Sells AI analytics software, mostly to US defense and government agencies.
$2.16close as of 2026-10-16
-71.9% over 1Y · 88.7 points behind the S&P 500
BBAIS&P 500 (SPY), rebased to BBAI's first close
“Can Ask Sage’s higher margins and growing backlog translate into lower losses as BigBear.ai accelerates spending?”
Editorial note · updated 2026-10-08
The TenQ Radar
BigBear.ai in 36 checks
BigBear.ai on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 3 of 36 checks passed.
The BigBear.ai story
What drives BigBear.ai, what its price assumes and what could change the story, written from its own filings.
Ask Sage drives growth. In the quarter to June 2026, Ask Sage helped lift revenue 13% to $36.7 million and gross margin to 32.8%.
Costs absorb the gains. Despite higher gross margin, adjusted EBITDA worsened to $(11.6) million in the quarter to June 2026 from $(8.5) million a year earlier.
Liquidity provides flexibility. BigBear.ai reported $409.8 million in total available cash and investments at June 30, 2026, supporting potential acquisitions despite continued operating losses.
Q2 '26 · quarter to 30 June 2026 · reported 30 July 2026 · Earnings release ↗
Revenue$37M+13%vs 2025+6.7%vs Q1
Earnings-$26M+$203Mvs 2025+$31Mvs Q1
What the release says
Highlights
BigBear.ai reported Q2 2026 revenue of $36.7 million, a 13% increase year-over-year, driven by revenue from Ask Sage’s GenAI Platforms and Products.
Gross margin expanded significantly to 32.8% in Q2 2026 from 25.0% in Q2 2025, primarily due to higher margin contributions from Ask Sage’s GenAI offerings.
The company secured more than 20 new contract wins in the quarter and increased its backlog by 9% to $269.6 million between December 31, 2025 and June 30, 2026.
BigBear.ai ended the quarter with $409.8 million in total available cash and investments, positioning the company for potential M&A activity.
What management expects
The company affirmed its full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $135 million to $165 million.
Management stated they are on track for a target of 17% revenue growth for the year.
Key risks
A significant portion of BigBear.ai’s business depends on sales to the public and government sector, and the company may not receive or maintain government contracts or the full benefit of such contracts, which could impact revenue and growth.
The U.S. government’s budget deficit, national debt, or inability to complete its budget process could result in government shutdowns or funding reductions, affecting the company’s contracts and financial results.
Revenue is concentrated among a limited number of customers, and the loss, reduction, or delayed spending of any major customer could adversely affect sales, margins, and financial position.
The company has a limited operating history as a combined entity, making it difficult to forecast future results, and it may not be able to sustain its revenue growth rate or achieve profitability.
AI summary of the company's filings, every number checked against them · 8 October 2026 · Sources: earnings release, 10-K, 10-Q
Earnings alerts
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I
Value
●●●●●●0/6
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales, as it is not yet profitable): the price asks a lot of the business.
-no history
7.9xown 5-year median 3.5x
-7.0%cash earned per $ of price
-whole-business multiple
Valuation history
Is BBAI's P/E, P/S or P/B high or low against its own past?
Year
P/E
P/S
P/B
2026
-
7.8685
1.3445
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→At 7.9x sales, the market is paying +124% more than BBAI's own 5-year median of 3.5x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What this measures
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
Free cash flow yield
What is BBAI's free cash flow yield at today's price?
Period
FCF yield
2021
-0.0199
2022
-0.0912
2023
-0.0575
2024
-0.0881
2025
-0.0221
2026
-0.0702
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Every dollar of market value currently buys -7.0% of annual free cash flow, more than its 5-year median of -5.7% - the cash is cheaper than usual.
What this measures
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on
II
Growth
●●●●●●0/6
Growth is weak or inconsistent. The trend, not the story, is the problem.
-13.7%vs the year before
-6.3%compound annual
-net income growth
-compound annual
Revenue history
Is BBAI's revenue growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Revenue ($)
Q1 2021
35.6M
Q2 2021
36.3M
Q3 2021
40.2M
Q4 2021
33.5M
Q1 2022
36.4M
Q2 2022
37.6M
Q3 2022
40.7M
Q4 2022
40.4M
Q1 2023
42.2M
Q2 2023
38.5M
Q3 2023
34.0M
Q4 2023
40.6M
Q1 2024
33.1M
Q2 2024
39.8M
Q3 2024
41.5M
Q4 2024
43.8M
Q1 2025
34.8M
Q2 2025
32.5M
Q3 2025
33.1M
Q4 2025
27.3M
Q1 2026
34.4M
Q2 2026
36.7M
2019
73.6M
2021
145.6M
2022
155.0M
2023
155.2M
2024
158.2M
2025
127.7M
→Revenue reached $128M in 2025, compounding -6% a year since 2022 though the pace has cooled. The trailing twelve months are already running at $132M, ahead of the last full year.
What this measures
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
Profit history
Is BBAI's net profit growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Net income ($)
Q1 2021
-2.4M
Q2 2021
-3.2M
Q3 2021
-3.1M
Q4 2021
-114.8M
Q1 2022
-18.8M
Q2 2022
-56.8M
Q3 2022
-16.1M
Q1 2023
-31.2M
Q2 2023
-18.8M
Q3 2023
2.9M
Q4 2023
-23.5M
Q1 2024
-127.8M
Q2 2024
-14.4M
Q3 2024
-15.1M
Q4 2024
-138.2M
Q1 2025
-62.0M
Q2 2025
-228.6M
Q3 2025
2.5M
Q4 2025
-5.8M
Q1 2026
-56.8M
Q2 2026
-25.7M
2019
6.2M
2021
-123.6M
2022
-111.4M
2023
-70.7M
2024
-295.5M
2025
-293.9M
→The company lost $294M in 2025, less than the $296M it lost the year before. The losses are narrowing, but it is still burning shareholder money.
What this measures
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Growth rate
How fast are BBAI's revenue and earnings growing?
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2021 earnings -2078% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
Year
Revenue growth
Earnings growth
2,021
0.9773
-
2,022
0.0648
-
2,023
0.001
-
2,024
0.0198
-
2,025
-0.1932
-
2026
-0.1372
-
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Revenue fell 14% over the twelve months to 2026-06-30, against an average of +17% a year over 2021-2025.
What this measures
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Per-share growth
Are BBAI's revenue and free cash flow per share growing?
Year
Revenue per share ($)
Free cash flow per share ($)
2,021
1.3604
-0.1909
2,022
1.2139
-0.3891
2,023
1.0397
-0.1227
2,024
0.6774
-0.1652
2,025
0.3558
-0.1184
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Revenue per share reached $0.36 in 2025, compounding -34% a year against -6% for BBAI as a whole. Dilution absorbed about 27.3 points of that growth. The trailing twelve months are running at $0.37 a share. Free cash flow per share stands at $-0.12.
What this measures
Revenue and free cash flow, each divided by the number of shares in issue and adjusted for splits so old and new years compare honestly. Both lines rising means each share owns more of the business's sales and cash.
What good looks like. Both lines rising, and revenue per share growing at least as fast as the company's total revenue, which the answer compares. Faster means buybacks are working for you; slower means new shares are absorbing part of the growth.
If it rises or falls. This is the line that actually reaches you. A company can grow revenue every year and still shrink your slice by issuing shares faster than it grows.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
27.9%kept after direct costs
-117.9%kept after running costs
-14.1%profit on shareholders' money
-20.0%against a 10% cost of capital
-operating cash ÷ net income
Margins
What profit margin does BBAI keep on each sale?
Year
Gross
Operating
Net
2,019
0.2376
0.0867
0.0848
2,021
0.234
-0.539
-0.8487
2,022
0.2774
-0.713
-0.7184
2,023
0.2617
-0.2516
-0.4554
2,024
0.2858
-0.8432
-1.8678
2,025
0.2231
-1.6754
-2.3021
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating margin compressed 96 points to -168% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
What this measures
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
Earnings quality
Does BBAI's operating cash flow keep up with its profit?
Year
Cash from operations
Net income
2,019
4.1M
6.2M
2,021
-19.8M
-123.6M
2,022
-48.9M
-111.4M
2,023
-18.3M
-70.7M
2,024
-38.1M
-295.5M
2,025
-42.0M
-293.9M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The company generated -$42M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
What this measures
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
Returns on capital
What return on equity and on capital does BBAI earn?
Year
ROE
ROA
ROCE
2,019
0.7003
-
-
2,021
-0.9501
-0.3223
-0.2505
2,022
-1.3145
-0.5702
-0.6928
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→ROE of -14% and ROCE of -20% sit close together, so the returns come from the business itself rather than from borrowing.
What this measures
Two returns side by side: on shareholders' capital (ROE), and on all the capital in the business including debt (ROCE).
What good looks like. Both comfortably above roughly 10%, and close together. A wide gap means borrowing, not operations, is doing the work.
If it rises or falls. A high ROE built on debt looks like quality until the debt has to be refinanced. ROCE is the harder number to flatter, which is why both are shown.
Income waterfall
Where does BBAI's revenue go, from sales to net profit?
Step
Amount ($)
Revenue, last 12m
131.6M
Gross profit
36.7M
Operating income
-155.2M
Net income
-85.8M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Of $132M over the twelve months to 2026-06-30 sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $86M underwater.
What this measures
One year of revenue, with each major cost taken out in the order the income statement takes it, ending at net profit.
What good looks like. No single step swallowing a surprising share, and a bottom line that survives all of them.
If it rises or falls. The largest step is where the business really spends its money, and it is the one to watch year to year: a step that grows faster than revenue is what margin compression looks like before it reaches the margin chart.
Cash conversion
How much of each sale does BBAI turn into free cash flow?
Period
FCF margin
2019
0.0557
2021
-0.1403
2022
-0.3205
2023
-0.118
2024
-0.244
2025
-0.3327
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
What this measures
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
Spending intensity
How much of its revenue does BBAI spend on capex, R&D and stock pay?
Year
Capex % of rev
R&D % of rev
Stock comp % of rev
2,019
0.0002
0.0015
0.0014
2,021
0.0044
0.0414
0.4164
2,022
0.005
0.0541
0.0701
2,023
0
0.0324
0.1203
2,024
0.0031
0.0687
0.1335
2,025
0.0041
0.1312
0.1827
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is stock compensation, at 18% of revenue (research and development 13%, capital spending 0%). That share has risen since 2022, so the cost of competing is climbing.
What this measures
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
Customer concentrationInsight
How much of BigBear.ai's revenue comes from its largest customers?
→BigBear.ai's five largest customers made up 59% of its revenue in FY2025. The largest alone was 16%, down from 22% in FY2021.
Source: SEC filings: customer concentration notes (XBRL) · as at 2026-06-30
Return on capital employed
Is BBAI's return on capital above what its capital costs?
Period
Return on capital employed
2021
-0.2505
2022
-0.6928
2023
-0.2984
2024
-0.9475
2025
-0.3017
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→BBAI's return on capital is negative at -30.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
What this measures
The same return as the card above, but every filed year, against a 10% line that stands in for what capital costs.
What good looks like. Years above the line, and a trend that is flat or rising rather than drifting down towards it.
If it rises or falls. A business earning above its cost of capital creates value by growing; one earning below it destroys value by growing. The 10% line is a convention, not a law, so read the distance from it rather than the crossing.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
TTM operating cash flow -$72M on a net loss of $86M
IV
Financial health
●●●●●●3/6
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
0.02xborrowed vs owned
5.7xnear-term bills coverage
-17xearnings ÷ interest bill
$36Mcash plus short-term investments
Debt & cash
How much debt does BBAI carry, and do its profits cover the interest?
Year
Total debt
Cash & investments
2,018
-
380,000
2,019
-
1.6M
2,020
107.0M
9.7M
2,021
194.6M
68.9M
2,022
194.4M
12.6M
2,023
157.4M
32.6M
2,024
136.2M
50.1M
2,025
107.0M
87.1M
2,026
16.6M
36.3M
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→The company holds $36M in cash against $17M of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
What this measures
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
Near-term liquidity
Do BBAI's current assets cover the bills due within a year?
Period
Current ratio
2021
2.9447
2022
1.5194
2023
0.9228
2024
0.4619
2025
1.7817
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 5.7x of current assets for every dollar due within the year. That is stronger than in 2021.
What this measures
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
Interest cover
How many times over can BBAI's operating profit pay its interest bill?
Period
Interest cover (x)
2019
50.252
2021
-10.1098
2022
-7.6563
2023
-1.5691
2024
-5.2022
2025
-11.8071
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating profit does not cover the interest bill (-16.9x). Cover was 50.3x in 2019, so the margin of safety has narrowed.
What this measures
Operating profit divided by interest expense - how many times over the year's earnings could pay the year's interest.
What good looks like. High and steady. Five times is a common floor; comfortably above it means the debt is being carried, not merely serviced.
If it rises or falls. It falls when profit falls or when borrowing costs rise, and a company can look safe on the level while the direction is telling you otherwise.
Cash conversion
How much of BBAI's revenue arrives as operating cash?
Period
Operating cash flow / revenue
2019
0.056
2021
-0.1359
2022
-0.3156
2023
-0.118
2024
-0.2409
2025
-0.3286
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→BBAI's operations consumed cash rather than produced it over the last twelve months. Down from 5.6% in 2019.
What this measures
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
Shareholders' equity
Is BBAI's shareholder equity (book value) growing?
Period
Equity ($)
2018
6.2M
2019
11.7M
2020
100.4M
2021
159.7M
2022
9.8M
2023
-30.0M
2024
-3.7M
2025
611.9M
2026
770.3M
→The company's own capital grew from -$30M in 2023 to $770M. The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What this measures
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
BBAI returns nothing to shareholders yet, and the share count keeps rising. Every dollar stays in the business.
+0.00%bought back, TTM, over market value
-at the current rate
$0.00dividends plus buybacks
$20Mlast 12m, dilutes the buybacks
+302.0%since 2021 (split-adjusted)
Capital returned vs stock comp
Do BBAI's buybacks and dividends outweigh the stock it issues to staff?
Year
Buybacks
Dividends
Stock comp
2,021
-
-
60.6M
2,022
100.9M
-
10.9M
2,023
-
-
18.7M
2,024
-
-
21.1M
→BBAI returned no cash to shareholders in the latest filed year: everything is being retained or reinvested.
What this measures
Cash returned through buybacks and dividends, alongside the value of new shares issued to employees as compensation.
What good looks like. Returns comfortably larger than stock compensation, so the share count actually falls.
If it rises or falls. A company can announce billions in buybacks while issuing nearly as much stock to staff, and the two largely cancel. What reaches you is the net effect, which is why both bars are here rather than only the buyback.
Shareholder yield
What is BBAI's shareholder yield from dividends and buybacks?
Year
Buyback yield
Dividend yield
2,021
0
-
2,022
0.1852
-
2,023
0
-
2,024
0
-
→BBAI handed back 0.0% of its market value over the last twelve months, below the 2% this check asks for. All of it is the dividend; BBAI is not buying back stock.
What this measures
Dividends and buybacks, each as a percentage of what the company was worth that year. The dollar chart says how much came back; this says how much came back for the price.
What good looks like. A total that clears a couple of percent and holds. Which half it comes from matters less than whether it is sustained.
If it rises or falls. A yield rises when the price falls as readily as when the payout grows, so read a jump beside the price chart before treating it as generosity.
Share count change (split-adjusted)
Is BBAI's share count rising or falling?
Year
Share-count change
2,022
0.1933
2,023
0.1687
2,024
0.5653
2,025
0.5359
→The share count grew 53.6% in 2025, averaging 42.3% a year over three years. Your slice of the company shrinks by that much each year unless earnings grow faster.
What this measures
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
Dilution against what it bought
Has BBAI's revenue per share grown faster than its share count?
Change since 2021. The gap between the lines is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted weighted averages.
Year
Share count, change since 2021
Revenue per share, change since 2021
2,021
0
0
2,022
0.1933
-0.1077
2,023
0.3946
-0.2357
2,024
1.183
-0.5021
2,025
2.353
-0.7384
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly view, revenue per share is the trailing twelve months over that quarter's diluted count
→BBAI issued 235% more shares from 2021 to 2025 and revenue per share still fell 74%. On this measure the new shares have not paid for themselves.
What this measures
The share count and revenue per share over the same years, both indexed to 100 at the start, so the two lines can be compared directly.
What good looks like. The per-share line above the share-count line: whatever the company did with its shares, more business ended up behind each one.
If it rises or falls. Issuing shares is not automatically bad. It is bad when the money raised buys less growth than the dilution cost, which is exactly what the gap between these two lines shows.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
→BBAI is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. Both shorter readings point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
Are BBAI's insiders buying or selling shares with their own money?
Month
Buys ($)
Sells ($)
2023-11
0
385,132
2023-12
96,048
231,029
2024-01
0
0
2024-02
0
0
2024-03
0
60.0M
2024-04
0
0
2024-05
0
0
2024-06
209,999
0
2024-07
0
0
2024-08
0
0
2024-09
0
0
2024-10
0
3.5M
2024-11
0
36.1M
2024-12
0
198.0M
2025-01
0
505,826
2025-02
0
0
2025-03
0
147.7M
2025-04
0
78.5M
2025-05
0
644,557
2025-06
0
0
2025-07
0
0
2025-08
0
238,993
2025-09
0
0
2025-10
0
0
2025-11
0
133,870
2025-12
0
35,296
2026-01
0
0
2026-02
0
0
2026-03
0
387,660
2026-04
0
0
2026-05
0
104,875
2026-06
0
0
2026-07
0
0
2026-08
0
0
2026-09
0
0
2026-10
0
0
→Since November 2023, insiders bought $306,047 and sold $527M on the open market, a net sale of $526M. A further 136 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
What this measures
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
The record
Who did what, exactly?
Date
Insider
Role
Type
Shares
Price
Value
2026-10-14
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
34,050
$2.39
$81,380
2026-09-30
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
6,991
$2.65
$18,526
2026-09-30
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
9,020
$2.65
$23,903
2026-09-30
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
21,523
$2.65
$57,036
2026-06-30
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
10,069
$3.60
$36,248
2026-06-30
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
9,019
$3.60
$32,468
2026-06-30
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
23,562
$3.60
$84,823
2026-06-06
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
9,759
$4.20
$40,988
2026-05-22
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
10,000
$4.33
$43,300
2026-05-08
Dorothy D Hayes
Director
SELL
15,000
$4.11
$61,575
2026-04-01
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
10,665
$3.52
$37,541
2026-04-01
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
13,649
$3.52
$48,044
2026-04-01
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
39,424
$3.52
$138,772
2026-03-31
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
4,324
$3.04
$13,145
2026-03-31
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
5,606
$3.04
$17,042
2026-03-31
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
22,392
$3.04
$68,072
2026-03-16
Pamela Joyce Braden
Director
SELL
80,000
$4.00
$320,000
2026-03-06
Dorothy D Hayes
Director
SELL
17,000
$3.98
$67,660
2026-03-02
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
18,725
$3.96
$74,151
2026-03-02
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
15,075
$3.96
$59,697
2026-03-02
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
46,449
$3.96
$183,938
2026-01-15
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
48,691
$6.26
$304,806
2025-12-31
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
6,625
$5.50
$36,438
2025-12-31
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
5,945
$5.50
$32,698
2025-12-31
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
4,663
$5.50
$25,647
2025-12-07
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
1,227
$6.82
$8,368
2025-12-04
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
5,000
$7.06
$35,296
2025-11-18
Dorothy D Hayes
Director
SELL
22,000
$6.09
$133,870
2025-09-30
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
6,625
$6.46
$42,798
2025-09-30
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
5,945
$6.46
$38,405
2025-09-30
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
3,132
$6.46
$20,233
2025-08-27
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
11,978
$5.35
$64,082
2025-08-26
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
2
$5.40
$11
2025-08-14
Dorothy D Hayes
Director
SELL
30,000
$5.83
$174,900
2025-06-30
Sean Raymond Ricker
Chief Financial Officer
tax
6,524
$5.84
$38,100
2025-06-30
Carolyn Blankenship
General Counsel and Secretary
tax
5,945
$5.84
$34,719
2025-06-30
Kevin Mcaleenan
Chief Executive Officer
tax
3,113
$5.84
$18,180
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
VIII
Ownership
informational
39.0%on Form 13F, 30 June 2026
15.4%officers, directors, founders
39.7%together
2last 12 months
Top holders
Who owns BigBear.ai stock?
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 39.0% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is Bbai Ultimate Holdings, LLC, with 13.4%. Insiders hold 15.4%.
#
Holder
Stake
Shares
Value
Change
1
Bbai Ultimate Holdings, LLCDirector · Form 4, 22 January 2025
13.39%
64.2M
$139M
-
2
BlackRock, Inc.Fund manager
8.46%
40.6M
$88M
+12.8%
3
Vanguard Capital Management LLCFund manager
4.42%
21.2M
$46M
+10.1%
4
Geode Capital Management, LLCFund manager
2.59%
12.4M
$27M
+17.0%
5
State Street CorpFund manager
2.54%
12.2M
$26M
+16.0%
6
Vanguard Portfolio Management LLCFund manager
2.25%
10.8M
$23M
+8.2%
7
UBS Group AGFund manager
2.02%
9.7M
$21M
-4.6%
8
Van Eck Associates CorpFund manager
1.71%
8.2M
$18M
+574.1%
9
MIRAE ASSET GLOBAL ETFS HOLDINGS Ltd.Fund manager
1.21%
5.8M
$12M
-8.0%
10
Citadel Advisors LLCFund manager
1.12%
5.4M
$12M
-26.6%
11
Northern Trust CorpFund manager
0.90%
4.3M
$9M
+16.8%
12
Charles Schwab Investment Management IncFund manager
0.84%
4.0M
$9M
+11.5%
13
Goldman Sachs Group IncFund manager
0.73%
3.5M
$8M
-9.8%
14
Vanguard Fiduciary Trust CoFund manager
0.68%
3.2M
$7M
+13.0%
15
Captrust Financial AdvisorsFund manager
0.53%
2.5M
$5M
+29.2%
16
Amanda LongChief Executive Officer · Form 4, 6 January 2025
0.51%
2.4M
$5M
-
17
Morgan StanleyFund manager
0.50%
2.4M
$5M
+27.9%
18
First Trust Advisors LPFund manager
0.45%
2.2M
$5M
-10.4%
19
National Bank of CanadaFund manager
0.45%
2.1M
$5M
+110.6%
20
Susquehanna International Group, LLPFund manager
0.44%
2.1M
$5M
+19.7%
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Source: Periodic Transaction Reports filed with the Clerk of the House under the STOCK Act, within 45 days of a trade. Amounts are the ranges the law asks for. The Senate's reports are not included yet. All Congress trades
Where does this list come from?
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.