
Developing small nuclear microreactors, pre-revenue.
NANO Nuclear Energy on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 4 of 36 checks passed.
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales, as it is not yet profitable): the price asks a lot of the business.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | under 3 years of history |
| – | Cheap on sales (under 2.5x) | ps not reported |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales (under 3x) | enterprise value unavailable |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | FCF yield -5.5% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value (under 14x EBITDA) | EBITDA unavailable |
| ✕ | Priced for less growth than its record suggests | not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on |
Growth is weak or inconsistent. The trend, not the story, is the problem.
| Period | Revenue ($) |
|---|---|
| Q2 2026 | 214,042 |
→No revenue history has been filed for NNE yet.
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
| Period | Net income ($) |
|---|---|
| Q1 2023 | -1.5M |
| Q2 2023 | -2.7M |
| Q4 2023 | -1.3M |
| Q1 2024 | -1.7M |
| Q2 2024 | -4.7M |
| Q3 2024 | -2.5M |
| Q4 2024 | -3.1M |
| Q1 2025 | -21.3M |
| Q2 2025 | -7.6M |
| Q3 2025 | -8.1M |
| Q4 2025 | -6.5M |
| Q1 2026 | -9.2M |
| Q2 2026 | -10.1M |
| 2023 | -6.3M |
| 2024 | -10.2M |
| 2025 | -40.1M |
→The company lost $40M in 2025, more than the $10M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| – | Outgrew its sector over the last twelve months | under 8 quarters of history |
| – | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | under 3 years of history |
| ✕ | Profits grew over the last twelve months | loss-making: TTM net income -$34M |
| ✕ | Profit growth beats its peers (3 years) | loss-making: TTM net income -$34M |
| – | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | under 3 years of history |
| – | Grew per share, not just in total | under 3 years of per-share history |
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
| Year | Cash from operations | Net income |
|---|---|---|
| 2,023 | -3.9M | -6.3M |
| 2,024 | -8.5M | -10.2M |
| 2,025 | -19.6M | -40.1M |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The company generated -$20M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
| Year | ROE | ROA | ROCE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2,023 | -2.1462 | -0.8641 | - |
| 2,024 | -0.1528 | -0.0757 | - |
| 2,025 | -0.1098 | -0.0661 | - |
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→NNE earns -7% on shareholders' capital. Return on capital employed isn't meaningful for this business model, so ROE carries the picture alone.
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| – | Better gross margins than the market | gross profit not tagged in its filings |
| – | Runs leaner than its sector (operating margin) | operating margin not reported |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income -$34M |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -7.5% vs 11.1% (sector 70th pct, n=99) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on its assets | -5.4% vs 5.0% |
| ✕ | Generates cash despite the loss | TTM operating cash flow -$24M on a net loss of $34M |
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
| Year | Total debt | Cash & investments |
|---|---|---|
| 2,022 | 0 | - |
| 2,023 | 0 | - |
| 2,024 | 0 | 123.3M |
| 2,025 | 0 | 577.5M |
| 2,026 | 0 | 580.0M |
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→The company holds $580M in cash against $0.00 of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
| Period | Current ratio |
|---|---|
| 2023 | 31.8155 |
| 2024 | 51.0361 |
| 2025 | 134.0637 |
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 79.2x of current assets for every dollar due within the year.
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
| Period | Equity ($) |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 3.0M |
| 2023 | 2.8M |
| 2024 | 130.1M |
| 2025 | 599.6M |
| 2026 | 616.0M |
→The company's own capital grew from $3M in 2023 to $616M (+21892%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 79.18 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.00 vs 1.00 |
| – | Debt trending the right way | under 5 years of balance-sheet history |
| ✓ | Earnings cover the interest | no debt |
| – | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | cash-flow statement unavailable |
| ✓ | Self-funding | 15.24 years of cash at current burn |
NNE returns nothing to shareholders yet. Every dollar stays in the business.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| – | Share count isn't climbing | under 3 years of share counts |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $8M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | pays no dividend and reports no buybacks |
Every reading points down: a falling trend, not a dip inside a rising one.
Chart by TradingView
→NNE is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. Both shorter readings point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
| ✕ | Price above the Kumo cloud | $12.88, below the cloud bottom of $18.55 |
| ✕ | Price above the Tenkan and the Kijun | $12.88 against the Tenkan (9 sessions) at $14.48 and the Kijun (26) at $14.78 |
| ✕ | Tenkan above the Kijun | Tenkan $14.48 below the Kijun $14.78, 28 sessions since they crossed |
| ✕ | The Senkou cloud ahead is rising | the Senkou spans already drawn for the next 26 sessions are falling |
| ✕ | Chikou above the price 26 sessions back | $12.88 against $17.36 26 sessions ago |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -75.6% vs 16.0% |
| Month | Buys ($) | Sells ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-03 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-04 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-05 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-06 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-07 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-08 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-09 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-10 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-11 | 0 | 0 |
| 2025-12 | 0 | 55.8M |
| 2026-01 | 0 | 69.8M |
| 2026-02 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-03 | 0 | 101,444 |
| 2026-04 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-05 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-06 | 0 | 43.1M |
| 2026-07 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-08 | 0 | 0 |
| 2026-09 | 0 | 9.2M |
| 2026-10 | 0 | 0 |
→Since March 2025, insiders sold $178M on the open market and bought nothing. Many sales are pre-scheduled diversification rather than a view on the price. A further 40 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 25,000 | $17.77 | $444,168 |
| 2026-09-02 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 141,931 | $17.48 | $2.48M |
| 2026-09-01 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 332,569 | $17.45 | $5.8M |
| 2026-09-01 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 25,000 | $17.44 | $436,065 |
| 2026-06-05 | Florent Heidet | Chief Technology Officer | SELL | 3,000 | $24.95 | $74,858 |
| 2026-06-05 | Seth Jason Berl | Director | SELL | 3,750 | $24.92 | $93,459 |
| 2026-06-03 | Diane Elizabeth Hare | Director | SELL | 2,228 | $26.31 | $58,616 |
| 2026-06-03 | Diane Elizabeth Hare | Director | SELL | 1,000 | $27.04 | $27,035 |
| 2026-06-03 | Diane Elizabeth Hare | Director | SELL | 100 | $27.84 | $2,784 |
| 2026-06-03 | Diane Elizabeth Hare | Director | SELL | 100 | $28.87 | $2,887 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | exercise | 70,000 | $3.00 | $210,000 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 46,145 | $26.18 | $1.21M |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 22,380 | $27.06 | $605,670 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 1,475 | $27.90 | $41,153 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 25,792 | $26.77 | $690,426 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 2,624 | $27.56 | $72,304 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 201 | $28.69 | $5,766 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 71 | $29.91 | $2,124 |
| 2026-06-03 | James John Walker | Chief Executive Officer | SELL | 25,000 | $26.04 | $650,950 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 312,553 | $26.30 | $8.22M |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 168,626 | $27.16 | $4.58M |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 10,035 | $27.83 | $279,301 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 3,571 | $28.98 | $103,478 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 5,215 | $29.91 | $155,981 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | exercise | 200,000 | $3.00 | $600,000 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 125,021 | $26.30 | $3.29M |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 67,451 | $27.16 | $1.83M |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 4,014 | $27.83 | $111,720 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 1,429 | $28.98 | $41,408 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 2,085 | $29.91 | $62,362 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 30,250 | $26.29 | $795,273 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 13,050 | $27.07 | $353,237 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 1,400 | $27.83 | $38,962 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 500 | $28.89 | $14,445 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jiang Yu | President and Chairman | SELL | 700 | $29.91 | $20,937 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | exercise | 20,000 | $3.00 | $60,000 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 20,000 | $26.08 | $521,660 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 15,223 | $26.84 | $408,646 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 1,761 | $27.59 | $48,593 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 174 | $28.81 | $5,013 |
| 2026-06-03 | Jaisun Garcha | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 57 | $29.91 | $1,705 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 312,553 | $26.30 | $8.22M |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 168,626 | $27.16 | $4.58M |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 10,035 | $27.83 | $279,301 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 3,571 | $28.98 | $103,478 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 5,215 | $29.91 | $155,981 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | exercise | 200,000 | $3.00 | $600,000 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 125,021 | $26.30 | $3.29M |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 67,451 | $27.16 | $1.83M |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 4,014 | $27.83 | $111,720 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 1,429 | $28.98 | $41,408 |
| 2026-06-03 | I Financial Ventures Group LLC | 10% owner | SELL | 2,085 | $29.91 | $62,362 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 42.9% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is Jiang Yu, with 15.3%. Insiders hold 31.8%.
| # | Holder | Stake | Shares | Value | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Jiang Yu10% owner · Form 4, 3 June 2026 | 15.32% | 8.2M | $106M | - |
| 2 | Jiang YuPresident and Chairman · Form 4, 1 September 2026 | 14.43% | 7.7M | $100M | - |
| 3 | Van Eck Associates CorpFund manager | 7.11% | 3.8M | $49M | +26.9% |
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Sign up freeSource: SEC Form 13F filings for the quarter to 30 June 2026, Schedules 13D and 13G, and Form 4. Shares on today's basis, value at the latest price.
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.