Sells Anktiva, an immunotherapy for bladder cancer, and develops other cancer treatments.
$9.18close as of 2026-10-16
+262.8% over 1Y · 246.1 points ahead of the S&P 500
IBRXS&P 500 (SPY), rebased to IBRX's first close
“Can ANKTIVA’s growing adoption and broader approvals narrow ImmunityBio’s cash burn while it funds further clinical development?”
Editorial note · updated 2026-10-08
The TenQ Radar
ImmunityBio in 36 checks
ImmunityBio on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 10 of 36 checks passed.
The ImmunityBio story
What drives ImmunityBio, what its price assumes and what could change the story, written from its own filings.
Adoption keeps growing. Net product revenue reached $50.7 million in the quarter to June 2026, up 92% from a year earlier and 15% sequentially.
Expansion needs execution. ANKTIVA’s authorization footprint reached 34 countries after the July 2026 UAE decision, but regulatory access still needs to translate into commercial revenue.
Funding remains central. ImmunityBio reported $357.4 million in cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities at June 30, 2026, against free cash flow of -$288 million over the last twelve months.
Q2 '26 · quarter to 30 June 2026 · reported 4 August 2026 · Earnings release ↗
Revenue$51M+94%vs 2025+16%vs Q1
Earnings-$230M-$138Mvs 2025+$402Mvs Q1
What the release says
Highlights
Net product revenue reached $50.7 million in Q2 2026, up 92% year-over-year and 15% sequentially, marking the eighth consecutive quarter of sequential revenue growth since the commercial launch of ANKTIVA, driven by continued adoption among U.S. urologists and strong market access.
In July 2026, the Emirates Drug Establishment of the United Arab Emirates granted the broadest marketing authorization for ANKTIVA across BCG-unresponsive NMIBC for CIS and papillary disease and metastatic NSCLC, expanding the product's global footprint.
The FDA accepted for review the supplemental Biologics License Application (sBLA) for ANKTIVA plus BCG in patients with BCG-unresponsive NMIBC with papillary disease without CIS, assigning a PDUFA target action date of January 6, 2027.
ImmunityBio entered into an exclusive development and supply agreement with Japan BCG Laboratory, securing exclusive U.S. rights to develop, import, and commercialize intravesical Tokyo-172 BCG to support long-term supply for patients with NMIBC.
What management expects
The company anticipates multiple regulatory, clinical, and data milestones over the next 12 months, including a planned 2026 sBLA submission for the Phase 2B QUILT-2.005 trial in BCG-naïve NMIBC carcinoma in situ (with or without papillary disease).
Key risks
New Increasing demand for BCG has led to U.S. supply constraints for TICE BCG, which could materially impact the demand for ANKTIVA and the company's ability to commercialize its approved product; efforts to introduce alternative sources of BCG through collaborations may not be successful in mitigating this shortage.
New Recent U.S. and international regulatory and trade policy changes, including new tariffs on pharmaceuticals and the implementation of the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, could impact the company's operations, product pricing, and ability to obtain or maintain regulatory approvals in various jurisdictions.
ImmunityBio is highly dependent on the successful commercialization of its single approved product, ANKTIVA, and the success and regulatory approval of its other product candidates; failure to achieve these could materially harm the business.
The company anticipates needing additional financing to fund operations, complete commercialization, conduct clinical trials, and develop and commercialize other product candidates; inability to secure such financing could force delays or reductions in development and commercialization efforts.
ImmunityBio has a substantial amount of debt and revenue interest liability, which could require significant cash outflows for interest and principal payments, limit flexibility to raise additional capital, and increase vulnerability to adverse economic or regulatory changes.
The company relies on third parties for manufacturing, clinical trials, and essential services; any failure by these parties to perform as expected or comply with regulations could delay or prevent commercialization and regulatory approvals.
AI summary of the company's filings, every number checked against them · 8 October 2026 · Sources: earnings release, 10-K, 10-Q
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I
Value
●●●●●●1/6
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales, as it is not yet profitable): the price asks a lot of the business.
-no history
58.7xown 7-year median 2264.2x
-3.0%cash earned per $ of price
-whole-business multiple
Valuation history
Is IBRX's P/E, P/S or P/B high or low against its own past?
Year
P/E
P/S
P/B
2026
-
58.6838
-
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→At 58.7x sales, the market is paying 97% less than IBRX's own 7-year median of 2264.2x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
What this measures
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
Free cash flow yield
What is IBRX's free cash flow yield at today's price?
Period
FCF yield
2019
-0.3187
2020
-0.0606
2021
-0.0524
2022
-0.2059
2023
-0.2821
2024
-0.1142
2025
-0.1275
2026
-0.0296
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Every dollar of market value currently buys -3.0% of annual free cash flow, less than its 7-year median of -12.7% - you are paying up for the same cash.
What this measures
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on
II
Growth
●●●●●●3/6
Growing, with caveats: revenue +192.9% over the last year.
+192.9%vs the year before
+678.6%compound annual
-net income growth
-compound annual
Revenue history
Is IBRX's revenue growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Revenue ($)
Q1 2014
286,000
Q2 2014
124,000
Q3 2014
133,000
Q4 2014
98,000
Q1 2015
120,000
Q2 2015
91,000
Q3 2015
10,000
Q4 2015
15,000
Q1 2016
6,000
Q2 2016
12,000
Q3 2016
12,000
Q4 2016
14,000
Q1 2017
11,000
Q2 2017
14,000
Q3 2017
8,000
Q4 2017
12,000
Q1 2018
5,000
Q2 2018
4,000
Q3 2018
31,000
Q4 2018
7,000
Q1 2019
5,000
Q2 2019
17,000
Q3 2019
12,000
Q4 2019
9,000
Q1 2020
165,000
Q2 2020
436,000
Q3 2020
151,000
Q4 2020
21,000
Q1 2021
139,000
Q2 2021
339,000
Q3 2021
66,000
Q4 2021
390,000
Q1 2022
14,000
Q2 2022
35,000
Q3 2022
118,000
Q4 2022
73,000
Q1 2023
360,000
Q2 2023
41,000
Q3 2023
82,000
Q4 2023
139,000
Q1 2024
40,000
Q2 2024
1.0M
Q3 2024
6.1M
Q4 2024
7.6M
Q1 2025
16.5M
Q2 2025
26.4M
Q3 2025
32.1M
Q4 2025
38.3M
Q1 2026
44.2M
Q2 2026
51.2M
2013
600,000
2014
641,000
2015
236,000
2016
44,000
2017
45,000
2018
47,000
2019
2.2M
2020
605,000
2021
934,000
2022
240,000
2023
622,000
2024
14.7M
2025
113.3M
→Revenue reached $113M in 2025, compounding +679% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The last twelve months (+193%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing. The trailing twelve months are already running at $166M, ahead of the last full year.
What this measures
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
Profit history
Is IBRX's net profit growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Net income ($)
Q1 2014
-1.1M
Q2 2014
-1.4M
Q3 2014
-918,000
Q4 2014
-2.8M
Q1 2015
-32.8M
Q2 2015
-130.9M
Q3 2015
-46.3M
Q4 2015
-26.8M
Q1 2016
-30.7M
Q2 2016
-34.0M
Q3 2016
-31.9M
Q4 2016
-24.2M
Q1 2017
-24.5M
Q2 2017
-23.5M
Q3 2017
-24.0M
Q4 2017
-24.5M
Q1 2018
-27.5M
Q2 2018
-27.7M
Q3 2018
-23.6M
Q4 2018
-17.3M
Q1 2019
-17.9M
Q2 2019
-16.7M
Q3 2019
-15.6M
Q4 2019
-15.6M
Q1 2020
-37.0M
Q2 2020
-51.4M
Q3 2020
-65.6M
Q4 2020
-32.1M
Q1 2021
-79.6M
Q2 2021
-88.3M
Q3 2021
-87.6M
Q4 2021
-91.3M
Q1 2022
-102.8M
Q2 2022
-94.6M
Q3 2022
-110.9M
Q4 2022
-108.2M
Q1 2023
-116.3M
Q2 2023
-137.9M
Q3 2023
-95.6M
Q4 2023
-233.4M
Q1 2024
-134.1M
Q2 2024
-134.6M
Q3 2024
-85.7M
Q4 2024
-59.2M
Q1 2025
-129.6M
Q2 2025
-92.6M
Q3 2025
-67.3M
Q4 2025
-61.9M
Q1 2026
-632.8M
Q2 2026
-230.4M
2013
-2.0M
2014
-6.2M
2015
-236.9M
2016
-120.8M
2017
-96.4M
2018
-96.2M
2019
-157.8M
2020
-221.9M
2021
-346.8M
2022
-416.6M
2023
-583.2M
2024
-413.6M
2025
-351.4M
→The company lost $351M in 2025, less than the $414M it lost the year before. The losses are narrowing, but it is still burning shareholder money.
What this measures
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Growth rate
How fast are IBRX's revenue and earnings growing?
Year
Revenue growth
Earnings growth
2,014
0.0683
-
2,015
-0.6318
-
2,016
-0.8136
-
2,017
0.0227
-
2,018
0.0444
-
2,019
45.8511
-
2,020
-0.7252
-
2,021
0.5438
-
2,022
-0.743
-
2,023
1.5917
-
2,024
22.7058
-
2,025
6.6831
-
2026
1.9292
-
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Revenue grew 193% over the twelve months to 2026-06-30, against an average of +616% a year over 2021-2025.
What this measures
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Per-share growth
Are IBRX's revenue and free cash flow per share growing?
Year
Revenue per share ($)
Free cash flow per share ($)
2,019
0.006
-0.4269
2,020
0.0016
-0.4598
2,021
0.0024
-0.7913
2,022
0.0006
-1.0394
2,023
0.0012
-0.7812
2,024
0.0211
-0.5684
2,025
0.1232
-0.3357
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Revenue per share reached $0.12 in 2025, compounding +490% a year against +679% for IBRX as a whole. Dilution absorbed about 188.8 points of that growth. The trailing twelve months are running at $0.18 a share. Free cash flow per share stands at $-0.34.
What this measures
Revenue and free cash flow, each divided by the number of shares in issue and adjusted for splits so old and new years compare honestly. Both lines rising means each share owns more of the business's sales and cash.
What good looks like. Both lines rising, and revenue per share growing at least as fast as the company's total revenue, which the answer compares. Faster means buybacks are working for you; slower means new shares are absorbing part of the growth.
If it rises or falls. This is the line that actually reaches you. A company can grow revenue every year and still shrink your slice by issuing shares faster than it grows.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
-kept after direct costs
-151.9%kept after running costs
-profit on shareholders' money
-45.6%against a 10% cost of capital
-operating cash ÷ net income
Margins
What profit margin does IBRX keep on each sale?
Year
Gross
Operating
Net
2,013
-
-
-3.4117
2,014
-
-8.6973
-9.649
2,015
-
-1,012
-1,004
2,016
-
-2,830
-2,746
2,017
-
-2,203
-2,143
2,018
-
-2,093
-2,047
2,019
-
-70.9587
-71.6517
2,020
-
-365.0909
-366.6959
2,021
-
-353.6188
-371.2955
2,022
-
-1,464
-1,736
2,023
-
-582.3955
-937.6141
2,024
-
-23.3423
-28.0477
2,025
-
-2.26
-3.1018
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating margin widened 146148 points to -226% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left. IBRX doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
What this measures
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
Earnings quality
Does IBRX's operating cash flow keep up with its profit?
Year
Cash from operations
Net income
2,013
-668,000
-2.0M
2,014
-5.4M
-6.2M
2,015
-25.3M
-236.9M
2,016
-38.6M
-120.8M
2,017
-48.8M
-96.4M
2,018
-63.4M
-96.2M
2,019
-152.1M
-157.8M
2,020
-171.7M
-221.9M
2,021
-274.4M
-346.8M
2,022
-337.5M
-416.6M
2,023
-366.8M
-583.2M
2,024
-391.2M
-413.6M
2,025
-304.9M
-351.4M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The company generated -$305M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
What this measures
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
Returns on capital
What return on equity and on capital does IBRX earn?
Year
ROE
ROA
ROCE
2,015
-1.1455
-0.6457
-0.6623
2,016
-0.3721
-0.3805
-0.4083
2,017
-0.3765
-0.385
-0.4318
2,018
-0.6398
-0.5289
-0.636
2,019
-3.2111
-0.5848
-0.7061
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -321% and ROCE of -46% sit close together, so the returns come from the business itself rather than from borrowing.
What this measures
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
Cash conversion
How much of each sale does IBRX turn into free cash flow?
Period
FCF margin
2013
-1.1183
2014
-8.819
2015
-116.7203
2016
-1,026
2017
-1,858
2018
-1,627
2019
-71.0245
2020
-286.6
2021
-329.7452
2022
-1,732
2023
-638.8119
2024
-27.0006
2025
-2.7256
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
What this measures
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
Spending intensity
How much of its revenue does IBRX spend on capex, R&D and stock pay?
Year
Capex % of rev
R&D % of rev
Stock comp % of rev
2,013
0.005
0.7433
1.4733
2,014
0.3666
2.4883
1.2309
2,015
9.4958
48.4492
895.0042
2,016
149.0909
662.5682
1,678
2,017
773.6667
934.3111
822.1556
2,018
278.766
1,185
497.4894
2,019
1.9469
50.8615
1.5536
2,020
2.7587
230.5901
3.6149
2,021
35.9347
209.8051
61.2216
2,022
325.675
1,034
167.4125
2,023
49.1704
373.5788
79.0402
2,024
0.4671
12.8955
2.3352
2,025
0.0339
-
0.3249
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is research and development, at 1290% of revenue (stock compensation 32%, capital spending 3%). That share has fallen since 2021, so the cost of competing is easing.
What this measures
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
Return on capital employed
Is IBRX's return on capital above what its capital costs?
Period
Return on capital employed
2014
-0.0946
2015
-0.6623
2016
-0.4083
2017
-0.4318
2018
-0.636
2019
-0.7061
2020
-1.4413
2021
-3.3056
2023
-0.8119
2024
-1.0494
2025
-0.5817
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→IBRX's return on capital is negative at -58.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
What this measures
The same return as the card above, but every filed year, against a 10% line that stands in for what capital costs.
What good looks like. Years above the line, and a trend that is flat or rising rather than drifting down towards it.
If it rises or falls. A business earning above its cost of capital creates value by growing; one earning below it destroys value by growing. The 10% line is a convention, not a law, so read the distance from it rather than the crossing.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
TTM operating cash flow -$281M on a net loss of $992M
IV
Financial health
●●●●●●1/6
The balance sheet carries real risk. Read the checks before anything else.
-debt unreported
5.7xnear-term bills coverage
-4xearnings ÷ interest bill
$357Mcash plus short-term investments
Debt & cash
How much debt does IBRX carry, and do its profits cover the interest?
Year
Total debt
Cash & investments
2,013
-
350,000
2,014
1.3M
59.1M
2,015
1.3M
294.2M
2,016
0
198.9M
2,017
0
128.2M
2,018
0
74.1M
2,019
757,000
115.3M
2,020
1.4M
96.1M
2,021
1.4M
317.1M
2,022
673.2M
107.2M
2,023
577.0M
266.5M
2,024
1.2M
149.8M
2,025
1.8M
242.8M
2,026
884,000
357.4M
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→The company holds $357M in cash against $884,000 of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
What this measures
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
Near-term liquidity
Do IBRX's current assets cover the bills due within a year?
Period
Current ratio
2014
31.5143
2015
48.3962
2016
16.3423
2017
6.3474
2018
3.2565
2019
2.708
2020
1.6396
2021
0.9061
2022
0.2807
2023
5.0458
2024
3.3595
2025
5.0989
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 5.7x of current assets for every dollar due within the year. That is thinner than in 2014.
What this measures
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
Interest cover
How many times over can IBRX's operating profit pay its interest bill?
Period
Interest cover (x)
2014
-11.8365
2016
-1,886
2017
-160.3883
2019
-26.3937
2020
-24.3421
2021
-22.2426
2022
-5.5309
2023
-2.8114
2024
-3.0036
2025
-4.205
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating profit does not cover the interest bill (-4.1x). Cover is wider than in 2014.
What this measures
Operating profit divided by interest expense - how many times over the year's earnings could pay the year's interest.
What good looks like. High and steady. Five times is a common floor; comfortably above it means the debt is being carried, not merely serviced.
If it rises or falls. It falls when profit falls or when borrowing costs rise, and a company can look safe on the level while the direction is telling you otherwise.
Cash conversion
How much of IBRX's revenue arrives as operating cash?
Period
Operating cash flow / revenue
2013
-1.1133
2014
-8.4524
2015
-107.2246
2016
-877.1136
2017
-1,084
2018
-1,349
2019
-69.0777
2020
-283.8413
2021
-293.8105
2022
-1,406
2023
-589.6415
2024
-26.5335
2025
-2.6917
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→IBRX's operations consumed cash rather than produced it over the last twelve months. Down from -111.3% in 2013.
What this measures
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
Shareholders' equity
Is IBRX's shareholder equity (book value) growing?
Equity is below zero after years of buybacks exceeding earnings, so debt-to-equity and return on equity are not published for IBRX: a ratio to a negative base means nothing.
Period
Equity ($)
2013
-3.8M
2014
57.6M
2015
356.0M
2016
293.4M
2017
218.8M
2018
81.9M
2019
16.3M
2020
-119.8M
2021
-242.2M
2022
-447.3M
2023
-587.0M
2024
-489.1M
2025
-500.5M
2026
-1.05B
→Shareholders' equity is negative at -$1.0B: liabilities exceed assets. Usually the mark of heavy buybacks or accumulated losses, and always worth understanding which.
What this measures
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
IBRX returns nothing to shareholders yet, and the share count keeps rising. Every dollar stays in the business.
+0.00%bought back, TTM, over market value
-at the current rate
$0.00dividends plus buybacks
$34Mlast 12m, dilutes the buybacks
+167.0%since 2019 (split-adjusted)
Capital returned vs stock comp
Do IBRX's buybacks and dividends outweigh the stock it issues to staff?
Year
Buybacks
Dividends
Stock comp
2,014
-
-
789,000
2,015
4.8M
-
211.2M
2,016
15.8M
-
73.9M
2,017
15.2M
-
37.0M
2,018
228,000
-
23.4M
2,019
2.5M
-
3.4M
2,020
-
-
2.2M
2,021
-
-
57.2M
→IBRX returned no cash to shareholders in the latest filed year: everything is being retained or reinvested.
What this measures
Cash returned through buybacks and dividends, alongside the value of new shares issued to employees as compensation.
What good looks like. Returns comfortably larger than stock compensation, so the share count actually falls.
If it rises or falls. A company can announce billions in buybacks while issuing nearly as much stock to staff, and the two largely cancel. What reaches you is the net effect, which is why both bars are here rather than only the buyback.
Shareholder yield
What is IBRX's shareholder yield from dividends and buybacks?
Year
Buyback yield
Dividend yield
2,019
0.0051
-
2,020
0
-
2,021
0
-
→IBRX handed back 0.0% of its market value over the last twelve months, below the 2% this check asks for. All of it is the dividend; IBRX is not buying back stock.
What this measures
Dividends and buybacks, each as a percentage of what the company was worth that year. The dollar chart says how much came back; this says how much came back for the price.
What good looks like. A total that clears a couple of percent and holds. Which half it comes from matters less than whether it is sustained.
If it rises or falls. A yield rises when the price falls as readily as when the payout grows, so read a jump beside the price chart before treating it as generosity.
Share count change (split-adjusted)
Is IBRX's share count rising or falling?
Year
Share-count change
2,020
0.0293
2,021
0.0323
2,022
0.0274
2,023
0.2719
2,024
0.3771
2,025
0.3133
→The share count grew 31.3% in 2025, averaging 32.1% a year over three years. Your slice of the company shrinks by that much each year unless earnings grow faster.
What this measures
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
Dilution against what it bought
Has IBRX's revenue per share grown faster than its share count?
Change since 2019. The gap between the lines is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted weighted averages.
Year
Share count, change since 2019
Revenue per share, change since 2019
2,019
0
0
2,020
0.0293
-0.7331
2,021
0.0625
-0.6008
2,022
0.0917
-0.9002
2,023
0.3885
-0.7966
2,024
0.9121
2.502
2,025
1.5111
19.4885
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly view, revenue per share is the trailing twelve months over that quarter's diluted count
→IBRX issued 151% more shares from 2019 to 2025, but revenue per share still rose 1949%. The dilution bought more growth than it cost existing holders.
What this measures
The share count and revenue per share over the same years, both indexed to 100 at the start, so the two lines can be compared directly.
What good looks like. The per-share line above the share-count line: whatever the company did with its shares, more business ended up behind each one.
If it rises or falls. Issuing shares is not automatically bad. It is bad when the money raised buys less growth than the dilution cost, which is exactly what the gap between these two lines shows.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
→IBRX is in a clear uptrend: the price is above the cloud where recent trading settled, and that cloud is still rising underneath it. The last two weeks and the month-ago comparison both point up, so the shorter readings back the trend.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
Are IBRX's insiders buying or selling shares with their own money?
Month
Buys ($)
Sells ($)
2023-12
0
0
2024-01
0
0
2024-02
0
0
2024-03
0
0
2024-04
0
0
2024-05
0
0
2024-06
0
0
2024-07
0
0
2024-08
0
0
2024-09
0
0
2024-10
0
0
2024-11
0
0
2024-12
0
0
2025-01
0
0
2025-02
0
0
2025-03
0
0
2025-04
0
0
2025-05
0
0
2025-06
0
0
2025-07
0
0
2025-08
0
0
2025-09
0
0
2025-10
0
0
2025-11
0
0
2025-12
0
0
2026-01
0
1.5M
2026-02
0
2.9M
2026-03
0
0
2026-04
0
0
2026-05
0
0
2026-06
0
1.2M
2026-07
0
2.7M
2026-08
0
0
2026-09
0
0
2026-10
0
1.1M
→Since December 2023, insiders sold $10M on the open market and bought nothing. Many sales are pre-scheduled diversification rather than a view on the price. A further 67 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
What this measures
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
The record
Who did what, exactly?
Date
Insider
Role
Type
Shares
Price
Value
2026-10-05
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
25,000
$10.75
$268,760
2026-10-02
Cheryl Cohen
Director
exercise
55,979
$2.98
$166,817
2026-10-02
Cheryl Cohen
Director
SELL
81,056
$10.50
$851,088
2026-07-02
Cheryl Cohen
Director
exercise
55,979
$2.98
$166,817
2026-07-02
Cheryl Cohen
Director
SELL
131,210
$9.50
$1.25M
2026-07-01
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
35,064
$2.98
$104,491
2026-07-01
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
124,414
$2.99
$371,998
2026-07-01
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
159,478
$9.02
$1.44M
2026-06-30
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
700
$2.98
$2,086
2026-06-30
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
300
$2.99
$897
2026-06-30
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
1,000
$9.00
$9,000
2026-06-29
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
32,173
$2.98
$95,876
2026-06-29
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
33,549
$2.99
$100,312
2026-06-29
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
30,000
$2.84
$85,200
2026-06-29
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
95,722
$9.01
$862,216
2026-06-24
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
25,000
$7.88
$196,908
2026-06-04
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
23,033
$7.18
$165,306
2026-03-31
Patrick Soon-Shiong
See remarks
conversion
4,606,596
$5.43
$25M
2026-02-24
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
75,000
$12.01
$900,788
2026-02-23
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
25,000
$2.98
$74,500
2026-02-23
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
25,000
$10.00
$250,000
2026-02-23
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
165,000
$10.25
$1.69M
2026-02-22
David C. Sachs
Chief Financial Officer
tax
20,682
$8.70
$179,933
2026-02-22
Patrick Soon-Shiong
See remarks
tax
58,170
$8.70
$506,079
2026-02-22
Regan J Lauer
Chief Accounting Officer
tax
1,673
$8.70
$14,555
2026-02-22
Richard Adcock
CEO & President
tax
77,560
$8.70
$674,772
2026-02-22
Barry J. Simon
Director
tax
6,026
$8.70
$52,426
2026-02-20
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
10,000
$9.25
$92,500
2026-02-10
Patrick Soon-Shiong
See remarks
tax
118,560
$6.93
$821,621
2026-02-10
David C. Sachs
Chief Financial Officer
tax
42,643
$6.93
$295,516
2026-02-10
Regan J Lauer
Chief Accounting Officer
tax
2,257
$6.93
$15,641
2026-02-10
Richard Adcock
CEO & President
tax
140,048
$6.93
$970,533
2026-01-20
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
76,967
$6.54
$503,364
2026-01-20
Barry J. Simon
Director
SELL
75,000
$7.88
$590,933
2026-01-20
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
25,000
$2.98
$74,500
2026-01-20
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
25,000
$7.51
$187,650
2026-01-16
Christobel Selecky
Director
exercise
50,000
$2.98
$149,000
2026-01-16
Christobel Selecky
Director
SELL
50,000
$5.00
$250,000
2025-12-31
David C. Sachs
Chief Financial Officer
tax
15,435
$1.98
$30,561
2025-12-31
Richard Adcock
CEO & President
tax
17,510
$1.98
$34,670
2025-02-22
Regan J Lauer
Chief Accounting Officer
tax
1,669
$3.42
$5,708
2025-02-22
Patrick Soon-Shiong
See remarks
tax
42,071
$3.42
$143,883
2025-02-22
David C. Sachs
Chief Financial Officer
tax
15,860
$3.42
$54,241
2025-02-22
Richard Adcock
CEO & President
tax
78,167
$3.42
$267,331
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
VIII
Ownership
informational
19.1%on Form 13F, 30 June 2026
7.0%officers, directors, founders
19.0%together
2last 12 months
Top holders
Who owns ImmunityBio stock?
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 19.1% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is Patrick Soon-Shiong, with 6.6%. Insiders hold 7.0%.
#
Holder
Stake
Shares
Value
Change
1
Patrick Soon-ShiongSee remarks · Form 4, 31 March 2026
6.64%
70.3M
$646M
-
2
BlackRock, Inc.Fund manager
3.22%
34.1M
$313M
+29.4%
3
State Street CorpFund manager
2.02%
21.4M
$196M
+20.8%
4
Vanguard Portfolio Management LLCFund manager
1.69%
17.9M
$164M
+9.4%
5
Vanguard Capital Management LLCFund manager
1.48%
15.7M
$144M
+3.7%
6
D. E. Shaw & Co., Inc.Fund manager
1.09%
11.6M
$106M
-8.1%
7
Two Sigma Investments, LPFund manager
1.05%
11.1M
$102M
+153.0%
8
Geode Capital Management, LLCFund manager
0.93%
9.8M
$90M
+22.6%
9
Millennium Management LLCFund manager
0.53%
5.6M
$51M
+292.9%
10
Northern Trust CorpFund manager
0.34%
3.6M
$33M
+42.3%
11
Morgan StanleyFund manager
0.32%
3.4M
$32M
-14.6%
12
Goldman Sachs Group IncFund manager
0.31%
3.2M
$30M
-0.1%
13
UBS Group AGFund manager
0.30%
3.2M
$29M
+8.5%
14
Charles Schwab Investment Management IncFund manager
0.27%
2.9M
$27M
+16.6%
15
Barry J. SimonDirector · Form 4, 5 October 2026
0.26%
2.8M
$26M
-
16
Woodline Partners LPFund manager
0.24%
2.5M
$23M
-27.5%
17
SEB Asset Management ABFund manager
0.23%
2.4M
$22M
+0.0%
18
Vanguard Fiduciary Trust CoFund manager
0.23%
2.4M
$22M
+13.6%
19
Bank of America CorpFund manager
0.21%
2.2M
$20M
-10.8%
20
Voloridge Investment Management, LLCFund manager
0.16%
1.7M
$16M
-41.2%
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Source: Periodic Transaction Reports filed with the Clerk of the House under the STOCK Act, within 45 days of a trade. Amounts are the ranges the law asks for. The Senate's reports are not included yet. All Congress trades
Where does this list come from?
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.