
Franchises KFC, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut worldwide.
Yum! Brands at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
A mixed picture - strengths and real weaknesses - 18 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against YUM's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector - you're paying up for what you get.
→At 19.1x earnings, the market is paying 13% less than YUM's own 11-year median of 21.9x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 19.1x earnings, the market is paying 13% less than YUM's own 11-year median of 21.9x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
4.1%FCF yield today
→At 4.1%, the business is throwing off more cash per dollar of market value than its own 10-year median of 3.9% - the cheaper end of its history.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 5.2% vs 4.0% |
| – | Better cash yield than its own history | under 3 years of cash-flow history |
| ✓ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | 4.1% vs 3.0% |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value | 17.94 vs 14.00 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Price isn't outrunning growth | PEG 2.86 |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +10.3% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $8.2B in 2025, compounding +6% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $8.7B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $1.6B in 2025, compounding +6% a year over three years. Earnings per share moved +55% over the last twelve months. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $2.2B.
+9%revenue growth, FY 2025
→In 2025 revenue grew +9% while earnings moved +5% - when the earnings line runs above revenue, each new dollar of sales is arriving more profitably.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 10.3% vs 15.1% (sector 70th pct, n=43) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 6.3% vs 14.8% (sector 70th pct, n=41) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 54.8% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers | 6.7% vs 20.9% (sector 70th pct, n=22) |
| ✓ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 10.3% vs 3y 6.3% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 23.9% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Rare profitability: margins and returns on capital are well above its peers.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin has held near 31% since 2022. After everything, 19 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit. YUM doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→94% of reported profit shows up as operating cash - a normal gap, usually working capital absorbing some of the growth.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -21% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→20 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, up 3 points since 2022.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 5% of revenue (stock compensation 1%, research and development 0%).
→Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 2 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.
→YUM earns 38.5% on the capital it employs, well above the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 52.3% in 2022, so the trend is down, though the pace has cooled.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✓ | Better gross margins than peers | 68.1% vs 52.5% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | 31.0% vs 9.5% (sector 70th pct, n=41) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $2.2B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | negative equity |
| ✓ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | 61.6% vs 10.0% |
| ✓ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 0.94 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could YUM survive a bad year?
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
→Debt of $12.3B sits against $674M of cash. Earnings cover interest 5.0 times - adequate, with less room than it looks in a downturn.
Equity is below zero after years of buybacks exceeding earnings, so debt-to-equity and return on equity are not published for YUM: a ratio to a negative base means nothing.
→Shareholders' equity is negative at $-7.1B: liabilities exceed assets. Usually the mark of heavy buybacks or accumulated losses, and always worth understanding which.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✕ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 0.59 vs 1.50 |
| ✕ | Debt isn't dominating | negative equity |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | liabilities are 181.9% of assets vs 240.3% five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | 4.97 vs 5.00 |
| ✓ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 23.9% vs 14.6% (sector 70th pct, n=43) |
| ✓ | Self-funding | TTM free cash flow $1.7B |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
Cash comes back to owners, with a caveat or two in the checks below.
→$1.3B returned last year against $70M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 19.2-to-1.
→The count shrank 1.4% last year - buybacks are outrunning stock compensation.
→Up from $1.84 to $2.81 per share over 5 years - the cheque keeps growing.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At today's price the yield is 1.9%.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Comfortable: 51% of profits and 48% of free cash flow go out as dividends - well inside what the business generates.
Both lines start at 100 in 2011, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→YUM has shrunk its share count -42% from 2011 to 2025, so each remaining share owns more of the business. Revenue per share is +11% over the same years.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✓ | Share count isn't climbing | shares down 3.1% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $888M bought back vs $68M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | 101.0% vs 100.0% |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $1.7B returned, 4.1% of market value |
| ✕ | Reliable payer, never cut | paid 10/10 years, worst year-on-year change -43.0% |
| ✓ | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | 21.6% vs 9.0% |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→YUM is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. The last two weeks have ticked up, but the price is still below where it stood a month ago, so it is too early to call this a turn. The band is unusually narrow at the moment, which makes it easy to cross in either direction.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | Trading above its cloud | 0.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✕ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 153.23 vs 154.09 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -0.1% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -0.1% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 6.4% vs 20.0% |
| ✓ | Not in a deep hole | -10.0% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→No open-market buying, and $7M of selling across 8 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | Scott Mezvinsky | KFC Division CEO | exercise | 482 | $32,776 |
| 2026-09-01 | Scott Mezvinsky | KFC Division CEO | disposition | 214 | $32,808 |
| 2026-09-01 | Scott Mezvinsky | KFC Division CEO | SELL | 268 | $41,176 |
| 2026-09-01 | Christopher Lee Turner | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 261 | $40,100 |
| 2026-08-24 | Tracy L Skeans | COO and CPO | SELL | 3,494 | $552,052 |
| 2026-08-18 | Sean Tresvant | Taco Bell, CEO, YUM CCO | exercise | 4,101 | $594,071 |
| 2026-08-18 | Sean Tresvant | Taco Bell, CEO, YUM CCO | tax | 2,035 | $294,790 |
| 2026-08-03 | David Eric Russell | Sr. Vice President, Controller | exercise | 23,163 | $2M |
| 2026-08-03 | David Eric Russell | Sr. Vice President, Controller | disposition | 15,202 | $2M |
| 2026-08-03 | David Eric Russell | Sr. Vice President, Controller | SELL | 7,961 | $1M |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.