→BlackRock (BLK) and Goldman Sachs (GS) are close in size, worth $175.8B and $256.6B, and BlackRock passes more of the TenQ Score checks, 16 of 36 against 14.
Each company is scored on the same checks, computed from its own filings: value, growth, quality, financial health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the more checks it passes.
→The two are furthest apart on Shareholder returns, where Goldman Sachs passes 3 more checks.
→Goldman Sachs brings in $66.2B of revenue a year to BlackRock's $27.3B, 2.4 times as much. BlackRock keeps 24.1% of revenue as profit against 31.7% at Goldman Sachs.
Goldman Sachs costs less for each dollar of profit, a P/E of 13.3x against 27.7x. Against its own past, BlackRock trades above its usual 19.7x and Goldman Sachs above its usual 9.6x.
| Year | BLK P/E | GS P/E | BLK P/S | GS P/S | BLK P/B | GS P/B |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | - | 8.0549 | - | 1.9354 | - | 0.6858 |
| 2017 | - | 18.291 | - | 2.3952 | - | 0.9532 |
| 2018 | - | 7.2227 | - | 2.0631 | - | 0.8376 |
| 2019 | - | 7.6603 | - | 1.7745 | - | 0.7185 |
| 2020 | - | 6.8017 | - | 1.4438 | - | 0.6707 |
| 2021 | - | 5.2885 | - | 1.9282 | - | 1.0409 |
| 2022 | 18.2532 | 9.5742 | 5.2882 | 2.2763 | 2.4954 | 0.92 |
| 2023 | 17.5936 | 12.653 | 5.4202 | 2.3296 | 2.4602 | 0.9217 |
| 2024 | 19.6656 | 10.4807 | 6.1376 | 2.7961 | 2.6371 | 1.2265 |
| 2025 | 29.2133 | 12.3906 | 6.6989 | 3.6515 | 2.9026 | 1.7029 |
| 2026 | 27.75 | 13.3452 | 6.4407 | 3.8759 | 3.0518 | 2.0905 |
◌ The last point is at each company's latest close. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's price to earnings is 27.7x, against 13.3x at GS.
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
| Period | BLK free cash flow yield | GS free cash flow yield |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | - | 0.0609 |
| 2017 | - | -0.302 |
| 2018 | - | 0.1136 |
| 2019 | - | 0.2378 |
| 2020 | - | -0.3862 |
| 2021 | - | 0.0143 |
| 2022 | 0.0468 | 0.046 |
| 2023 | 0.0395 | -0.1383 |
| 2024 | 0.0375 | -0.1023 |
| 2025 | 0.0219 | -0.2219 |
| 2026 | 0.02 | -0.1618 |
◌ The last point is at each company's latest close. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's free cash flow yield is 2.0%, against -16.2% at GS.
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash a business produces. A high multiple is not automatically bad, since fast growers can earn theirs, but a price far above a company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. Each company is measured against its own past and its sector.
BlackRock grew revenue faster over the last twelve months, +26.5% against +17.8% at Goldman Sachs, 9 percentage points apart. Over three years the order is the same, BlackRock at +10.7% a year and Goldman Sachs at +7.2%.
| Period | BLK revenue | GS revenue |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 28.81B |
| 2012 | - | 34.16B |
| 2013 | - | 34.21B |
| 2014 | - | 34.53B |
| 2015 | - | 33.82B |
| 2016 | - | 30.79B |
| 2017 | - | 32.73B |
| 2018 | - | 36.62B |
| 2019 | - | 36.55B |
| 2020 | - | 44.56B |
| 2021 | - | 59.34B |
| 2022 | 17.87B | 47.37B |
| 2023 | 17.86B | 46.25B |
| 2024 | 20.41B | 53.51B |
| 2025 | 24.22B | 58.28B |
| 2026 | 27.30B | 66.20B |
◌ The last yearly bar is the trailing twelve months. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's revenue is $27.3B, against $66.2B at GS.
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
| Period | BLK net profit | GS net profit |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 4.44B |
| 2012 | - | 7.47B |
| 2013 | - | 8.04B |
| 2014 | - | 8.48B |
| 2015 | - | 6.08B |
| 2016 | - | 7.40B |
| 2017 | - | 4.29B |
| 2018 | - | 10.46B |
| 2019 | - | 8.47B |
| 2020 | - | 9.46B |
| 2021 | - | 21.64B |
| 2022 | 5.18B | 11.26B |
| 2023 | 5.50B | 8.52B |
| 2024 | 6.37B | 14.28B |
| 2025 | 5.55B | 17.18B |
| 2026 | 6.58B | 20.97B |
◌ The last yearly bar is the trailing twelve months. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's net profit is $6.6B, against $21.0B at GS.
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
| Period | BLK revenue growth | GS revenue growth |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | - | 0.1858 |
| 2013 | - | 0.0013 |
| 2014 | - | 0.0094 |
| 2015 | - | -0.0205 |
| 2016 | - | -0.0896 |
| 2017 | - | 0.063 |
| 2018 | - | 0.1187 |
| 2019 | - | -0.0019 |
| 2020 | - | 0.2193 |
| 2021 | - | 0.3317 |
| 2022 | - | -0.2018 |
| 2023 | -0.0008 | -0.0235 |
| 2024 | 0.1427 | 0.1569 |
| 2025 | 0.1867 | 0.0892 |
◌ On the quarterly view, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before.
→On the latest figures, BLK's revenue growth is 26.5%, against 17.8% at GS.
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Growth here is what each company has reported to the SEC, not a forecast: the last year, the three-year pace, and whether growth is speeding up or slowing down. Both companies are measured the same way, so their lines can be read against each other.
| Year | BLK Net | GS Net |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.1542 |
| 2012 | - | 0.2188 |
| 2013 | - | 0.235 |
| 2014 | - | 0.2455 |
| 2015 | - | 0.1799 |
| 2016 | - | 0.2403 |
| 2017 | - | 0.131 |
| 2018 | - | 0.2856 |
| 2019 | - | 0.2317 |
| 2020 | - | 0.2123 |
| 2021 | - | 0.3646 |
| 2022 | 0.2897 | 0.2377 |
| 2023 | 0.3081 | 0.1841 |
| 2024 | 0.3121 | 0.2668 |
| 2025 | 0.2293 | 0.2947 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's net margin is 24.1%, against 31.7% at GS.
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
| Period | BLK operating cash per dollar of profit | GS operating cash per dollar of profit |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 5.0655 |
| 2012 | - | 1.7229 |
| 2013 | - | 0.565 |
| 2014 | - | -0.9357 |
| 2015 | - | 1.5586 |
| 2016 | - | 0.8778 |
| 2017 | - | -4.7804 |
| 2018 | - | 1.5837 |
| 2019 | - | 2.8193 |
| 2020 | - | -1.9595 |
| 2021 | - | 0.2911 |
| 2022 | 0.9571 | 0.7733 |
| 2023 | 0.757 | -1.478 |
| 2024 | 0.7781 | -0.9255 |
| 2025 | 0.7072 | -2.6289 |
◌ Operating cash flow divided by net income, in years with a profit. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's operating cash per dollar of profit is 0.7x, against -2.6x at GS.
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
| Year | BLK Return on equity | GS Return on equity |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.0601 |
| 2012 | - | 0.1023 |
| 2013 | - | 0.1043 |
| 2014 | - | 0.1051 |
| 2015 | - | 0.0718 |
| 2016 | - | 0.0852 |
| 2017 | - | 0.0507 |
| 2018 | - | 0.1213 |
| 2019 | - | 0.0938 |
| 2020 | - | 0.1016 |
| 2021 | - | 0.2102 |
| 2022 | 0.1368 | 0.0992 |
| 2023 | 0.1425 | 0.0728 |
| 2024 | 0.1467 | 0.1195 |
| 2025 | 0.1074 | 0.1391 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's return on equity is 12.0%, against 16.9% at GS.
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
| Period | BLK free cash flow margin | GS free cash flow margin |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.7399 |
| 2012 | - | 0.3489 |
| 2013 | - | 0.1122 |
| 2014 | - | -0.2494 |
| 2015 | - | 0.2261 |
| 2016 | - | 0.1179 |
| 2017 | - | -0.7233 |
| 2018 | - | 0.2344 |
| 2019 | - | 0.4221 |
| 2020 | - | -0.5575 |
| 2021 | - | 0.0275 |
| 2022 | 0.2475 | 0.1047 |
| 2023 | 0.214 | -0.3222 |
| 2024 | 0.2304 | -0.286 |
| 2025 | 0.1467 | -0.8102 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's free cash flow margin is 12.9%, against -62.7% at GS.
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
| Year | BLK Capex | GS Capex | BLK Stock pay | GS Stock pay |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.0411 | - | 0.0989 |
| 2012 | - | 0.0281 | - | 0.0386 |
| 2013 | - | 0.0206 | - | 0.0589 |
| 2014 | - | 0.0196 | - | 0.0604 |
| 2015 | - | 0.0542 | - | 0.0672 |
| 2016 | - | 0.093 | - | 0.0686 |
| 2017 | - | 0.0973 | - | 0.054 |
| 2018 | - | 0.218 | - | 0.05 |
| 2019 | - | 0.231 | - | 0.0552 |
| 2020 | - | 0.1416 | - | 0.0431 |
| 2021 | - | 0.0786 | - | 0.0396 |
| 2022 | 0.0298 | 0.0791 | 0.0396 | 0.0862 |
| 2023 | 0.0193 | 0.0501 | 0.0353 | 0.0451 |
| 2024 | 0.0125 | 0.0391 | 0.0369 | 0.0498 |
| 2025 | 0.0155 | 0.0354 | 0.054 | 0.0591 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's capex as a share of revenue is 1.5%, against 3.3% at GS.
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
Quality asks whether growth turns into real money: how much of each sale is kept as profit, whether that profit arrives as cash, and what return the business earns on the money invested in it.
BlackRock carries far less debt for its size, 0.22x of debt for each dollar of equity against 3.57x. The gap matters most in a bad year.
| Year | BLK Debt | GS Debt | BLK Cash | GS Cash |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | - | 243.62B | - | 72.67B |
| 2013 | - | 173.18B | - | 78.87B |
| 2014 | - | 234.65B | - | 75.03B |
| 2015 | - | 242.96B | - | 93.44B |
| 2016 | - | 201.53B | - | 121.71B |
| 2017 | - | 231.44B | - | 110.05B |
| 2018 | - | 264.65B | - | 130.55B |
| 2019 | - | 255.36B | - | 133.55B |
| 2020 | - | 266.35B | - | 155.84B |
| 2021 | - | 301.05B | 9.34B | 261.04B |
| 2022 | - | 308.10B | 7.43B | 241.82B |
| 2023 | 7.92B | 317.82B | 8.74B | 241.58B |
| 2024 | 12.31B | 312.34B | 12.76B | 182.09B |
| 2025 | 12.77B | 355.96B | 11.47B | 164.26B |
| 2026 | 12.74B | 437.87B | 10.49B | 187.27B |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's total debt is $12.7B, against $437.9B at GS.
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
| Period | BLK operating cash margin | GS operating cash margin |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.781 |
| 2012 | - | 0.377 |
| 2013 | - | 0.1328 |
| 2014 | - | -0.2297 |
| 2015 | - | 0.2803 |
| 2016 | - | 0.2109 |
| 2017 | - | -0.626 |
| 2018 | - | 0.4524 |
| 2019 | - | 0.6531 |
| 2020 | - | -0.416 |
| 2021 | - | 0.1061 |
| 2022 | 0.2773 | 0.1838 |
| 2023 | 0.2332 | -0.2721 |
| 2024 | 0.2429 | -0.2469 |
| 2025 | 0.1622 | -0.7747 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's operating cash margin is 14.4%, against -59.5% at GS.
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
| Period | BLK shareholders' equity | GS shareholders' equity |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | - | 75.72B |
| 2013 | - | 78.47B |
| 2014 | - | 82.80B |
| 2015 | - | 86.73B |
| 2016 | - | 86.89B |
| 2017 | - | 82.24B |
| 2018 | - | 90.19B |
| 2019 | - | 90.27B |
| 2020 | - | 95.93B |
| 2021 | 37.81B | 109.93B |
| 2022 | 37.88B | 117.19B |
| 2023 | 39.35B | 116.91B |
| 2024 | 47.49B | 122.00B |
| 2025 | 55.89B | 124.97B |
| 2026 | 57.61B | 122.74B |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's shareholders' equity is $57.6B, against $122.7B at GS.
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
Financial health asks one question: could the business get through a bad year? It looks at how much each company has borrowed, how easily its profits cover the interest, and how much cash it holds against the bills due soon.
BlackRock and Goldman Sachs pay the same dividend yield at today's prices, 2.0% each. A yield also rises when a share price falls, so it reads best beside how much of its profit each pays out.
| Period | BLK cash returned in dividends and buybacks | GS cash returned in dividends and buybacks |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 8.82B |
| 2012 | - | 5.73B |
| 2013 | - | 7.48B |
| 2014 | - | 6.92B |
| 2015 | - | 5.82B |
| 2016 | - | 7.78B |
| 2017 | - | 8.54B |
| 2018 | - | 5.10B |
| 2019 | - | 7.44B |
| 2020 | - | 4.26B |
| 2021 | - | 7.92B |
| 2022 | 5.32B | 7.18B |
| 2023 | 4.92B | 9.98B |
| 2024 | 5.03B | 12.50B |
| 2025 | - | 17.64B |
◌ Dividends plus share buybacks in each fiscal year. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→BLK's latest cash returned in dividends and buybacks is $5.0B (2024), against $17.6B at GS (2025).
Cash returned through buybacks and dividends, alongside the value of new shares issued to employees as compensation.
What good looks like. Returns comfortably larger than stock compensation, so the share count actually falls.
If it rises or falls. A company can announce billions in buybacks while issuing nearly as much stock to staff, and the two largely cancel. What reaches you is the net effect, which is why both bars are here rather than only the buyback.
| Period | BLK change in share count | GS change in share count |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | - | -0.0733 |
| 2013 | - | -0.032 |
| 2014 | - | -0.0528 |
| 2015 | - | -0.0309 |
| 2016 | - | -0.0512 |
| 2017 | - | -0.0598 |
| 2018 | - | -0.0462 |
| 2019 | - | -0.0377 |
| 2020 | - | -0.0405 |
| 2021 | - | -0.0125 |
| 2022 | - | 0.0065 |
| 2023 | -0.0114 | -0.0343 |
| 2024 | 0.006 | -0.0353 |
| 2025 | 0.061 | -0.048 |
◌ Split-adjusted. Below zero, the company has fewer shares than a year earlier. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→On the latest figures, BLK's change in share count is 5.4%, against -4.2% at GS.
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
| Period | BLK dividend per share | GS dividend per share |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 4.9758 |
| 2012 | - | 2.1042 |
| 2013 | - | 2.6061 |
| 2014 | - | 3.0727 |
| 2015 | - | 3.6655 |
| 2016 | - | 3.9209 |
| 2017 | - | 4.3241 |
| 2018 | - | 4.6386 |
| 2019 | - | 5.6032 |
| 2020 | - | 6.4835 |
| 2021 | - | 7.6588 |
| 2022 | 19.6142 | 10.282 |
| 2023 | 20.1385 | 12.1139 |
| 2024 | 20.4531 | 13.4802 |
| 2025 | - | 16.6152 |
◌ Split-adjusted. Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→BLK's latest dividend per share is $20.45 (2024), against $16.62 at GS (2025).
The dividend paid on one share each year, adjusted for splits so a share today compares with a share ten years ago.
What good looks like. A payment that rises steadily. A long unbroken run of rises is a management commitment as much as a number.
If it rises or falls. A cut is one of the strongest signals a board can send, because they know how it will be read. Check it against the payout chart: a rising dividend the business cannot cover is a promise borrowed against.
| Period | BLK dividend yield | GS dividend yield |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | - | 0.0286 |
| 2017 | - | 0.0226 |
| 2018 | - | 0.024 |
| 2019 | - | 0.0324 |
| 2020 | - | 0.0363 |
| 2021 | - | 0.0238 |
| 2022 | 0.0316 | 0.0342 |
| 2023 | 0.0314 | 0.0389 |
| 2024 | 0.0248 | 0.0301 |
| 2025 | - | 0.0248 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→BLK's latest dividend yield is 2.5% (2024), against 2.5% at GS (2025).
The dividend paid over the trailing twelve months as a percentage of the share price, at each quarter's (or year's) average price and at today's.
What good looks like. A yield in line with the company's own history. A yield far above it is usually the price falling, not the dividend rising.
If it rises or falls. Yield moves for two opposite reasons, and they are easy to confuse: a bigger dividend, or a cheaper share. The dividend-per-share chart above tells you which one happened.
| Period | BLK share of profit paid as dividends | GS share of profit paid as dividends |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | - | 0.6238 |
| 2012 | - | 0.1453 |
| 2013 | - | 0.1619 |
| 2014 | - | 0.1715 |
| 2015 | - | 0.2763 |
| 2016 | - | 0.2306 |
| 2017 | - | 0.4127 |
| 2018 | - | 0.1731 |
| 2019 | - | 0.2485 |
| 2020 | - | 0.247 |
| 2021 | - | 0.126 |
| 2022 | 0.5774 | 0.327 |
| 2023 | 0.5516 | 0.4919 |
| 2024 | 0.4869 | 0.315 |
| 2025 | - | 0.3072 |
◌ Annual views are each company's own fiscal years; the quarterly views line up on calendar quarters.
→BLK's latest share of profit paid as dividends is 48.7% (2024), against 30.7% at GS (2025).
The dividend as a share of profit, and as a share of free cash flow. Two views of the same question, because profit and cash are not the same thing.
What good looks like. Comfortably under 75% of profit and under 90% of free cash flow, which leaves room to keep paying through a weak year.
If it rises or falls. A payout ratio climbing towards 100% means the dividend is consuming everything the business earns, so the next bad year has to be funded by borrowing or by a cut. Above 100% it is already being funded from somewhere else.
Shareholder returns is the cash a company hands back to the people who own its shares, through dividends and by buying its own shares back, and whether the stock it issues to staff quietly undoes those buybacks.
Charts by TradingView
→BLK is still in an uptrend, above the cloud where recent trading settled, but that cloud has started to slope down, so the support beneath is weakening. GS is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling.
Trend reads the share price only: where it sits against its own long-term averages and how it has moved against the S&P 500. It says nothing about the business, which the other chapters cover.