
Runs the second US ride-hailing network.
Lyft at a glance: how it scores on value, growth, quality, health, shareholder returns and trend. The fuller the shape, the stronger the company. Behind each axis are six pass-or-fail checks from its filings, spelled out in the chapters below. Point at an axis to see them.
The business itself is the question here - 14 of 36 checks passed.
What you pay today for what the business produces, measured against LYFT's own history and its peers, never a universal rule.
Expensive against its own history and its sector - you're paying up for what you get.
Value asks what you pay for each dollar of earnings, sales or cash the business produces. A high multiple isn't automatically bad - fast growers earn theirs - but a price far above the company's own history means the market expects a lot to go right. We compare each multiple to the company's own past and to its sector, never to a universal rule.
| – | Cheaper than its own history (earnings) | no multiple history |
| ✓ | Earnings yield beats a long bond (4%) | 41.0% vs 4.0% |
| – | Better cash yield than its own history | under 3 years of cash-flow history |
| – | Free cash flow yield above 3% | free cash flow or market cap unavailable |
| ✕ | Cheap on enterprise value | 208.98 vs 14.00 (peer median) |
| ✕ | Price isn't outrunning growth | no positive three-year earnings growth behind the price |
What the company has actually reported - is it selling more, and is more of it becoming profit?
Growing, but with caveats - revenue +15.0% over the last year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Revenue reached $5.9B in 2025, compounding +16% a year since 2022 and the pace is picking up. The trailing twelve months are already running at $6.5B, ahead of the last full year.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter, not a full fiscal year
→Net income was $2.8B in 2025, against $23M the year before. Earnings per share moved +3009% over the last twelve months.
+10%revenue growth, FY 2025
Shown separately because they would flatten the axis: 2025 earnings +12382% - rebounds off a collapsed prior year.
→Revenue grew +10% in 2025. Each point is one year's change against the year before.
Growth here is what the company has actually reported to the SEC - not a forecast. We look at the last year, the three-year pace, whether growth is speeding up or slowing down, and whether it's been consistent rather than one lucky year. Hatched bars are fourth quarters we derived from annual filings (companies file a full-year 10-K rather than a Q4 report).
| ✕ | Outgrew its sector last year | 15.0% vs 15.8% (sector 70th pct, n=404) |
| ✕ | Sustained growth beats its sector (3 years) | 15.6% vs 17.6% (sector 70th pct, n=373) |
| ✓ | Profits grew last year | 3008.6% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Profit growth beats its peers | profitable now after losses three years ago |
| ✕ | Growth is speeding up, not slowing | 1y 15.0% vs 3y 15.6% |
| ✓ | Grew per share, not just in total | 31.4% vs 0.0% |
Whether the growth makes real money - margins, returns on capital, and whether profits turn into cash.
Profitability is thin or negative - the growth isn't turning into money yet.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Operating margin widened 35 points to -3% since 2022. After everything, 48 cents of each sales dollar reaches net profit. LYFT doesn't tag a gross-profit line in its filings, so the chart starts at operating margin.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→Only 42% of reported profit becomes operating cash. Accounting profit is running ahead of cash collection, which is worth watching in the receivables and inventory lines.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→ROE of 87% but ROCE of only -4% - a chunk of those shareholder returns is manufactured with leverage, not operations.
→20 cents of every sales dollar became free cash in 2025, up 26 points since 2022 - the best conversion in its filed history.
◌ 2026 = trailing twelve months to the latest filed quarter (2026-06-30), not a full fiscal year
→The biggest claim on each sales dollar is research and development, at 8% of revenue (stock compensation 5%). That share has fallen since 2022, so the cost of competing is easing.
→LYFT's return on capital is negative at -4.2% in 2025. The capital in the business is not yet earning anything back.
Quality asks whether the growth makes real money. Margins show how much of each sale survives costs; return on equity shows what shareholders earn on their capital; and the profit-to-cash comparison catches companies whose accounting profits never turn into actual cash.
| ✕ | Better gross margins than peers | 43.6% vs 74.4% (sector 70th pct, n=245) |
| ✕ | Runs leaner than peers (operating margin) | -1.8% vs 11.0% (sector 70th pct, n=398) |
| ✓ | Actually profitable | TTM net income $2.9B |
| ✓ | Earns well on shareholders' money | 94.8% vs 13.3% (sector 70th pct, n=346) |
| ✕ | Earns a real return on the capital it employs | -2.8% vs 10.0% |
| ✕ | Profits are cash, not accounting | 0.42 vs 0.80 |
The balance sheet stress test: could LYFT survive a bad year?
The balance sheet carries real risk - read the checks before anything else.
◌ 2026 = the latest balance sheet (2026-06-30), not a fiscal year-end
→The company holds $1.8B in cash against $1.0B of debt - a net-cash balance sheet, which means a bad year is an inconvenience rather than a threat.
→The company's own capital grew from $542M in 2023 to $3.0B (+458%). The business is building book value rather than consuming it.
Health asks one question: can the business survive a bad year? We check whether near-term bills are covered, whether debt is modest and shrinking, whether earnings comfortably pay the interest, and - for loss-makers - how many years of cash are left at the current burn rate.
| ✕ | Comfortable near-term liquidity | 0.59 vs 1.50 |
| ✓ | Debt isn't dominating | 0.35 vs 1.00 |
| ✓ | Debt trending the right way | debt/equity 0.35 now vs 0.53 five years ago |
| ✕ | Earnings cover the interest | -5.91 vs 5.00 |
| ✕ | Converts sales to cash better than its sector | 18.3% vs 23.1% (sector 70th pct, n=410) |
| – | Self-funding | free cash flow unavailable |
How much cash actually flows back to owners - dividends, buybacks, whether the share count truly falls, and whether what is handed back is affordable.
What comes back to owners is thin or stretched - read the checks before counting on it.
→$500M returned last year against $322M of stock issued to employees - the returns outweigh the dilution 1.6-to-1.
→1.0% more shares last year - your stake was diluted by that much.
Both lines start at 100 in 2019, so the gap between them is what each share gained or lost. Share counts are split-adjusted.
→LYFT issued +84% more shares from 2019 to 2025 and revenue per share still fell -7%. On this measure the new shares have not paid for themselves.
A company can trumpet billions in buybacks while quietly issuing nearly as much stock to employees. What matters to you is the net effect: is the share count actually falling? If not, the 'return' is mostly recycling.
| ✕ | Share count isn't climbing | shares up 17.7% over 3 years |
| ✓ | Buybacks outpace the stock issued to staff | $700M bought back vs $310M of stock compensation |
| – | What it hands back fits inside its cash flow | free cash flow unavailable or negative |
| ✓ | Meaningful yield to owners (dividends and buybacks) | $700M returned, 11.1% of market value |
| ✕ | Buybacks are sustained, not one-off | $700M bought back in the last twelve months, 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
| ✕ | Buybacks growing | $700M vs 0.00 the year before; no dividend |
What the market is doing about all of the above. This is price behaviour, not a fact about the business - read it as the market's current opinion, scored on six checks like every other chapter. The market is the S&P 500, measured by the SPY ETF with dividends included, over 3 months (63 trading sessions) and 12 months (252).
Mixed signals from the market - some trends up, some rolling over.
Chart by TradingView
→LYFT is in a clear uptrend. The price is above the band where recent trading settled, and that band is still rising underneath it, so the floor keeps moving up. The last two weeks are running ahead of the last month and the price is above where it stood a month ago, so the shorter-term readings back the trend up.
The trend read comes from the daily Ichimoku picture, a standard trend indicator, translated out of its jargon. It builds a band from the midpoints of the last 9, 26 and 52 sessions' highs and lows - in effect, the range where recent trading has settled - and draws that band 26 sessions into the future. Price above the band is an uptrend, below it a downtrend, inside it no trend. Because the band is drawn forward, the support for the next few weeks is already fixed and a change of its direction can be seen coming. We also compare the last two weeks against the last month, and today's price against where it stood a month ago. None of this says anything about the business; it describes the price only, and it is not advice. Where a check says 'the S&P 500', the comparison is with the SPY ETF including dividends, on the same adjusted basis as the stock's own price: short means 3 months, 63 trading sessions; long means 12 months, 252.
| ✓ | Trading above its cloud | 1.00 vs 0.50 |
| ✓ | Long-term trend structure is healthy | 16.20 vs 15.96 |
| ✓ | Rising over 3 months | 22.5% vs 0.0% |
| ✓ | Beating the S&P 500 over 3 months | 22.5% vs 4.7% |
| ✕ | Beating the S&P 500 over 12 months | -0.4% vs 20.0% |
| ✕ | Not in a deep hole | -31.9% from its 52-week high |
What the people running the company do with their own shares - reported to the SEC within two days, classified so pay-plumbing doesn't masquerade as conviction.
→No open-market buying, and $3M of selling across 6 months. Selling alone is a weak signal - much of it is pre-scheduled - but the absence of buying tells you no insider saw the price as a bargain.
| Date | Insider | Role | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | Lindsay Catherine Llewellyn | SEE REMARKS | SELL | 13,204 | $219,711 |
| 2026-08-27 | David Lawee | Director | SELL | 4,613 | $79,951 |
| 2026-08-27 | Stephen W. Hope | CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER | SELL | 5,982 | $103,724 |
| 2026-08-27 | Jill Beggs | Director | SELL | 2,307 | $40,004 |
| 2026-08-25 | Janey Whiteside | Director | SELL | 5,480 | $96,886 |
| 2026-08-24 | Erin Brewer | CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER | SELL | 15,000 | $264,399 |
| 2026-08-20 | Lindsay Catherine Llewellyn | SEE REMARKS | tax | 23,161 | $403,696 |
| 2026-08-20 | Stephen W. Hope | CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER | tax | 29,507 | $514,307 |
| 2026-08-20 | Erin Brewer | CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER | tax | 186,735 | $3M |
| 2026-08-07 | Janey Whiteside | Director | SELL | 14,220 | $241,740 |
Most insider filings are not trades: stock grants, option exercises and tax withholding are how executives get paid, and gifts are estate planning. The signal lives in open-market transactions - a buy means an insider chose to spend their own cash on the stock. Sells are murkier: many are pre-scheduled 10b5-1 plans set months in advance. That's why the chart counts only open-market activity, and the table labels every row.