Builds quantum computers and sells access to them through its cloud.
$11.78close as of 2026-10-16
-70.9% over 1Y · 87.7 points behind the S&P 500
QBTSS&P 500 (SPY), rebased to QBTS's first close
“Can D-Wave turn its $35.5 million bookings into revenue while containing the cost of developing both quantum platforms?”
Editorial note · updated 2026-10-08
The TenQ Radar
D-Wave Quantum in 36 checks
D-Wave Quantum on the TenQ Radar: value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here: 5 of 36 checks passed.
The D-Wave Quantum story
What drives D-Wave Quantum, what its price assumes and what could change the story, written from its own filings.
Orders precede revenue. Bookings reached $35.5 million in the first half of 2026, including a $20 million system sale awaiting revenue recognition, while revenue was $5.9 million.
Production use expands. Cloud revenue from production applications reached $1.3 million in the first half of 2026, or 37.3% of quantum computing as a service revenue, versus 9.8% a year earlier.
Development costs climb. Operating expenses reached $55.0 million in the quarter to June 2026, up 93% from a year earlier, against revenue of $3.1 million.
Q2 '26 · quarter to 30 June 2026 · reported 6 August 2026 · Earnings release ↗
Revenue$3M-0.6%vs 2025+7.6%vs Q1
Earnings-$48M+$119Mvs 2025-$30Mvs Q1
What the release says
Highlights
D-Wave reported first half 2026 bookings of $35.5 million, up over 1,120% year over year, including a $20 million system sale that will be recognized as revenue in future quarters.
The company expanded its customer base, with over 100 individual customers recognized in the first half of 2026 and more than 50% of these being commercial enterprises; Forbes Global 2000 customers accounted for 48.5% of first half revenue, up from 7.5% a year ago.
D-Wave announced technical milestones, including a peer-reviewed breakthrough in dual-rail architecture for gate-model quantum computing and a roadmap targeting a 100,000-qubit annealing system by 2031 and a 100-logical-qubit gate-model system by 2032.
The company completed the acquisition of Quantum Circuits, Inc. in January 2026, which contributed to a 33% decrease in cash and marketable investment securities to $546.2 million as of June 30, 2026, primarily due to the cash consideration for the acquisition.
What management expects
Approximately 57% of the $40.7 million in remaining performance obligations as of June 30, 2026 is expected to be recognized as revenue in the next 12 months, and 72% is expected to be recognized as revenue in the next two years, with the remainder to be recognized thereafter.
D-Wave expects its multi-chip approach to enable the next generation Advantage3 system to reach 100,000 qubits by 2031, with an intermediate 20,000-qubit system available in 2029.
Key risks
D-Wave's ability to generate revenue depends on continued development and commercialization of both annealing and gate-model quantum computers, and delays or failures in achieving technical milestones could materially impact its business and financial results.
The company has a history of significant losses and expects to incur substantial expenses and negative cash flows for the foreseeable future, which could affect its ability to raise capital, expand operations, or continue as a going concern.
D-Wave's business relies on successful integration of Quantum Circuits, and failure to integrate operations, systems, and personnel could adversely affect its operations and financial condition.
The company is dependent on third-party suppliers and cloud providers for critical components and services, and any disruption, supply chain issue, or change in service levels could negatively impact its ability to deliver products and services.
AI summary of the company's filings, every number checked against them · 8 October 2026 · Sources: earnings release, 10-K, 10-Q
Earnings alerts
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I
Value
●●●●●●0/6
Expensive against its own history and its sector (judged on sales, as it is not yet profitable): the price asks a lot of the business.
-no history
350.1xown 5-year median 132.9x
-2.7%cash earned per $ of price
-whole-business multiple
Valuation history
Is QBTS's P/E, P/S or P/B high or low against its own past?
Year
P/E
P/S
P/B
2026
-
350.0948
4.0161
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→At 350.1x sales, the market is paying +163% more than QBTS's own 5-year median of 132.9x. Expectations are elevated, so more has to go right to justify the price.
What this measures
What the market has paid for each dollar of earnings, sales or book value, every year, with today's multiple as the last point and the median drawn across.
What good looks like. There is no good level. What matters is the distance from the company's own history, and whether the business has changed enough to justify it.
If it rises or falls. A multiple above its own median means the market expects more than it used to, so more has to go right. Below the median means the opposite, and the question is whether the pessimism is deserved. A multiple can also fall because earnings rose, which is the good way.
Free cash flow yield
What is QBTS's free cash flow yield at today's price?
Period
FCF yield
2021
-0.0292
2022
-0.0479
2023
-0.3916
2024
-0.1365
2025
-0.0142
2026
-0.0274
◌ 2026 = at the latest close (2026-10-16), over the trailing twelve months; earlier years are annual averages · the last point is at the latest close (2026-10-16); earlier quarters use that quarter's average price over the trailing twelve months to it
→Every dollar of market value currently buys -2.7% of annual free cash flow, less than its 5-year median of -4.8% - you are paying up for the same cash.
What this measures
Free cash flow divided by market value: the cash the business generates for every dollar you pay for it. The inverse of a price-to-cash multiple.
What good looks like. A yield at or above the company's own history, and one that compares well with what cash is worth elsewhere.
If it rises or falls. The yield rises when cash grows or the price falls, so a high yield is either a bargain or a warning about the cash continuing. Read it beside the cash conversion chart, which shows whether the cash is holding up.
What does “Value” actually mean?
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
not profitable: no free cash flow or earnings for the price to rest on
II
Growth
●●●●●●2/6
Growth is weak or inconsistent. The trend, not the story, is the problem.
-44.2%vs the year before
+50.8%compound annual
-net income growth
-compound annual
Revenue history
Is QBTS's revenue growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Revenue ($)
Q2 2021
1.1M
Q3 2021
1.3M
Q1 2022
1.7M
Q2 2022
1.4M
Q3 2022
1.7M
Q4 2022
2.4M
Q1 2023
1.6M
Q2 2023
1.7M
Q3 2023
2.6M
Q4 2023
2.9M
Q1 2024
2.5M
Q2 2024
2.2M
Q3 2024
1.9M
Q4 2024
2.3M
Q1 2025
15.0M
Q2 2025
3.1M
Q3 2025
3.7M
Q4 2025
2.8M
Q1 2026
2.9M
Q2 2026
3.1M
2020
5.2M
2021
6.3M
2022
7.2M
2023
8.8M
2024
8.8M
2025
24.6M
→Revenue reached $25M in 2025, compounding +51% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The last twelve months (-44%) ran below that pace, so growth is slowing. The trailing twelve months are already running at $12M, behind the last full year.
What this measures
The money customers paid, before any costs are taken out. Each bar is one quarter or, on the annual view, a full financial year; the last annual bar may be the trailing twelve months, which the footnote marks.
What good looks like. Growth that repeats, rather than one strong year carrying the chart, and a trailing twelve months keeping pace with the last full year.
If it rises or falls. Revenue is the hardest line to flatter, so a rise is the most trustworthy kind of growth. A fall puts pressure on every margin below it, because costs rarely come down as quickly as sales do.
Revenue by productInsight
Where does D-Wave Quantum's revenue come from?
dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
→D-Wave Quantum makes 60% of its revenue from QCaa S ($2M), and that share has fallen from 69% in 2024Q1: the mix is shifting away from QCaa S.
Source: SEC filings - segment disclosures (XBRL notes) · as at 2026-06-30
Profit history
Is QBTS's net profit growing?
◌ dashed quarter = Q4 derived from the annual filing minus Q1, Q2 and Q3 (the SEC never receives a Q4 report)
Period
Net income ($)
Q2 2021
-4.7M
Q3 2021
-4.2M
Q1 2022
-11.6M
Q2 2022
-12.3M
Q3 2022
-11.7M
Q4 2022
-18.2M
Q1 2023
-24.4M
Q2 2023
-26.2M
Q3 2023
-16.1M
Q4 2023
-16.0M
Q1 2024
-17.3M
Q2 2024
-17.8M
Q3 2024
-22.7M
Q4 2024
-86.1M
Q1 2025
-5.4M
Q2 2025
-167.3M
Q3 2025
-140.0M
Q4 2025
-42.3M
Q1 2026
-18.4M
Q2 2026
-48.0M
2020
-22.0M
2021
-41.0M
2022
-53.7M
2023
-82.7M
2024
-143.9M
2025
-355.1M
→The company lost $355M in 2025, more than the $144M it lost the year before. The losses are widening - check the Health chapter for how long the cash lasts.
What this measures
What is left after every cost, including tax and interest. The bottom line of the income statement.
What good looks like. Profit growing at least as fast as revenue, which means the business is keeping more of each sale as it gets bigger.
If it rises or falls. Profit can move for reasons revenue cannot explain - a one-off charge, a tax change, a write-down - so a single sharp year is worth checking against the margin chart before reading it as a trend.
Growth rate
How fast are QBTS's revenue and earnings growing?
Year
Revenue growth
Earnings growth
2,021
0.2169
-
2,022
0.1424
-
2,023
0.221
-
2,024
0.0079
-
2,025
1.7854
-
2026
-0.4422
-
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly views, growth is the trailing twelve months against the twelve before, or a quarter against the same quarter a year earlier
→Revenue fell 44% over the twelve months to 2026-06-30, against an average of +47% a year over 2021-2025.
What this measures
How much revenue and earnings changed against the year before - the trailing twelve months against the twelve before them at each quarter, or one point per fiscal year. It is the speed of the business, not its size.
What good looks like. The earnings line above the revenue line: profits growing faster than sales means each new dollar of sales arrives more profitably than the last.
If it rises or falls. A high growth rate off a small base is easy and gets harder every year, so slowing growth in a large business is normal rather than a warning. Earnings falling while revenue grows is the combination worth understanding: costs are rising faster than sales.
Per-share growth
Are QBTS's revenue and free cash flow per share growing?
Year
Revenue per share ($)
Free cash flow per share ($)
2,020
0.0406
-0.2361
2,021
0.0501
-0.2918
2,022
0.06
-0.3815
2,023
0.0635
-0.4437
2,024
0.0459
-0.2329
2,025
0.0765
-0.2361
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Revenue per share reached $0.08 in 2025, compounding +8% a year against +51% for QBTS as a whole. Dilution absorbed about 42.3 points of that growth. The trailing twelve months are running at $0.04 a share. Free cash flow per share stands at $-0.24.
What this measures
Revenue and free cash flow, each divided by the number of shares in issue and adjusted for splits so old and new years compare honestly. Both lines rising means each share owns more of the business's sales and cash.
What good looks like. Both lines rising, and revenue per share growing at least as fast as the company's total revenue, which the answer compares. Faster means buybacks are working for you; slower means new shares are absorbing part of the growth.
If it rises or falls. This is the line that actually reaches you. A company can grow revenue every year and still shrink your slice by issuing shares faster than it grows.
What does “Growth” actually mean?
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
Profitability is thin or negative. The growth isn't turning into money yet.
64.2%kept after direct costs
-1372.9%kept after running costs
-28.1%profit on shareholders' money
-15.1%against a 10% cost of capital
-operating cash ÷ net income
Margins
What profit margin does QBTS keep on each sale?
Year
Gross
Operating
Net
2,020
0.8227
-6.0983
-4.2572
2,021
0.7213
-6.2029
-6.5254
2,022
0.5925
-8.2891
-7.4867
2,023
0.5277
-9.1968
-9.4445
2,024
0.6302
-8.7485
-16.2999
2,025
0.8259
-4.0822
-14.441
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating margin widened 421 points to -408% since 2022. The bottom line is still negative: costs below the operating line eat what is left.
What this measures
What survives at three points on the way down the income statement: after the direct cost of the product, after the cost of running the company, and after everything.
What good looks like. Margins that hold or widen as the business grows. The level itself varies enormously by industry, so the shape over time tells you more than the number.
If it rises or falls. A widening margin means pricing power or costs under control. A compressing one means the opposite, and it compounds: on large revenue, two points of margin is a great deal of profit.
Earnings quality
Does QBTS's operating cash flow keep up with its profit?
Year
Cash from operations
Net income
2,020
-29.3M
-22.0M
2,021
-34.8M
-41.0M
2,022
-45.2M
-53.7M
2,023
-60.6M
-82.7M
2,024
-42.6M
-143.9M
2,025
-72.0M
-355.1M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The company generated -$72M of operating cash in 2025. With no profit to compare against, cash generation is the number that matters here.
What this measures
Reported profit against the cash the business actually collected from operating. Profit is an accounting judgement; cash is not.
What good looks like. Cash at or above profit, year after year. Depreciation and other non-cash charges usually push cash above profit, so roughly 100% or more is healthy.
If it rises or falls. Cash falling behind profit for more than a year is the classic early warning: the sales are booked but the money has not arrived, and it shows up in receivables and inventory. For a lender the comparison behaves differently, because a growing loan book consumes cash.
Income waterfall
Where does QBTS's revenue go, from sales to net profit?
Step
Amount ($)
Revenue, last 12m
12.4M
Gross profit
8.0M
Operating income
-170.6M
Net income
-248.7M
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Of $12M over the twelve months to 2026-06-30 sales, nothing reaches the bottom line - the journey from revenue to profit ends $249M underwater.
What this measures
One year of revenue, with each major cost taken out in the order the income statement takes it, ending at net profit.
What good looks like. No single step swallowing a surprising share, and a bottom line that survives all of them.
If it rises or falls. The largest step is where the business really spends its money, and it is the one to watch year to year: a step that grows faster than revenue is what margin compression looks like before it reaches the margin chart.
Cash conversion
How much of each sale does QBTS turn into free cash flow?
Period
FCF margin
2020
-5.8184
2021
-5.8248
2022
-6.364
2023
-6.9916
2024
-5.0696
2025
-3.0847
→Free cash flow is negative, so no share of revenue is currently converting to spare cash. Every sales dollar is being reinvested or consumed.
What this measures
Free cash flow as a share of revenue: how much of each dollar of sales survives both costs and capital spending.
What good looks like. A steady or rising share. Asset-light businesses convert far more than manufacturers, so compare a company with itself.
If it rises or falls. Falling conversion while revenue grows means growth is being bought with capital spending or working capital, which is fine while it lasts and painful when it stops.
Spending intensity
How much of its revenue does QBTS spend on capex, R&D and stock pay?
Year
Capex % of rev
R&D % of rev
Stock comp % of rev
2,020
0.1426
3.9556
0.5793
2,021
0.2825
4.0454
0.277
2,022
0.059
4.4753
1.2776
2,023
0.0666
4.325
2.5027
2,024
0.2386
3.9991
1.7742
2,025
0.1571
2.0634
0.9215
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is research and development, at 206% of revenue (stock compensation 92%, capital spending 16%). That share has fallen since 2022, so the cost of competing is easing.
What this measures
Capital spending, research and development, and stock compensation, each as a share of revenue. The three ways a business pays to keep its position.
What good looks like. A share that is stable or falling while revenue grows, which means the cost of competing is not rising with the business.
If it rises or falls. Rising intensity means each new dollar of sales is getting more expensive to win. Falling intensity can mean efficiency, or it can mean under-investment that shows up years later.
Customer concentrationInsight
How much of D-Wave Quantum's revenue comes from its largest customers?
→D-Wave Quantum's largest customer made up 67% of its revenue in FY2025, up from 15% in FY2021.
Source: SEC filings: customer concentration notes (XBRL) · as at 2026-06-30
Return on capital employed
Is QBTS's return on capital above what its capital costs?
Period
Return on capital employed
2020
-1.3205
2021
-2.0477
2022
-5.4514
2023
-1.6743
2024
-0.455
2025
-0.1122
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→QBTS's return on capital is negative at -11.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
What this measures
The same return as the card above, but every filed year, against a 10% line that stands in for what capital costs.
What good looks like. Years above the line, and a trend that is flat or rising rather than drifting down towards it.
If it rises or falls. A business earning above its cost of capital creates value by growing; one earning below it destroys value by growing. The 10% line is a convention, not a law, so read the distance from it rather than the crossing.
What does “Quality” actually mean?
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
TTM operating cash flow -$111M on a net loss of $249M
IV
Financial health
●●●●●●3/6
Financially sound overall, with one or two things worth watching.
0.03xborrowed vs owned
20.5xnear-term bills coverage
-42xearnings ÷ interest bill
$546Mcash plus short-term investments
Debt & cash
How much debt does QBTS carry, and do its profits cover the interest?
Year
Total debt
Cash & investments
2,019
-
8.3M
2,020
1.6M
21.3M
2,021
30.5M
9.5M
2,022
33.0M
7.1M
2,023
63.9M
41.3M
2,024
30.1M
178.0M
2,025
35.8M
884.5M
2,026
34.9M
546.2M
◌ each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→The company holds $546M in cash against $35M of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
What this measures
Total borrowings against cash on hand, with debt as a multiple of shareholders' equity, and how many times profit covers the interest bill.
What good looks like. Interest covered comfortably - roughly eight times or more - and debt that is not a large multiple of equity.
If it rises or falls. Debt is only a problem when it has to be repaid or refinanced in a bad year, so cover matters more than the amount. Rising debt with rising cover is a business borrowing to grow; rising debt with falling cover is the combination that ends badly.
Near-term liquidity
Do QBTS's current assets cover the bills due within a year?
Period
Current ratio
2020
2.4746
2021
1.5329
2022
0.8681
2023
4.1819
2024
6.1383
2025
42.379
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end · each quarterly point is the balance sheet at that quarter end
→Near-term liquidity is comfortable: 20.5x of current assets for every dollar due within the year. That is stronger than in 2020.
What this measures
Current assets over current liabilities: what the company can turn into cash within a year against what it owes within a year.
What good looks like. Comfortably above 1.0, and not falling year after year. Below 1.0 means near-term bills exceed near-term resources, which is normal for some business models and a warning in others.
If it rises or falls. Inventory and receivables build it up; short-term borrowing and payables pull it down. A retailer that turns stock over quickly can run lower than a manufacturer and be perfectly sound.
Interest cover
How many times over can QBTS's operating profit pay its interest bill?
Period
Interest cover (x)
2020
-5.9857
2021
-22.5394
2022
-12.8336
2024
-19.816
2025
-25.0107
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→Operating profit does not cover the interest bill (-41.7x). Cover was -6.0x in 2020, so the margin of safety has narrowed.
What this measures
Operating profit divided by interest expense - how many times over the year's earnings could pay the year's interest.
What good looks like. High and steady. Five times is a common floor; comfortably above it means the debt is being carried, not merely serviced.
If it rises or falls. It falls when profit falls or when borrowing costs rise, and a company can look safe on the level while the direction is telling you otherwise.
Cash conversion
How much of QBTS's revenue arrives as operating cash?
Period
Operating cash flow / revenue
2020
-5.6758
2021
-5.5423
2022
-6.305
2023
-6.925
2024
-4.831
2025
-2.9276
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · each quarterly point is the trailing twelve months to that quarter end, so the last one is the current figure
→QBTS's operations consumed cash rather than produced it over the last twelve months. Down from -567.6% in 2020.
What this measures
Operating cash flow as a share of revenue: of every dollar sold, how much reached the bank before capital spending.
What good looks like. A high share, holding up or improving. It is the clearest sign that reported profit is real.
If it rises or falls. It falls when customers take longer to pay or stock builds up, and it can stay high while profit falls - which is usually the more reassuring of the two.
Shareholders' equity
Is QBTS's shareholder equity (book value) growing?
Period
Equity ($)
2019
-103.9M
2020
20.8M
2021
-18.4M
2022
-29.5M
2023
-24.5M
2024
62.6M
2025
852.2M
2026
1.08B
→The company's own capital grew from -$24M in 2023 to $1.1B. The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
What this measures
What would be left for shareholders if every asset were sold at its book value and every debt repaid. Book value, in other words.
What good looks like. Equity growing as retained profits build up, unless the company is deliberately returning more than it earns.
If it rises or falls. Equity falls for two very different reasons: buybacks, which return money to you, and losses, which do not. The distinction is the whole story, and negative equity means liabilities now exceed assets, which makes debt-to-equity and return on equity meaningless rather than alarming.
What does “Health” actually mean?
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
QBTS returns nothing to shareholders yet, and the share count keeps rising. Every dollar stays in the business.
-bought back, TTM, over market value
-at the current rate
-dividends plus buybacks
$31Mlast 12m, dilutes the buybacks
+171.9%since 2020 (split-adjusted)
Share count change (split-adjusted)
Is QBTS's share count rising or falling?
Year
Share-count change
2,021
-0.0143
2,022
-0.0454
2,023
0.1533
2,024
0.3923
2,025
0.6718
→The share count grew 67.2% in 2025, averaging 40.6% a year over three years. Your slice of the company shrinks by that much each year unless earnings grow faster.
What this measures
The yearly change in the number of shares in issue, adjusted for splits so the years compare. A bar below zero is a falling share count, usually from buybacks; above zero, new shares were issued.
What good looks like. A flat or falling share count. Falling means each share you hold owns a little more of the business every year.
If it rises or falls. A rising count divides the same business among more owners, so your slice shrinks unless profits grow faster. This is the most direct chart on the page: it is your ownership, measured.
Dilution against what it bought
Has QBTS's revenue per share grown faster than its share count?
Change since 2020. The gap between the lines is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted weighted averages.
Year
Share count, change since 2020
Revenue per share, change since 2020
2,020
0
0
2,021
-0.0143
0.2345
2,022
-0.0591
0.4774
2,023
0.0852
0.5641
2,024
0.5109
0.1322
2,025
1.5259
0.8864
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year · on the quarterly view, revenue per share is the trailing twelve months over that quarter's diluted count
→QBTS's share count rose 153% from 2020 to 2025 while revenue per share grew 89%. Holders are further ahead than before, though the gain per share is smaller than the growth in the business.
What this measures
The share count and revenue per share over the same years, both indexed to 100 at the start, so the two lines can be compared directly.
What good looks like. The per-share line above the share-count line: whatever the company did with its shares, more business ended up behind each one.
If it rises or falls. Issuing shares is not automatically bad. It is bad when the money raised buys less growth than the dilution cost, which is exactly what the gap between these two lines shows.
Why compare buybacks with stock compensation?
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
→QBTS is in a downtrend: the price is below the cloud where recent trading settled and that cloud is still falling. Both shorter readings point down as well, so nothing here disagrees with the downtrend.
How the trend above is worked out
The trend read is the daily Ichimoku picture, the same indicator drawn on the chart above. Five names, and what each one is: the TENKAN is the midpoint of the last 9 sessions' high and low, the fast line; the KIJUN is the same over 26 sessions, the slow one; the two SENKOU spans are midpoints drawn 26 sessions into the FUTURE, and the band between them is the KUMO cloud - because it is drawn forward, the support for the coming weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming; the CHIKOU is today's close compared with the close 26 sessions back. A trend confirms itself in that order and the checks follow it: price clears the cloud, holds above both lines, the Tenkan crosses above the Kijun, the cloud ahead turns up, and the Chikou stands higher than the price a month ago. Six of six therefore means all of that at once; a price sitting inside the cloud, or below its own lines, cannot get there. The last check is the one Ichimoku cannot answer - whether the S&P 500 did better over 12 months (252 sessions), measured on the SPY ETF with dividends included, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price. Our figures are the last close we hold, refreshed every trading night; the chart is live. None of this says anything about the business, and it is not advice.
Are QBTS's insiders buying or selling shares with their own money?
Month
Buys ($)
Sells ($)
2023-11
0
0
2023-12
0
0
2024-01
0
0
2024-02
0
0
2024-03
0
0
2024-04
0
0
2024-05
0
47,379
2024-06
0
97,648
2024-07
0
0
2024-08
0
0
2024-09
0
0
2024-10
0
0
2024-11
0
0
2024-12
0
85.4M
2025-01
0
90.2M
2025-02
0
0
2025-03
0
0
2025-04
0
0
2025-05
0
30.0M
2025-06
0
4.6M
2025-07
0
0
2025-08
0
5.7M
2025-09
0
2.8M
2025-10
0
2.6M
2025-11
1,795
34.6M
2025-12
0
33.1M
2026-01
0
1.9M
2026-02
0
28,671
2026-03
0
553,622
2026-04
0
65,548
2026-05
0
10.5M
2026-06
0
26.2M
2026-07
0
52,042
2026-08
0
0
2026-09
0
19,801
2026-10
0
0
→Since November 2023, insiders bought $1,795 and sold $329M on the open market, a net sale of $329M. A further 132 transactions were grants, option exercises or tax withholding, which say nothing either way.
What this measures
Open-market buys and sells by the company's own officers and directors, from their Form 4 filings. Grants, option exercises and shares withheld for tax are excluded, because they are compensation rather than decisions.
What good looks like. Buying with their own money, which is the one insider action that is hard to explain away.
If it rises or falls. Selling is weak evidence: insiders sell to diversify, to buy houses, and on pre-scheduled plans set months ahead. Buying is stronger evidence, because there is only one reason to do it. The absence of any buying over a long stretch is itself worth noticing.
The record
Who did what, exactly?
Date
Insider
Role
Type
Shares
Price
Value
2026-10-15
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
4,066
$12.03
$48,914
2026-10-15
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
tax
52,320
$12.03
$629,410
2026-10-15
Gregory Golkov
Acting CFO & SVP, Finance
tax
15,859
$12.03
$190,784
2026-10-15
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
3,180
$12.03
$38,255
2026-09-15
Gregory Golkov
Acting CFO & SVP, Finance
tax
1,132
$16.83
$19,052
2026-09-15
Stanley T Black
Exec. Vice President & CISO
tax
1,535
$16.83
$25,834
2026-09-15
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
1,544
$16.83
$25,986
2026-09-15
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
3,191
$16.83
$53,705
2026-09-08
John D Dilullo
Director
SELL
1,100
$18.00
$19,801
2026-08-17
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
4,042
$21.17
$85,569
2026-08-17
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
23,850
$21.17
$504,905
2026-07-20
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
SELL
3,070
$16.95
$52,042
2026-07-14
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
tax
52,320
$18.66
$976,291
2026-07-14
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
tax
8,607
$18.66
$160,607
2026-07-14
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
3,180
$18.66
$59,339
2026-07-14
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
4,066
$18.66
$75,872
2026-06-15
Rohit Ghai
Director
SELL
13,518
$26.41
$357,055
2026-06-15
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
100,000
$25.75
$2.58M
2026-06-15
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
100,000
$25.68
$2.57M
2026-06-15
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
tax
10,584
$23.37
$247,348
2026-06-15
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
3,191
$23.37
$74,574
2026-06-15
Stanley T Black
Exec. Vice President & CISO
tax
1,535
$23.37
$35,873
2026-06-15
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
1,544
$23.37
$36,083
2026-06-12
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
46,043
$24.01
$1.11M
2026-06-09
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
70
$26.54
$1,858
2026-06-08
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
exercise
474,395
$0.91
$431,699
2026-06-08
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
exercise
213,232
$0.85
$180,394
2026-06-08
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
SELL
687,627
$26.13
$17.97M
2026-06-08
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
50,979
$26.24
$1.34M
2026-06-05
John D Dilullo
Director
SELL
7,850
$24.43
$191,809
2026-06-02
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
2,908
$31.00
$90,148
2026-05-22
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
exercise
207,926
$0.92
$191,292
2026-05-22
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
exercise
120,826
$0.85
$102,219
2026-05-22
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
328,752
$27.70
$9.11M
2026-05-21
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
SELL
40,000
$25.01
$1M
2026-05-20
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
SELL
23,025
$18.98
$436,934
2026-05-13
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
2,459
$22.35
$54,959
2026-05-13
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
23,850
$22.35
$533,048
2026-05-13
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
tax
18,542
$22.35
$414,414
2026-04-20
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
SELL
3,070
$21.35
$65,548
2026-04-13
Sophie C Ames
Exec. Vice President & CHRO
tax
3,180
$14.25
$45,315
2026-04-13
Alan E Baratz
President & CEO
tax
33,778
$14.25
$481,337
2026-04-13
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
tax
8,607
$14.25
$122,650
2026-04-13
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
tax
4,066
$14.25
$57,941
2026-03-16
Rohit Ghai
Director
SELL
10,000
$17.62
$176,168
2026-03-13
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
SELL
2,532
$17.63
$44,634
2026-03-13
John M. Markovich
Chief Financial Officer
SELL
10,706
$17.63
$188,723
2026-03-05
John D Dilullo
Director
SELL
8,000
$18.01
$144,098
2026-02-13
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
SELL
1,451
$19.76
$28,671
2026-01-14
Diane Nguyen
EVP, Chief Legal Officer & GC
SELL
4,519
$28.06
$126,814
Why do the transaction types matter so much?
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.
VIII
Ownership
informational
53.5%on Form 13F, 30 June 2026
7.6%officers, directors, founders
37.0%together
Top holders
Who owns D-Wave Quantum stock?
Fund managers filing Form 13F held 53.5% of the company's shares on 30 June 2026. The largest holder is BlackRock, Inc., with 9.0%. Insiders hold 7.6%.
#
Holder
Stake
Shares
Value
Change
1
BlackRock, Inc.Fund manager
8.98%
33.1M
$390M
+9.9%
2
Vanguard Portfolio Management LLCFund manager
5.96%
22.0M
$259M
+5.9%
3
Public Sector Pension Investment Board10% owner · Form 4, 10 January 2025
5.52%
20.4M
$240M
-
4
Vanguard Capital Management LLCFund manager
4.32%
15.9M
$188M
+0.6%
5
UBS Group AGFund manager
3.15%
11.6M
$137M
+18.0%
6
Geode Capital Management, LLCFund manager
2.51%
9.3M
$109M
+2.5%
7
State Street CorpFund manager
2.45%
9.0M
$106M
+6.6%
8
Clear Street Group Inc.Fund manager
1.68%
6.2M
$73M
+8.7%
9
Norges BankFund manager
1.21%
4.5M
$53M
New
10
Bank of America CorpFund manager
1.18%
4.3M
$51M
+11.8%
11
Northern Trust CorpFund manager
0.91%
3.4M
$40M
+8.0%
12
Charles Schwab Investment Management IncFund manager
0.89%
3.3M
$39M
+1.5%
13
Alan E BaratzPresident & CEO · Form 4, 15 October 2026
0.87%
3.2M
$38M
-
14
UNICOM Systems, Inc.Fund manager
0.85%
3.1M
$37M
+0.0%
15
Morgan StanleyFund manager
0.79%
2.9M
$34M
+24.5%
16
Defiance ETFs, LLCFund manager
0.79%
2.9M
$34M
+751.8%
17
Penserra Capital Management LLCFund manager
0.77%
2.9M
$34M
+82.2%
18
JPMorgan Chase & CoFund manager
0.74%
2.7M
$32M
+100.7%
19
Goldman Sachs Group IncFund manager
0.73%
2.7M
$32M
-37.3%
20
Vanguard Fiduciary Trust CoFund manager
0.70%
2.6M
$31M
+2.4%
The full list of top holders is free with an account
Source: SEC Form 13F filings for the quarter to 30 June 2026, Schedules 13D and 13G, and Form 4. Shares on today's basis, value at the latest price.
Where does this list come from?
Fund managers with more than $100 million in US stocks report their holdings every quarter on Form 13F, up to 45 days after the quarter ends, so the fund figures are as of the last quarter end. A fund family reports as one manager, and funds together can report more than 100%: shares lent to short sellers are bought again by other funds, and both report them. Anyone holding more than 5% of a class files a Schedule 13D or 13G, and officers and directors report what they hold on Form 4 after every trade, so those rows carry their own dates. Short positions are not reported anywhere. A stake is the holder's shares as a share of all the company's shares, with other share classes converted at their market value.