
Mines uranium in the US and processes rare earths at its Utah mill.
Energy Fuels on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 6 of 36 checks passed.
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales, as it is not yet profitable): the price asks a lot of the business.
| Year | P/E | P/S | P/B |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 658.3076 | 299.3811 | 3.2692 |
| 2023 | 10.8164 | 28.4788 | 2.8785 |
| 2026 | - | 20.0193 | 2.6713 |
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→At 20.0x sales, the market is paying 38% less than UUUU's own 10-year median of 32.1x. Pessimism is priced in - the question is whether it is deserved.
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
| Period | FCF yield |
|---|---|
| 2016 | -0.1042 |
| 2017 | -0.0796 |
| 2018 | -0.038 |
| 2019 | -0.1872 |
| 2020 | -0.1552 |
| 2021 | -0.0322 |
| 2022 | -0.0472 |
| 2023 | -0.0286 |
| 2024 | -0.0636 |
| 2025 | -0.0515 |
| 2026 | -0.039 |
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Every dollar of market value currently buys -3.9% of annual free cash flow, less than its 10-year median of -5.1% - you are paying up for the same cash.
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| ✓ | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | 20.02 vs 32.05 |
| ✕ | Cheap on sales (under 2.5x) | 20.02 vs 2.50 (fixed yardstick) |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales (under 3x) | 25.87 vs 3.00 (fixed yardstick) |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | FCF yield -3.9% |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value (under 14x EBITDA) | no EBITDA to value: -$91M over the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Priced for less growth than its record suggests | not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on |
Growing, with caveats: revenue +62.5% over the last year.
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
| Period | Revenue ($) |
|---|---|
| Q1 2015 | 7.6M |
| Q2 2015 | 23.7M |
| Q3 2015 | 19.2M |
| Q4 2015 | 61.4M |
| Q1 2016 | 18.0M |
| Q2 2016 | 7.0M |
| Q3 2016 | 8.7M |
| Q4 2016 | 54.6M |
| Q1 2017 | 3.8M |
| Q2 2017 | 17.9M |
| Q3 2017 | 5.5M |
| Q4 2017 | 3.9M |
| Q1 2018 | 1.3M |
| Q2 2018 | 27.0M |
| Q3 2018 | 451,000 |
| Q4 2018 | 3.0M |
| Q1 2019 | 1.7M |
| Q2 2019 | 3.1M |
| Q3 2019 | 423,000 |
| Q4 2019 | 701,000 |
| Q1 2020 | 393,000 |
| Q2 2020 | 395,000 |
| Q3 2020 | 486,000 |
| Q4 2020 | 384,000 |
| Q1 2021 | 353,000 |
| Q2 2021 | 456,000 |
| Q3 2021 | 715,000 |
| Q4 2021 | 1.7M |
| Q1 2022 | 2.9M |
| Q2 2022 | 6.5M |
| Q3 2022 | 2.9M |
| Q4 2022 | 178,000 |
| Q1 2023 | 19.6M |
| Q2 2023 | 6.9M |
| Q3 2023 | 11.0M |
| Q4 2023 | 465,000 |
| Q1 2024 | 25.4M |
| Q2 2024 | 8.7M |
| Q3 2024 | 4.0M |
| Q4 2024 | 39.9M |
| Q1 2025 | 16.9M |
| Q2 2025 | 4.2M |
| Q3 2025 | 17.7M |
| Q4 2025 | 27.1M |
| Q1 2026 | 35.8M |
| Q2 2026 | 25.1M |
| 2014 | 46.3M |
| 2015 | 61.4M |
| 2016 | 54.6M |
| 2017 | 31.0M |
| 2018 | 31.7M |
| 2019 | 5.9M |
| 2020 | 1.7M |
| 2021 | 3.2M |
| 2022 | 12.5M |
| 2023 | 37.9M |
| 2024 | 78.1M |
| 2025 | 65.9M |
→Revenue reached $66M in 2025, compounding +74% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The trailing twelve months are already running at $106M, ahead of the last full year.
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
| Period | Net income ($) |
|---|---|
| Q1 2015 | -1.2M |
| Q2 2015 | -4.1M |
| Q3 2015 | -5.4M |
| Q4 2015 | -71.7M |
| Q1 2016 | -8.9M |
| Q2 2016 | -10.4M |
| Q3 2016 | -8.1M |
| Q4 2016 | -12.5M |
| Q1 2017 | 1.7M |
| Q2 2017 | 4.9M |
| Q3 2017 | 1.9M |
| Q4 2017 | -135,000 |
| Q1 2018 | -994,000 |
| Q2 2018 | 15.0M |
| Q3 2018 | -263,000 |
| Q4 2018 | -1.3M |
| Q1 2019 | -12.1M |
| Q2 2019 | -9.3M |
| Q3 2019 | -6.9M |
| Q4 2019 | -9.7M |
| Q1 2020 | -5.7M |
| Q2 2020 | -8.2M |
| Q3 2020 | -8.9M |
| Q4 2020 | -5.1M |
| Q1 2021 | -10.9M |
| Q2 2021 | -10.8M |
| Q3 2021 | -8.0M |
| Q4 2021 | 31.1M |
| Q1 2022 | -14.7M |
| Q2 2022 | -18.1M |
| Q3 2022 | -9.3M |
| Q4 2022 | -17.8M |
| Q1 2023 | 114.3M |
| Q2 2023 | -4.9M |
| Q3 2023 | 10.5M |
| Q4 2023 | -20.0M |
| Q1 2024 | 3.6M |
| Q2 2024 | -6.4M |
| Q3 2024 | -12.1M |
| Q4 2024 | -32.9M |
| Q1 2025 | -26.3M |
| Q2 2025 | -21.8M |
| Q3 2025 | -16.7M |
| Q4 2025 | -20.8M |
| Q1 2026 | -10.8M |
| Q2 2026 | -33.4M |
| 2014 | -86.6M |
| 2015 | -82.4M |
| 2016 | -39.9M |
| 2017 | -28.0M |
| 2018 | -25.4M |
| 2019 | -38.1M |
| 2020 | -27.9M |
| 2021 | 1.4M |
| 2022 | -59.8M |
| 2023 | 99.9M |
| 2024 | -47.8M |
| 2025 | -85.6M |
→The company lost $86M in 2025, more than the $48M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2022 earnings -4233% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
| Year | Revenue growth | Earnings growth |
|---|---|---|
| 2,015 | 0.3264 | - |
| 2,016 | -0.1108 | - |
| 2,017 | -0.4309 | - |
| 2,018 | 0.0217 | - |
| 2,019 | -0.8151 | - |
| 2,020 | -0.7173 | - |
| 2,021 | 0.9204 | - |
| 2,022 | 2.9306 | - |
| 2,023 | 2.0306 | - |
| 2,024 | 1.0595 | -1.4783 |
| 2,025 | -0.1561 | - |
| 2026 | 0.6251 | - |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Revenue grew 63% over the twelve months to 2026-06-30, against an average of +136% a year over 2021-2025.
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✓ | Outgrew the market over the last twelve months | 62.5% vs 13.0% (market 70th pct) |
| ✓ | Sustained growth beats the market (3 years) | 74.0% vs 10.8% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Profits grew over the last twelve months | loss-making: TTM net income -$82M |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers (3 years) | loss-making: TTM net income -$82M |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | last twelve months 62.5% vs three-year pace 74.0% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 268.8% vs 0.0% |
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
| Year | Gross | Operating | Net |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2,014 | 0.3534 | -1.8653 | -1.8731 |
| 2,015 | 0.3869 | -1.3024 | -1.3424 |
| 2,016 | 0.3501 | -0.7108 | -0.7308 |
| 2,017 | 0.375 | -0.9166 | -0.9016 |
| 2,018 | 0.5349 | -0.6719 | -0.7995 |
| 2,019 | 0.327 | -6.9192 | -6.4951 |
| 2,020 | 1 | -14.8534 | -16.8106 |
| 2,021 | 0.4303 | -11.1259 | 0.4548 |
| 2,022 | 0.3732 | -3.5907 | -4.7822 |
| 2,023 | 0.5206 | -0.8534 | 2.6329 |
| 2,024 | 0.2841 | -0.6083 | -0.6115 |
| 2,025 | 0.2086 | -1.5345 | -1.299 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating margin widened 206 points to -153% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
| Year | Cash from operations | Net income |
|---|---|---|
| 2,014 | -7.7M | -86.6M |
| 2,015 | -2.1M | -82.4M |
| 2,016 | -12.0M | -39.9M |
| 2,017 | -10.3M | -28.0M |
| 2,018 | -7.8M | -25.4M |
| 2,019 | -44.4M | -38.1M |
| 2,020 | -32.2M | -27.9M |
| 2,021 | -29.3M | 1.4M |
| 2,022 | -49.7M | -59.8M |
| 2,023 | -15.4M | 99.9M |
| 2,024 | -44.0M | -47.8M |
| 2,025 | -89.5M | -85.6M |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The company generated -$89M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
| Year | ROE | ROA | ROCE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2,014 | -0.6079 | - | - |
| 2,015 | -0.6975 | -0.4283 | -0.4478 |
| 2,016 | -0.2959 | -0.2029 | -0.2103 |
| 2,017 | -0.2174 | -0.151 | -0.1622 |
| 2,018 | -0.1918 | -0.1289 | -0.1134 |
| 2,019 | -0.2843 | -0.2168 | -0.2651 |
| 2,020 | -0.1986 | -0.1521 | -0.1441 |
| 2,021 | 0.0065 | 0.0046 | -0.1145 |
| 2,022 | -0.225 | -0.2185 | -0.176 |
| 2,023 | 0.3244 | 0.2485 | -0.0827 |
| 2,024 | -0.1058 | -0.0781 | -0.086 |
| 2,025 | -0.142 | -0.0607 | -0.0733 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→ROE of -12% and ROCE of -6% sit close together, so the returns come from the business itself rather than from borrowing.
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
| Step | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Revenue, last 12m | 105.8M |
| Gross profit | 43.2M |
| Operating income | -96.3M |
| Net income | -81.7M |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Of $106M over the twelve months to 2026-06-30 sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $82M underwater.
One year of revenue, with each major cost taken out in the order the income statement takes it, ending at net profit.
What good looks like. No single step swallowing a surprising share, and a bottom line that survives all of them.
If it rises or falls. The largest step is where the business really spends its money, and it is the one to watch year to year: a step that grows faster than revenue is what margin compression looks like before it reaches the margin chart.
| Period | FCF margin |
|---|---|
| 2014 | -0.1839 |
| 2015 | -0.104 |
| 2016 | -0.2255 |
| 2017 | -0.3331 |
| 2018 | -0.2488 |
| 2019 | -7.5666 |
| 2020 | -19.7859 |
| 2021 | -9.63 |
| 2022 | -4.1309 |
| 2023 | -0.8133 |
| 2024 | -0.8468 |
| 2025 | -1.6495 |
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
| Year | Capex % of rev | Stock comp % of rev |
|---|---|---|
| 2,014 | 0.0176 | 0.0304 |
| 2,015 | 0.07 | 0.0179 |
| 2,016 | 0.0048 | 0.0487 |
| 2,017 | 0 | 0.1135 |
| 2,018 | 0.0034 | 0.0871 |
| 2,019 | 0 | 0.643 |
| 2,020 | 0.3782 | 1.5669 |
| 2,021 | 0.4296 | 0.6778 |
| 2,022 | 0.1595 | 0.3708 |
| 2,023 | 0.407 | 0.1219 |
| 2,024 | 0.2839 | 0.0693 |
| 2,025 | 0.2922 | 0.191 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 29% of revenue (stock compensation 19%). That share has risen since 2022, so the cost of competing is climbing.
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
| Period | Return on capital employed |
|---|---|
| 2015 | -0.4478 |
| 2016 | -0.2103 |
| 2017 | -0.1622 |
| 2018 | -0.1134 |
| 2019 | -0.2651 |
| 2020 | -0.1441 |
| 2021 | -0.1145 |
| 2022 | -0.176 |
| 2023 | -0.0827 |
| 2024 | -0.086 |
| 2025 | -0.0733 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→UUUU's return on capital is negative at -7.3% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
The same return as the card above, but every filed year, against a 10% line that stands in for what capital costs.
What good looks like. Years above the line, and a trend that is flat or rising rather than drifting down towards it.
If it rises or falls. A business earning above its cost of capital creates value by growing; one earning below it destroys value by growing. The 10% line is a convention, not a law, so read the distance from it rather than the crossing.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Better gross margins than the market | 40.9% vs 52.4% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than the market (operating margin) | -91.0% vs 13.2% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income -$82M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -11.6% vs 12.3% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -6.4% vs 10.0% |
| ✕ | Generates cash despite the loss | TTM operating cash flow -$62M on a net loss of $82M |
The balance sheet carries real risk. Read the checks before anything else.
| Year | Total debt | Cash & investments |
|---|---|---|
| 2,013 | - | 6.6M |
| 2,014 | - | 10.4M |
| 2,015 | 32.5M | 13.0M |
| 2,016 | 29.6M | 16.9M |
| 2,017 | 27.5M | 18.6M |
| 2,018 | 15.9M | 40.2M |
| 2,019 | 16.9M | 19.9M |
| 2,020 | 0 | 22.2M |
| 2,021 | 0 | 112.5M |
| 2,022 | 0 | 62.8M |
| 2,023 | 0 | 57.4M |
| 2,024 | 0 | 38.6M |
| 2,025 | 675.7M | 64.7M |
| 2,026 | 677.7M | 58.4M |
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Debt of $678M sits against $58M of cash, or 0.9x shareholders' equity. Earnings don't currently cover the interest bill at all.
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
| Period | Current ratio |
|---|---|
| 2015 | 3.5354 |
| 2016 | 2.9842 |
| 2017 | 4.3649 |
| 2018 | 6.8737 |
| 2019 | 1.9071 |
| 2020 | 4.2612 |
| 2021 | 24.4162 |
| 2022 | 7.2804 |
| 2023 | 22.4609 |
| 2024 | 3.8825 |
| 2025 | 30.6942 |
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 27.9x of current assets for every dollar due within the year. That is stronger than in 2015.
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
| Period | Interest cover (x) |
|---|---|
| 2014 | -51.0823 |
| 2015 | -39.2639 |
| 2016 | -16.9393 |
| 2017 | -13.545 |
| 2018 | -12.3763 |
| 2019 | -27.2173 |
| 2020 | -25.8687 |
| 2021 | -656.0185 |
| 2025 | -43.4328 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating profit does not cover the interest bill (-14.1x). Cover is wider than in 2014.
Operating profit divided by interest expense - how many times over the year's earnings could pay the year's interest.
What good looks like. High and steady. Five times is a common floor; comfortably above it means the debt is being carried, not merely serviced.
If it rises or falls. It falls when profit falls or when borrowing costs rise, and a company can look safe on the level while the direction is telling you otherwise.
| Period | Operating cash flow / revenue |
|---|---|
| 2014 | -0.1663 |
| 2015 | -0.034 |
| 2016 | -0.2207 |
| 2017 | -0.3331 |
| 2018 | -0.2454 |
| 2019 | -7.5666 |
| 2020 | -19.4077 |
| 2021 | -9.2004 |
| 2022 | -3.9714 |
| 2023 | -0.4063 |
| 2024 | -0.5629 |
| 2025 | -1.3574 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→UUUU's operations consumed cash rather than produced it over the last twelve months. Down from -16.6% in 2014.
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
| Period | Equity ($) |
|---|---|
| 2013 | 184.2M |
| 2014 | 100.8M |
| 2015 | 135.3M |
| 2016 | 134.1M |
| 2017 | 123.4M |
| 2018 | 141.1M |
| 2019 | 126.9M |
| 2020 | 153.8M |
| 2021 | 291.6M |
| 2022 | 240.4M |
| 2023 | 375.2M |
| 2024 | 527.8M |
| 2025 | 678.4M |
| 2026 | 792.6M |
→The company's own capital grew from $375M in 2023 to $793M (+111%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 27.90 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.86 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.86 now vs 0.00 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -14.08 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than the market | -59.1% vs 21.6% (market 70th pct) |
| ✕ | Self-funding | 0.71 years of cash at current burn |
UUUU returns nothing to shareholders yet, and the share count keeps rising. Every dollar stays in the business.
| Year | Share-count change |
|---|---|
| 2,017 | 0.2602 |
| 2,018 | 0.1779 |
| 2,019 | 0.1265 |
| 2,020 | 0.2723 |
| 2,021 | 0.2356 |
| 2,022 | 0.0509 |
| 2,023 | 0.0179 |
| 2,024 | 0.0737 |
| 2,025 | 0.3068 |
→The share count grew 30.7% in 2025, averaging 13.3% a year over three years. Your slice of the company shrinks by that much each year unless earnings grow faster.
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
Change since 2016. The gap between the lines is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted weighted averages.
| Year | Share count, change since 2016 | Revenue per share, change since 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| 2,016 | 0 | 0 |
| 2,017 | 0.2602 | -0.5484 |
| 2,018 | 0.4845 | -0.6083 |
| 2,019 | 0.6723 | -0.9357 |
| 2,020 | 1.1277 | -0.9857 |
| 2,021 | 1.6291 | -0.9778 |
| 2,022 | 1.7629 | -0.917 |
| 2,023 | 1.8123 | -0.7528 |
| 2,024 | 2.0196 | -0.5258 |
| 2,025 | 2.9461 | -0.6938 |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly view, revenue per share is the trailing twelve months over that quarter's diluted count
→UUUU issued 295% more shares from 2016 to 2025 and revenue per share still fell 69%. On this measure the new shares have not paid for themselves.
The share count and revenue per share over the same years, both indexed to 100 at the start, so the two lines can be compared directly.
What good looks like. The per-share line above the share-count line: whatever the company did with its shares, more business ended up behind each one.
If it rises or falls. Issuing shares is not automatically bad. It is bad when the money raised buys less growth than the dilution cost, which is exactly what the gap between these two lines shows.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 42.8% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $14M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
Every reading points down: a falling trend, not a dip inside a rising one.
Chart by TradingView
→UUUU is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. Both shorter readings point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
| ✕ | Price above the Kumo cloud | $8.47, below the cloud bottom of $13.59 |
| ✕ | Price above the Tenkan and the Kijun | $8.47 against the Tenkan (9 sessions) at $9.69 and the Kijun (26) at $10.80 |
| ✕ | Tenkan above the Kijun | Tenkan $9.69 below the Kijun $10.80, 26 sessions since they crossed |
| ✕ | The Senkou cloud ahead is rising | the Senkou spans already drawn for the next 26 sessions are falling and it turns down partway through |
| ✕ | Chikou above the price 26 sessions back | $8.47 against $13.63 26 sessions ago |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -66.1% vs 16.0% |
| Month | Buys ($) | Sells ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2023-11 | 0 | 69,000 |
| 2023-12 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-01 | 0 | 41,785 |
| 2024-02 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-03 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-04 | 0 | 92,800 |
| 2024-05 | 430,391 | 0 |
| 2024-06 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-07 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-08 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-09 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024-10 | 8,085 | 0 |
| 2024-11 | 0 | 134,635 |
| 2024-12 | 0 | 100,025 |
| 2025-01 | 0 | 54,400 |
| 2025-02 | 30,750 | 0 |
| 2025-03 | 40,604 | 92,146 |
| 2025-04 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-05 | 0 | 23,980 |
| 2025-06 | 0 | 1.2M |
| 2025-07 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-08 | 0 | 8.2M |
| 2025-09 | 0 | 623,530 |
| 2025-10 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-11 | 0 | 5.5M |
| 2025-12 | 0 | 1.5M |
| 2026-01 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-02 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-03 | 0 | 1.1M |
| 2026-04 | 0 | 280,650 |
| 2026-05 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-06 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-07 | 1.0M | 0 |
| 2026-08 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-09 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-10 | 0 | 0 |
→Since November 2023, insiders bought $2M and sold $19M on the open market, a net sale of $17M. A further 162 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-05 | Ross R. Bhappu | President and CEO | tax | 14,375 | $12.44 | $178,825 |
| 2026-07-08 | Bruce D Hansen | Director | BUY | 4,000 | $12.70 | $50,780 |
| 2026-07-07 | Ross R. Bhappu | President and CEO | BUY | 74,000 | $13.08 | $967,920 |
| 2026-04-10 | Daniel Kapostasy | VP, Technical Services | SELL | 15,000 | $18.71 | $280,650 |
| 2026-03-18 | Daniel Kapostasy | VP Technical Services | SELL | 25,000 | $18.84 | $471,000 |
| 2026-03-13 | Daniel Kapostasy | VP, Technical Services | exercise | 7,200 | $19.82 | $142,704 |
| 2026-03-10 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $20.27 | $40,540 |
| 2026-03-10 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $20.64 | $41,280 |
| 2026-03-10 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $21.01 | $42,020 |
| 2026-03-09 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $19.15 | $38,300 |
| 2026-03-09 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $19.52 | $39,040 |
| 2026-03-09 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $19.89 | $39,780 |
| 2026-03-09 | Dennis Lyle Higgs | Director | SELL | 2,000 | $19.92 | $39,840 |
| 2026-03-09 | Barbara Appelin Filas | Director | SELL | 5,000 | $19.51 | $97,551 |
| 2026-03-02 | Curtis Moore | SVP, Marketing & Corp. Develop | exercise | 15,478 | $21.32 | $329,991 |
| 2026-03-02 | Curtis Moore | SVP, Marketing & Corp. Develop | disposition | 15,478 | $21.32 | $329,991 |
| 2026-03-02 | Curtis Moore | SVP, Marketing & Corp. Develop | exercise | 8,288 | $21.32 | $176,700 |
| 2026-03-02 | Curtis Moore | SVP, Marketing & Corp. Develop | disposition | 8,288 | $21.32 | $176,700 |
| 2026-03-02 | Curtis Moore | Senior VP, Marketing & | SELL | 10,000 | $23.12 | $231,183 |
| 2026-01-27 | Saleem Drera | VP Radioisotopes, Radiological | tax | 5,287 | $24.16 | $127,734 |
| 2026-01-27 | Logan Shumway | VP, Processing Operations | tax | 5,589 | $24.16 | $135,030 |
| 2026-01-27 | Bernard Bonifas | VP, ISR Operations | tax | 6,501 | $24.16 | $157,064 |
| 2026-01-27 | Debra Bennethum | VP Critical Minerals/Strategic | tax | 2,278 | $24.16 | $55,036 |
| 2026-01-27 | Scott Bakken | VP, Regulatory Affairs | tax | 5,646 | $24.16 | $136,407 |
| 2026-01-27 | Daniel Kapostasy | VP, Technical Services | tax | 7,233 | $24.16 | $174,749 |
| 2026-01-27 | Nathan Reed Bennett | CFO | tax | 5,657 | $24.16 | $136,673 |
| 2026-01-27 | Curtis Moore | SVP Marketing/Corp Development | tax | 16,919 | $24.16 | $408,763 |
| 2026-01-27 | Oscar Armando German | SVP, Global Human Resources | tax | 1,165 | $24.16 | $28,146 |
| 2026-01-27 | Mark Chalmers | CEO | tax | 59,407 | $24.16 | $1.44M |
| 2026-01-27 | Akkooi Michiel Van | SVP, Global External Affairs | tax | 461 | $24.16 | $11,138 |
| 2026-01-27 | Nathan Longenecker | SVP and General Counsel | tax | 17,104 | $24.16 | $413,233 |
| 2026-01-27 | David C. Frydenlund | EVP & Chief Legal Officer | tax | 35,490 | $24.16 | $857,438 |
| 2026-01-27 | J. Birks Bovaird | Director | tax | 17,023 | $24.16 | $411,276 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 72.4% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is Van Eck Associates Corp, with 7.8%. Insiders hold 1.9%.
| # | Holder | Stake | Shares | Value | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Van Eck Associates CorpFund manager | 7.80% | 19.5M | $165M | +25.1% |
| 2 | MIRAE ASSET GLOBAL ETFS HOLDINGS Ltd.Fund manager | 6.86% | 17.1M | $145M | +1.7% |
| 3 | Global X Management CO LLCHolds over 5% · Form 13G, 31 March 2026 | 6.68% | 16.7M | $141M | - |
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Sign up freeSource: SEC Form 13F filings for the quarter to 30 June 2026, Schedules 13D and 13G, and Form 4. Shares on today's basis, value at the latest price.
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.