought back vs $1.0B of stock compensation |
| ✓ | What it hands back fits inside its profits | 69.0% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $9.7B returned, 2.7% of market value |
| ✓ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change 5.1% |
| ✓ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 32.1% vs 9.0% |
Trend analysis
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
Mixed signals from the market - some trends up, some rolling over.
How is UNH's trend actually behaving right now?
Chart by TradingView
→UNH is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. Both the last two weeks and the month-ago comparison point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
How we scored it · 4 of 6 checks passed
| ✓ | In an uptrend | 397.14 vs 349.14 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 411.74 vs 349.14 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -0.0% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -0.0% vs 4.7% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 31.4% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -9.0% from its 52-week high |
Insider activity
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
Are the people running it buying or selling with their own money?
→No open-market buying, and $944,910 of selling across 2 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
Who did what, exactly?
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-02 | Wayne S Deveydt | Chief Financial Officer | tax | 1,209 | $483,147 |
| 2026-08-21 | Patrick Hugh Conway | Chief Executive Officer, Optum | SELL | 1,169 | $455,910 |
| 2026-08-11 | Dennis Andrew Stankiewicz | Chief Accounting Officer | tax | 233 | $93,872 |
| 2026-08-05 | Patrick Hugh Conway | Chief Executive Officer, Optum | SELL | 500 | $205,000 |
| 2026-06-05 | Patrick Hugh Conway | Chief Executive Officer, Optum | tax | 687 | $274,380 |
| 2026-06-03 | Christopher R Zaetta | EVP & Chief Legal Officer | tax | 134 | $50,526 |
| 2026-06-02 | Patrick Hugh Conway | Chief Executive Officer, Optum | tax | 204 | $77,028 |
| 2026-04-23 | Patrick Hugh Conway | Chief Executive Officer, Optum | SELL | 800 | $284,000 |
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.