Supplies enriched uranium fuel for nuclear plants, and is building US enrichment capacity.
$114.94close as of 2026-10-16
-72.3% over 1Y · 89.1 points behind the S&P 500
LEUS&P 500 (SPY), rebased to LEU's first close
“Can Centrus bridge the end of DOE demonstration production while building commercial enrichment capacity in Piketon?”
Editorial note · updated 2026-10-08
The TenQ Radar
Centrus Energy in 36 checks
Centrus Energy on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 5 of 36 checks passed.
The Centrus Energy story
What drives Centrus Energy, what its price assumes and what could change the story, written from its own filings.
Orders depend on construction. At June 2026, Centrus had $3.0 billion in contingent LEU and HALEU commitments, including $2.4 billion under definitive agreements, generally tied to operational milestones.
Government support changes form. The $900 million DOE enrichment award supports commercial expansion, while DOE has indicated it does not intend to exercise further options under the separate HALEU Operation Contract.
Expansion consumes cash. Free cash flow was -$164 million over the last twelve months, and Centrus expects capital deployment of $350 million to $500 million for the full year 2026.
Q2 '26 · quarter to 30 June 2026 · reported 5 August 2026 · Earnings release ↗
Revenue$176M+14%vs 2025+130%vs Q1
Earnings$17M-42%vs 2025+68%vs Q1
What the release says
Highlights
Centrus signed a $900 million High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) enrichment award contract with the U.S. Department of Energy and grew its contingent LEU and HALEU enrichment backlog to $3.0 billion.
The company selected Geiger Brothers as the construction contractor for a major uranium enrichment plant expansion and signed its first large-scale commercial HALEU supply agreement, which may include prepayments.
Centrus is raising its full year 2026 hiring guidance in Piketon, Ohio, and expects to complete its first new centrifuge in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by year-end 2026.
Revenue from the LEU segment increased by 22% year-over-year to $153.4 million, while Technical Solutions segment revenue decreased by 21% primarily due to lower revenue from the HALEU Operation Contract.
What management expects
For the full year 2026, Centrus expects total revenue to be in the range of $450 million to $500 million and total capital deployment to be in the range of $350 million to $500 million, driven by increased investment in industrial build out.
Operationally, Centrus expects to finalize contracts with all critical partners, hire at least 100 net new employees for Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and at least 175 net new employees for Piketon, Ohio, release a Certified for Construction package, and complete its first centrifuge in Oak Ridge by year-end 2026.
The 2026 guidance assumes no significant change in restrictions on Russian LEU or other uranium products, no major economic disruptions, successful implementation of expansion projects, and ongoing business operations.
Key risks
New Centrus may require additional capital to support business growth, and such capital might not be available on acceptable terms or at all; future sales of common stock, including under its ATM program, or incurrence of additional debt could dilute existing stockholders or impose restrictive terms.
New If Centrus issues additional equity or debt securities, including through its shelf registration statement or in connection with acquisitions or strategic transactions, stockholders may experience dilution and new securities could have rights senior to existing common stock.
Centrus faces significant risk from the war in Ukraine and related international sanctions, including the Import Ban Act and Russian Decree, which could disrupt its ability to obtain, deliver, or sell LEU or SWU sourced from Russia, potentially impacting its ability to meet customer obligations and causing financial losses.
The company is highly dependent on a small number of customers and suppliers, particularly the Russian supplier TENEX, and disruptions in supply or customer demand could materially affect revenues, profitability, and business viability.
Centrus may not be able to secure additional contracts or funding from the U.S. government or other sources to continue operating its HALEU enrichment facility after current contracts end, which could result in facility closure and loss of NRC license.
The company has significant long-term liabilities, including convertible notes and postretirement benefit obligations, and may require substantial cash to service debt or fund benefit plans, which could constrain liquidity and financial flexibility.
AI summary of the company's filings, every number checked against them · 8 October 2026 · Sources: earnings release, 10-K, 10-Q
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I
Value
●●●●●●0/6
Expensive against its own history and its sector: the price asks a lot of the business.
47.2xown 7-year median 7.6x
5.0xown 10-year median 1.5x
-7.0%cash earned per $ of price
97.6xwhole-business multiple
Valuation history
Is LEU's P/E, P/S or P/B high or low against its own past?
Year
P/E
P/S
P/B
2017
3.5732
0.1996
-
2020
1.8828
0.4143
-
2021
2.6141
1.5336
-
2022
10.503
1.8661
-
2023
7.5741
1.9964
19.7911
2024
11.7642
1.9483
5.3354
2025
46.2614
8.0213
4.7041
2026
47.2202
4.9607
2.7808
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→At 47.2x earnings, the market is paying +523% more than LEU's own 7-year median of 7.6x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price. Today's multiple is the highest in the charted history.
What this measures
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
Earnings yield
Does LEU's earnings yield beat a 10-year Treasury?
Period
Earnings yield
10-year Treasury
2017
0.2799
0.0233
2020
0.5311
0.0083
2021
0.3825
0.0146
2022
0.0952
0.03
2023
0.132
0.0397
2024
0.085
0.0424
2025
0.0216
0.0425
2026
0.0212
0.051
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it · the Treasury line is the average 10-year yield over the same year or quarter, and today's yield at the last point
→At today's price, LEU earns 2.1% of its share price in profit a year, less than the 5.1% a 10-year Treasury pays.
What this measures
Earnings yield is profit per share divided by the share price: 1 ÷ P/E. It is the profit you buy with each dollar of share price. The 10-year US Treasury yield is what the government pays, with no risk to the payment, for lending to it for ten years.
What good looks like. An earnings yield above the Treasury yield: each dollar in the shares buys more profit than the same dollar earns in a government bond.
If it rises or falls. It falls when the share price rises faster than profit, and the bar rises when interest rates do: a higher Treasury yield makes the same shares harder to justify. A company whose profit is growing fast can sit below the line for years, which is what the price is betting on.
Free cash flow yield
What is LEU's free cash flow yield at today's price?
Period
FCF yield
2016
1.1347
2017
-0.3808
2018
-2.6291
2019
0.3132
2020
0.6414
2021
0.1067
2022
0.0363
2023
0.0117
2024
0.0382
2025
0.0087
2026
-0.0697
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Every dollar of market value currently buys -7.0% of annual free cash flow, less than its 10-year median of 3.8% - you are paying up for the same cash.
What this measures
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
Enterprise value
What is LEU's EV/EBITDA: the price of the whole business, debt included?
Period
EV / EBITDA
2020
1.1068
2021
4.8318
2022
6.7844
2023
8.9706
2024
11.3663
2025
46.8676
2026
97.64
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Buying LEU outright - equity plus debt, less the cash - costs 97.6x its EBITDA, above the 14.0x a broad market median sits at. Its own history runs at 9.0x, so the whole business is dearer than usual.
What this measures
Enterprise value over EBITDA. Enterprise value is the market value of the equity plus debt, less cash and short-term investments - what it would cost to buy the whole company outright. EBITDA is operating profit before depreciation and amortisation.
What good looks like. A multiple below what similar businesses change hands at, and one that has not run far above the company's own past.
If it rises or falls. It rises when the price rises or profit falls, and debt moves it too: two companies on the same price-to-earnings can sit far apart here if one is carrying borrowings the other is not.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on
II
Growth
●●●●●●2/6
Growth is weak or inconsistent. The trend, not the story, is the problem.
+8.5%vs the year before
+15.2%compound annual
-53.7%net income growth
+14.2%compound annual
Revenue history
Is LEU's revenue growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Revenue ($)
Q3 2011
374.5M
Q4 2011
462.4M
Q1 2012
542.0M
Q2 2012
353.8M
Q3 2012
563.0M
Q4 2012
403.3M
Q1 2013
320.4M
Q2 2013
284.8M
Q3 2013
303.8M
Q4 2013
398.5M
Q1 2014
148.6M
Q2 2014
121.2M
Q3 2014
120.7M
Q4 2014
123.6M
Q1 2015
167.8M
Q2 2015
63.3M
Q3 2015
29.2M
Q4 2015
157.9M
Q1 2016
90.0M
Q2 2016
63.4M
Q3 2016
21.4M
Q4 2016
136.5M
Q1 2017
7.2M
Q2 2017
44.0M
Q3 2017
50.3M
Q4 2017
116.9M
Q1 2018
35.7M
Q2 2018
39.4M
Q3 2018
34.1M
Q4 2018
83.8M
Q1 2019
38.7M
Q2 2019
10.6M
Q3 2019
104.7M
Q4 2019
55.7M
Q1 2020
45.0M
Q2 2020
75.7M
Q3 2020
33.6M
Q4 2020
92.9M
Q1 2021
55.6M
Q2 2021
62.4M
Q3 2021
91.3M
Q4 2021
89.0M
Q1 2022
35.3M
Q2 2022
99.1M
Q3 2022
33.2M
Q4 2022
126.2M
Q1 2023
66.9M
Q2 2023
98.4M
Q3 2023
51.3M
Q4 2023
103.6M
Q1 2024
43.7M
Q2 2024
189.0M
Q3 2024
57.7M
Q4 2024
151.6M
Q1 2025
73.1M
Q2 2025
154.5M
Q3 2025
74.9M
Q4 2025
146.2M
Q1 2026
76.7M
Q2 2026
176.1M
2011
1.60B
2012
1.86B
2013
1.31B
2014
514.1M
2015
418.2M
2016
311.3M
2017
218.4M
2018
193.0M
2019
209.7M
2020
247.2M
2021
298.3M
2022
293.8M
2023
320.2M
2024
442.0M
2025
448.7M
→Revenue reached $449M in 2025, compounding +15% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The last twelve months (+8%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing. The trailing twelve months are already running at $474M, ahead of the last full year.
What this measures
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
Profit history
Is LEU's net profit growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Net income ($)
Q3 2011
-6.9M
Q4 2011
-446.4M
Q1 2012
-28.8M
Q2 2012
-92.0M
Q3 2012
4.5M
Q4 2012
-1.08B
Q1 2013
-2.0M
Q2 2013
-40.9M
Q3 2013
-44.3M
Q4 2013
-71.7M
Q1 2014
-50.8M
Q2 2014
-28.0M
Q3 2014
418.9M
Q4 2014
-42.3M
Q1 2015
-15.4M
Q2 2015
-15.1M
Q3 2015
-55.1M
Q4 2015
-101.8M
Q1 2016
-14.6M
Q2 2016
-2.9M
Q3 2016
-41.3M
Q4 2016
-8.2M
Q1 2017
7.6M
Q2 2017
-22.4M
Q3 2017
-8.5M
Q4 2017
35.5M
Q1 2018
-25.0M
Q2 2018
-26.1M
Q3 2018
-7.8M
Q4 2018
-45.2M
Q1 2019
-20.9M
Q2 2019
-15.6M
Q3 2019
22.8M
Q4 2019
-2.8M
Q1 2020
11.3M
Q2 2020
33.7M
Q3 2020
-7.0M
Q4 2020
16.4M
Q1 2021
5.1M
Q2 2021
11.6M
Q3 2021
42.1M
Q4 2021
116.2M
Q1 2022
-400,000
Q2 2022
37.4M
Q3 2022
-6.1M
Q4 2022
21.3M
Q1 2023
7.2M
Q2 2023
12.7M
Q3 2023
8.2M
Q4 2023
56.3M
Q1 2024
-6.1M
Q2 2024
30.6M
Q3 2024
-5.0M
Q4 2024
53.7M
Q1 2025
27.2M
Q2 2025
28.9M
Q3 2025
3.9M
Q4 2025
17.8M
Q1 2026
10.0M
Q2 2026
16.8M
2010
7.5M
2011
-491.1M
2012
-1.20B
2013
-158.9M
2015
-187.4M
2016
-67.0M
2017
12.2M
2018
-104.1M
2019
-16.5M
2020
54.4M
2021
175.0M
2022
52.2M
2023
84.4M
2024
73.2M
2025
77.8M
→Net income was $78M in 2025, compounding +14% a year over three years. Earnings per share moved -54% over the last twelve months. Trailing twelve-month profit stands at $49M.
What this measures
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Growth rate
How fast are LEU's revenue and earnings growing?
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2011 earnings -6648% · 2018 earnings -953% · 2021 earnings +222% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
Year
Revenue growth
Earnings growth
2,012
0.1632
-
2,013
-0.2978
-
2,014
-0.6068
-
2,015
-0.1865
-
2,016
-0.2556
-
2,017
-0.2984
-
2,018
-0.1163
-
2,019
0.0865
-
2,020
0.1788
-
2,021
0.2067
-
2,022
-0.0151
-0.7017
2,023
0.0899
0.6169
2,024
0.3804
-0.1327
2,025
0.0152
0.0628
2026
0.0847
-0.5372
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Revenue grew 8% over the twelve months to 2026-06-30, against an average of +14% a year over 2021-2025. Earnings went the other way (fell 54%) even as sales grew, so margins compressed: costs rose faster than revenue.
What this measures
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Per-share growth
Are LEU's revenue and free cash flow per share growing?
Year
Revenue per share ($)
Free cash flow per share ($)
2,011
333.5
-20.1042
2,012
380.0204
28.2857
2,013
266.8367
16.5714
2,016
34.2088
3.8132
2,017
24.0502
-1.828
2,018
21.0906
-8.1412
2,019
21.9214
1.1708
2,020
24.4196
6.4902
2,021
21.4929
3.5161
2,022
19.6023
1.3277
2,023
20.6567
0.4838
2,024
26.9957
2.0094
2,025
22.5194
1.5709
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Revenue per share reached $22.52 in 2025, compounding +5% a year against +15% for LEU as a whole. Dilution absorbed about 10.4 points of that growth. The trailing twelve months are running at $23.78 a share. Free cash flow per share stands at $1.57.
What this measures
Revenue and free cash flow, each divided by the number of shares in issue and adjusted for splits so old and new years compare honestly. Both lines rising means each share owns more of the business's sales and cash.
What good looks like. Both lines rising, and revenue per share growing at least as fast as the company's total revenue, which the answer compares. Faster means buybacks are working for you; slower means new shares are absorbing part of the growth.
If it rises or falls. This is the line that actually reaches you. A company can grow revenue every year and still shrink your slice by issuing shares faster than it grows.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
23.7%kept after direct costs
1.6%kept after running costs
7.8%profit on shareholders' money
0.4%against a 10% cost of capital
-113%operating cash ÷ net income
Margins
What profit margin does LEU keep on each sale?
Year
Gross
Operating
Net
2,011
0.0471
-0.1555
-0.3068
2,012
0.0695
-0.6199
-0.6448
2,013
-0.0726
-0.1764
-0.1215
2,014
-0.0803
-
-
2,015
0.1648
-0.4027
-0.4481
2,016
0.1449
-0.1982
-0.2152
2,017
0.1383
-0.2047
0.0559
2,018
-0.0927
-0.4788
-0.5394
2,019
0.155
-0.0939
-0.0787
2,020
0.3948
0.2063
0.2201
2,021
0.3838
0.229
0.5867
2,022
0.4013
0.2032
0.1777
2,023
0.3501
0.1636
0.2636
2,024
0.2523
0.1086
0.1656
2,025
0.2619
0.1119
0.1734
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating margin compressed 9 points to 11% since 2022. After everything, 17 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit.
What this measures
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
Earnings quality
Does LEU's operating cash flow keep up with its profit?
Year
Cash from operations
Net income
2,010
22.5M
7.5M
2,011
56.3M
-491.1M
2,012
142.9M
-1.20B
2,013
81.2M
-158.9M
2,015
8.5M
-187.4M
2,016
37.7M
-67.0M
2,017
-16.1M
12.2M
2,018
-74.4M
-104.1M
2,019
11.3M
-16.5M
2,020
67.1M
54.4M
2,021
50.0M
175.0M
2,022
20.6M
52.2M
2,023
9.1M
84.4M
2,024
37.0M
73.2M
2,025
51.0M
77.8M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→LEU reported $78M of profit in 2025 while operating cash flow ran to -$51M. The profit was booked but the cash went out, so the receivables, inventory and payables lines are where that gap sits.
What this measures
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
Returns on capital
What return on equity and on capital does LEU earn?
Year
ROE
ROA
ROCE
2,010
0.0058
0.0019
0.0131
2,011
-0.4754
-0.1384
-0.1261
2,024
0.7558
0.0669
0.0643
2,025
0.1679
0.0318
0.0248
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→ROE of 8% sits well above ROCE of 0%. A meaningful share of the shareholder return is manufactured with leverage rather than operations.
What this measures
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
Income waterfall
Where does LEU's revenue go, from sales to net profit?
Step
Amount ($)
Revenue, last 12m
473.9M
Gross profit
112.1M
Operating income
7.4M
Net income
48.5M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Of $474M over the twelve months to 2026-06-30 sales, $112M survives production costs, $7M survives running the company, and $49M - 10¢ of every dollar - reaches the bottom line.
What this measures
One year of revenue, with each major cost taken out in the order the income statement takes it, ending at net profit.
What good looks like. No single step swallowing a surprising share, and a bottom line that survives all of them.
If it rises or falls. The largest step is where the business really spends its money, and it is the one to watch year to year: a step that grows faster than revenue is what margin compression looks like before it reaches the margin chart.
Cash conversion
How much of each sale does LEU turn into free cash flow?
Period
FCF margin
2011
-0.0603
2012
0.0744
2013
0.0621
2015
0.0196
2016
0.1115
2017
-0.076
2018
-0.386
2019
0.0534
2020
0.2658
2021
0.1636
2022
0.0677
2023
0.0234
2024
0.0744
2025
0.0698
→7 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, and it has held steady since 2022. The trailing twelve months run at -35 cents.
What this measures
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
Spending intensity
How much of its revenue does LEU spend on capex, R&D and stock pay?
Year
Capex % of rev
R&D % of rev
Stock comp % of rev
2,011
0.0955
0.1697
0.005
2,012
0.0023
0.7052
0.0027
2,013
0
0.1423
0.0015
2,015
0.0007
0.0789
0.001
2,016
0.0096
0.1539
0.0016
2,017
0.0023
0.0719
0.0023
2,018
0.0005
0.1352
0.0021
2,019
0.0005
0.0696
0.0067
2,020
0.0057
0.0113
0.0287
2,021
0.004
0.007
0.0409
2,022
0.0024
0.0504
0.0065
2,023
0.005
0.0443
0.0072
2,024
0.0093
0.0389
0.0034
2,025
0.0439
0.0377
0.0127
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 4% of revenue (research and development 4%, stock compensation 1%). That share has risen since 2022, so the cost of competing is climbing.
What this measures
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
Operating leverage
Does LEU's operating profit grow faster than its revenue?
Year
Revenue growth
Operating income growth
2,021
0.2067
0.3392
2,022
-0.0151
-0.1259
2,023
0.0899
-0.1223
2,024
0.3804
-0.084
2,025
0.0152
0.0458
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Operating profit outgrew revenue in only 2 of the last 5 years. Costs are growing roughly in step with the business, so scale isn't yet paying for itself.
What this measures
How often operating profit grew faster than revenue, year by year. Fixed costs mean profit should rise faster than sales once those costs are covered.
What good looks like. Profit outgrowing revenue in most years, and by a widening margin in the good ones.
If it rises or falls. Leverage cuts both ways: the same fixed costs that multiply profit on the way up multiply the damage when sales fall. A business with strong operating leverage is a better business and a more volatile one.
Customer concentrationInsight
How much of Centrus Energy's revenue comes from its largest customers?
→Centrus Energy's four largest customers made up 55% of its revenue in FY2025. The largest alone was 16%, up from 12% in FY2021.
Source: SEC filings: customer concentration notes (XBRL) · as at 2026-06-30
Return on capital employed
Is LEU's return on capital above what its capital costs?
Period
Return on capital employed
2010
0.0131
2011
-0.1261
2012
-1.7715
2015
-0.3585
2016
-0.1591
2017
-0.1644
2018
-0.6947
2019
-0.1654
2020
0.4243
2021
0.3814
2022
0.2329
2023
0.1612
2024
0.0643
2025
0.0248
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→LEU earns 2.5% on the capital it employs, below the 10% most investors treat as the cost of capital. It was 23.3% in 2022, so the trend is down.
What this measures
The same return as the card above, but every filed year, against a 10% line that stands in for what capital costs.
What good looks like. Years above the line, and a trend that is flat or rising rather than drifting down towards it.
If it rises or falls. A business earning above its cost of capital creates value by growing; one earning below it destroys value by growing. The 10% line is a convention, not a law, so read the distance from it rather than the crossing.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
The balance sheet carries real risk. Read the checks before anything else.
1.39xborrowed vs owned
5.4xnear-term bills coverage
1xearnings ÷ interest bill
$1.9Bcash plus short-term investments
Debt & cash
How much debt does LEU carry, and do its profits cover the interest?
Year
Total debt
Cash & investments
2,012
530.0M
292.9M
2,013
530.0M
314.2M
2,014
769.7M
218.8M
2,015
247.0M
234.0M
2,016
234.1M
260.7M
2,017
163.6M
208.8M
2,018
161.4M
123.1M
2,019
120.2M
130.7M
2,020
114.1M
152.0M
2,021
107.9M
193.8M
2,022
101.8M
179.9M
2,023
95.7M
201.2M
2,024
478.6M
671.4M
2,025
1.17B
1.96B
2,026
1.18B
1.87B
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→The company holds $1.9B in cash against $1.2B of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
What this measures
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
Near-term liquidity
Do LEU's current assets cover the bills due within a year?
Period
Current ratio
2010
1.777
2011
1.3909
2012
1.3357
2013
0.9093
2015
1.8784
2016
1.7212
2017
1.4053
2018
1.1044
2019
1.0974
2020
1.1093
2021
1.1846
2022
1.307
2023
1.4549
2024
2.9273
2025
5.5904
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 5.4x of current assets for every dollar due within the year. That is stronger than in 2010.
What this measures
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
Interest cover
How many times over can LEU's operating profit pay its interest bill?
Period
Interest cover (x)
2010
56.1667
2011
-21.4569
2012
-22.9028
2013
-5.7531
2015
-8.5918
2016
-3.132
2017
-8.434
2018
-22.5366
2019
-6.5667
2020
510
2021
683
2022
119.4
2024
30
2025
4.016
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating profit does not cover the interest bill (0.5x). Cover was 56.2x in 2010, so the margin of safety has narrowed.
What this measures
Operating profit divided by interest expense - how many times over the year's earnings could pay the year's interest.
What good looks like. High and steady. Five times is a common floor; comfortably above it means the debt is being carried, not merely serviced.
If it rises or falls. It falls when profit falls or when borrowing costs rise, and a company can look safe on the level while the direction is telling you otherwise.
Cash conversion
How much of LEU's revenue arrives as operating cash?
Period
Operating cash flow / revenue
2011
0.0352
2012
0.0767
2013
0.0621
2015
0.0203
2016
0.1211
2017
-0.0737
2018
-0.3855
2019
0.0539
2020
0.2714
2021
0.1676
2022
0.0701
2023
0.0284
2024
0.0837
2025
0.1137
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→LEU's operations consumed cash rather than produced it over the last twelve months. Down from 3.5% in 2011.
What this measures
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
Shareholders' equity
Is LEU's shareholder equity (book value) growing?
Period
Equity ($)
2012
-472.9M
2013
-458.2M
2014
21.6M
2015
-165.7M
2016
-236.1M
2017
-218.9M
2018
-321.9M
2019
-336.9M
2020
-320.6M
2021
-141.9M
2022
-74.1M
2023
32.3M
2024
161.4M
2025
765.1M
2026
845.4M
→The company's own capital grew from $32M in 2023 to $845M (+2517%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What this measures
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
LEU returns nothing to shareholders yet, and the share count keeps rising. Every dollar stays in the business.
-bought back, TTM, over market value
-at the current rate
-dividends plus buybacks
$6Mlast 12m, dilutes the buybacks
+224.5%since 2009 (split-adjusted)
Share count change (split-adjusted)
Is LEU's share count rising or falling?
Year
Share-count change
2,010
0.0406
2,011
-0.2797
2,012
0.0208
2,013
0
2,016
0.8571
2,017
-0.0021
2,018
0.0077
2,019
0.0454
2,020
0.0582
2,021
0.371
2,022
0.0799
2,023
0.0342
2,024
0.0563
2,025
0.2169
→The share count grew 21.7% in 2025, averaging 10.2% a year over three years. Your slice of the company shrinks by that much each year unless earnings grow faster.
What this measures
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
Dilution against what it bought
Has LEU's revenue per share grown faster than its share count?
Change since 2011. The gap between the lines is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted weighted averages.
Year
Share count, change since 2011
Revenue per share, change since 2011
2,011
0
0
2,012
0.0208
0.1395
2,013
0.0208
-0.1999
2,016
0.8958
-0.8974
2,017
0.8919
-0.9279
2,018
0.9065
-0.9368
2,019
0.9929
-0.9343
2,020
1.109
-0.9268
2,021
1.8915
-0.9356
2,022
2.1225
-0.9412
2,023
2.2294
-0.9381
2,024
2.411
-0.9191
2,025
3.151
-0.9325
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly view, revenue per share is the trailing twelve months over that quarter's diluted count
→LEU issued 211% more shares from 2009 to 2025 and revenue per share still fell 93%. On this measure the new shares have not paid for themselves.
What this measures
The share count and revenue per share over the same years, both indexed to 100 at the start, so the two lines can be compared directly.
What good looks like. The per-share line above the share-count line: whatever the company did with its shares, more business ended up behind each one.
If it rises or falls. Issuing shares is not automatically bad. It is bad when the money raised buys less growth than the dilution cost, which is exactly what the gap between these two lines shows.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
→LEU is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. Both shorter readings point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
Are LEU's insiders buying or selling shares with their own money?
Month
Buys ($)
Sells ($)
2023-12
0
0
2024-01
0
0
2024-02
0
646,778
2024-03
0
0
2024-04
0
0
2024-05
0
0
2024-06
0
0
2024-07
0
0
2024-08
0
112,920
2024-09
0
0
2024-10
0
0
2024-11
0
0
2024-12
0
0
2025-01
0
0
2025-02
0
481,240
2025-03
0
0
2025-04
0
0
2025-05
0
577,157
2025-06
0
0
2025-07
0
0
2025-08
0
0
2025-09
0
0
2025-10
0
0
2025-11
0
0
2025-12
0
0
2026-01
0
0
2026-02
0
0
2026-03
0
0
2026-04
0
0
2026-05
0
62,286
2026-06
0
0
2026-07
0
0
2026-08
0
0
2026-09
0
0
2026-10
0
0
→Since December 2023, insiders sold $2M on the open market and bought nothing. Many sales are pre-scheduled diversification rather than a view on the price. A further 57 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
What this measures
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
The record
Who did what, exactly?
Date
Insider
Role
Type
Shares
Price
Value
2026-08-11
Todd M Tinelli
SVP, CFO & Treasurer
tax
206
$189.19
$38,973
2026-05-11
Todd M Tinelli
SVP, CFO & Treasurer
SELL
306
$203.55
$62,286
2026-04-21
Patrick Sidney Brown
SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS
tax
389
$191.55
$74,513
2026-03-15
John M A Donelson
SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Off
tax
836
$209.64
$175,259
2025-12-04
Amir Vadim Vexler
President and CEO
tax
1,804
$278.63
$502,649
2025-08-11
Todd M Tinelli
SVP, CFO & Treasurer
tax
150
$219.10
$32,865
2025-05-30
Kevin J Harrill
CFO & Treasurer
SELL
1,728
$126.00
$217,728
2025-05-13
John M A Donelson
SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Off
SELL
3,732
$96.31
$359,429
2025-03-31
Larry B Cutlip
SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS
tax
1,246
$62.21
$77,514
2025-03-31
John M A Donelson
SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Officr
tax
1,588
$62.21
$98,789
2025-03-31
Kevin J Harrill
SVP, CFO and Treasurer
tax
745
$62.21
$46,346
2025-02-12
Larry B Cutlip
SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS
SELL
4,000
$120.31
$481,240
2024-12-04
Amir Vadim Vexler
PRESIDENT & CEO
tax
1,804
$76.55
$138,096
2024-08-13
Larry B Cutlip
SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS
SELL
3,000
$37.64
$112,920
2024-03-13
Larry B Cutlip
SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS
tax
1,160
$42.38
$49,161
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
VIII
Ownership
informational
73.1%on Form 13F, 30 June 2026
0.8%officers, directors, founders
52.5%together
Top holders
Who owns Centrus Energy stock?
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 73.1% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is Van Eck Associates Corp, with 8.1%. Insiders hold 0.8%.
#
Holder
Stake
Shares
Value
Change
1
Van Eck Associates CorpFund manager
8.08%
1.7M
$190M
+36.5%
2
State Street CorpFund manager
8.01%
1.6M
$188M
+16.8%
3
BlackRock, Inc.Fund manager
7.57%
1.5M
$178M
+4.0%
4
Bank of Nova ScotiaHolds over 5% · Form 13G, 30 June 2026
6.64%
1.4M
$156M
-
5
MIRAE ASSET GLOBAL ETFS HOLDINGS Ltd.Fund manager
6.15%
1.3M
$145M
+1.4%
6
Global X Management CO LLCHolds over 5% · Form 13G, 31 March 2026
5.94%
1.2M
$140M
-
7
Vanguard Capital Management LLCFund manager
3.96%
809,186
$93M
+0.8%
8
Geode Capital Management, LLCFund manager
2.32%
474,822
$55M
+10.6%
9
Bank of New York Mellon CorpFund manager
1.99%
406,771
$47M
+6.8%
10
D. E. Shaw & Co., L.P.Holds over 5% · Form 13G, 31 March 2026
1.81%
371,196
$43M
-
11
Dimensional Fund Advisors LPFund manager
1.79%
366,246
$42M
+2.2%
12
Morgan StanleyFund manager
1.48%
303,523
$35M
+93.4%
13
Renaissance Technologies LLCFund manager
1.37%
280,482
$32M
+74.7%
14
Two Sigma Investments, LPFund manager
1.15%
235,301
$27M
+74.6%
15
Vanguard Portfolio Management LLCFund manager
1.14%
232,657
$27M
+2.4%
16
Reaves W H & Co IncFund manager
1.11%
226,429
$26M
+6.9%
17
Goehring & Rozencwajg Associates, LLCFund manager
1.06%
216,750
$25M
+7.3%
18
American Century Companies IncFund manager
1.06%
215,930
$25M
-5.9%
19
Goldman Sachs Group IncFund manager
1.00%
204,008
$23M
+91.0%
20
UBS Group AGFund manager
0.93%
189,380
$22M
-29.0%
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Source: SEC Form 13F filings for the quarter to 30 June 2026, Schedules 13D and 13G, and Form 4. Shares on today's basis, value at the latest price.
Where does this list come from?
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.