
Classified by the SEC under motor vehicles and passenger car bodies.
Rivian at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 7 of 29 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against RIVN's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales - not yet profitable) - you're paying up for what you get.
→At 3.6x sales, the market is paying about what it has typically paid RIVN's own 4-year median of 3.9x. Neither a bargain nor a stretch by its own standard.
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At 3.6x sales, the market is paying about what it has typically paid RIVN's own 4-year median of 3.9x. Neither a bargain nor a stretch by its own standard.
-16.3%FCF yield today
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-09-04), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages
→At -16.3%, the business is throwing off more cash per dollar of market value than its own 4-year median of -18.1% - the cheaper end of its history.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| ✓ | Cheaper than its own history (sales - not yet profitable) | 3.64 vs 3.90 |
| ✕ | Cheaper than its peers (sales) | 3.64 vs 2.50 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value vs sales | 3.50 vs 3.00 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Free cash flow yield above 3% | FCF yield -16.3% |
| – | Cheap on enterprise value | EBITDA at or below zero, or unavailable |
| – | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive 3-year earnings growth to compare against |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +14.2% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $5.4B in 2025, compounding +48% a year since 2022 That is 5 straight years of gains. The last twelve months (+14%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing. The trailing twelve months are already running at $5.9B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→The company lost $3.6B in 2025, less than the $4.7B it lost the year before. The losses are narrowing, but it is still burning shareholder money.
+8%revenue growth, FY 2025
→Revenue grew +8% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✓ | Outgrew its sector last year | 14.2% vs 12.1% (sector 70th pct, n=84) |
| ✓ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 48.1% vs 13.9% (sector 70th pct, n=72) |
| – | Profits grew last year | loss-making in both years |
| – | Profit growth beats its peers | earnings at or below zero at either end |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 14.2% vs 3y 48.1% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 150.1% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin widened 347 points to -67% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The company generated $-779M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of -79% on shareholders' capital (ROCE isn't meaningful for this business model).
→Of $5.4B in sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $3.6B underwater.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is capital spending, at 32% of revenue (research and development 31%, stock compensation 14%). That share has fallen since 2022, so the cost of competing is easing.
→RIVN's return on capital is negative at -32.1% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Better gross margins than peers | 7.5% vs 25.3% (sector 70th pct, n=68) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | -60.1% vs 8.2% (sector 70th pct, n=78) |
| ✕ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $-3.2B |
| ✕ | Earns well on shareholders' money | -63.1% vs 11.8% (sector 70th pct, n=74) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -30.7% vs 10.0% |
| – | Profits are cash, not accounting | loss-making or operating cash flow unavailable |
The balance sheet stress test: could RIVN survive a bad year?
The balance sheet carries real risk - read the checks before anything else.
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end
→The company holds $5.3B in cash against $4.4B of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
→The company's own capital shrank from $9.1B in 2023 to $5.1B (-44%). Buybacks or losses are drawing the buffer down - the distinction matters.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✓ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 2.10 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.87 vs 1.00 |
| ✕ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.87 now vs 0.06 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -13.28 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | -31.4% vs 9.8% (sector 70th pct, n=86) |
| ✕ | Self-funding | 1.52 years of cash at current burn |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
RIVN returns nothing to owners yet, and the share count keeps rising - every dollar stays in the business.
→17.1% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 29.9% over 3 years |
| ✕ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | no buybacks against $797M of stock compensation |
| ✕ | Hands cash back to owners | no dividends and no buybacks in the last twelve months |
| ✕ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | 0.00 returned, 0.0% of market value |
| – | Reliable payer, never cut | no dividend in the last three years |
| – | Dividend growing ahead of inflation | no dividend in the last three years |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
The market is voting against it right now - a falling trend on most measures.
Chart by TradingView
→RIVN is in a downtrend. The price is below the band where recent trading settled and that band is still falling, so nothing in the picture has turned yet. The last two weeks have ticked up, but the price is still below where it stood a month ago, so it is too early to call this a turn. The band drawn for the coming weeks turns downward partway through, so that support is set to thin out from there.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✕ | In an uptrend | 15.74 vs 16.29 |
| ✓ | Trend structure is healthy | 16.51 vs 16.29 |
| ✕ | Rising over 3 months | -3.7% vs 0.0% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | -3.7% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | 14.9% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -29.9% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→Insiders bought $1.0B against $3M of sales - net buying with their own money is the single most bullish signal insiders can send.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-20 | Claire Mcdonough | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 8,023 | $128,368 |
| 2026-08-18 | Claire Mcdonough | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 13,144 | $190,650 |
| 2026-08-15 | Robert J Scaringe | Chief Executive Officer | tax | 44,033 | $676,347 |
| 2026-08-15 | Claire Mcdonough | Chief Financial Officer | tax | 38,640 | $593,510 |
| 2026-08-15 | Michael John Callahan | Chief Administrative Officer | tax | 42,082 | $646,380 |
| 2026-08-15 | Sreela Venkataratnam | Chief Accounting Officer | tax | 20,297 | $311,762 |
| 2026-07-20 | Aidan N. Gomez | Director | tax | 343 | $5,985 |
| 2026-07-06 | Karen Boone | Director | SELL | 20,000 | $400,000 |
| 2026-06-18 | Aidan N. Gomez | Director | tax | 8,926 | $145,137 |
| 2026-06-03 | Claire Mcdonough | Chief Financial Officer | SELL | 8,022 | $144,396 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.